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1 Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research: An 
Overview
Adrian Sawyer, David Massey and Lynne Oats1
This book principally contains a collection of papers that have their 
origins in a Tax Research Network (TRN) conference paper, revised 
or extended, from the 2018 and 2019 TRN Conferences, hosted by the 
University of Birmingham and Preston University, respectively. The 
conferences were sponsored by the Chartered Institute of Taxation and 
ICAEW Charitable Trusts. 
This book is the fourth volume in the series. The first volume was 
published in September 2003 by Routledge (both in print & eBook), 
under the editorship of Andy Lymer and David Salter. It contained 12 
chapters largely drawing upon papers presented at the 2000 TRN Con-
ference hosted by the University of Birmingham. Volume 2 was pub-
lished in March 2016 by Fiscal Publications (both in print & eBook), with 
the editors being David Salter and Lynne Oats. Once again it contained 
12 chapters, this time drawing upon papers presented at the 2013 TRN 
Conference hosted by the University of Exeter. The most recent contri-
bution, Volume 3, was published in September 2018 by Fiscal Publica-
tions (both in print & eBook), under the editorship of Emer Mulligan 
& Lynne Oats. Similar to the earlier volumes, it contained 12 chapters, 
with the contributions drawing upon papers presented at the 2015 and 
2016 TRN Conferences, hosted by Hull University and Roehampton 
University, respectively. 
The current volume comprises eight chapters (including this over-
view), and is somewhat smaller than the earlier volumes. This is in part 
a consequence of the delay in finalising this volume, which has been 
1 Adrian Sawyer is Professor of Taxation in the Business School at the University of 
Canterbury. David Massey is a Lecturer in Taxation in the University of Central 
Lancashire’s School of Business and Enterprise. Lynne Oats is a Professor of Taxation and 
Accounting in the Business School at the University of Exeter. 
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made even more challenging by the continual pressure on academics 
to publish their work in highly ranked journals rather than in other for-
mats such as book chapters. We are indebted to the current contributors 
who have supported this volume and shown considerable resilience 
and patience throughout the process. We sincerely hope this will not be 
the last volume in this series. 
For those that are not familiar with the TRN, it is an interdisciplinary 
group of academics and practitioners from the UK and elsewhere with 
a shared commitment to pursuing and furthering academic research 
in taxation. The TRN held its first conference in 1991 and since then 
has gone from strength to strength, attracting scholars from all over the 
world. It now incorporates a tax education day, as part of its commit-
ment to capacity building. It delivered its first entirely online confer-
ence (hosted by the University of Cambridge) in 2020 due to COVID-19 
restrictions, and will run its 2021 conference (hosted by Aston Univer-
sity) in a blended format of online and face to face. 
Recent developments in the UK and elsewhere have raised the 
profile of tax issues significantly, and in the case of the UK, this has 
brought to the surface concerns about underinvestment in tax as an area 
of academic research. This volume serves as a further reminder that 
tax research is, in fact, alive and well, if unfortunately, often lacking 
in visibility. Indeed, the diversity of the topics covered in the ensuing 
chapters includes contributions from both early stage/doctoral student 
researchers and more experienced researchers. This is a testament to 
a vibrant community of scholarship with wide ranging interests and 
approaches to tax research.
The chapters provide valuable insights into the rich diversity of 
contemporary tax research. They draw upon a variety of perspectives 
including law, anthropology, social and public policy, utilising a range 
of research methodologies. This volume should provide insights and 
inspiration for aspiring tax researchers and policy professionals alike. 
In terms of overarching themes, the contributions offer a “smor-
gasbord of delights” which can be generally grouped into three broad 
themes. The first theme addresses gender issues and taxation. Helen 
Thornley’s chapter explores the women’s tax resistance movement in 
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the UK, with board composition & tax aggressiveness in Spain the sub-
ject of Francesco Cortellese’s empirical contribution. The third chapter 
within this grouping is Cristina Trenta’s chapter examining the role of 
tax law in the support of Sustainable Development Goals with the Euro-
pean Consensus on Development.
The second broad thematic grouping comes within the broad sphere 
of tax administration. In the first chapter in this grouping, Lucy Bowe 
reviews Cooperative compliance from an Irish case study perspective. 
The second contribution is an empirical analysis of the UK Tax credits 
system by Sara Closs-Davies.
The third theme is broadly titled tax policy. The first contribution 
is Benita Mathew’s examination of the application of a market-based 
approach to taxation in the digital era. The final chapter in this group 
and the book is a critique of Principles-based legislative drafting by 
Hans Gribnau and Sonja Dusarduij. 
The following overview gives a flavour of the content of each of the 
ensuing chapters.
Helen Thornley observes that emerging from the Women’s Freedom 
League in 1909, the Women’s Tax Resistance League (the League) was a 
small unique part of the campaign for women’s suffrage which focused 
on tax resistance as a form of protest. The League campaigned under 
the banner “No Vote, No Tax”. This chapter reviews some of the resis-
tance prior to the formation of the League in 1909, the League’s most 
active years from 1909 to 1914, including some of the cases the League 
took, before concluding with a summary of the League’s final years and 
cessation of activities in 1918 following the passing of the Representa-
tion of the People Act. The research presented here draws primarily on 
the League’s archives, which are held at the Women’s Library of the 
London School of Economics.
Francesco Cortellese considers whether the gender composition of the 
board of directors could have some relation with tax aggressiveness 
for a sample of public Spanish listed companies covering the 2011-2017 
period. Using a fixed-effect models, he concludes that the panel data 
does not show any significant relation between female representation 
on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness.
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Cristina Trenta investigates the role of taxation in the light of the evo-
lution from the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the current European tax law 
and development landscape, and in connection to the New European 
Consensus on Development. Somewhat pessimistically her chapter 
concludes that a substantive coherent approach that transforms dec-
larations and intents into factual, concrete, unambiguous legislation in 
the field of taxation, reversing its accepted impact on gender equality 
and promoting overall sustainable development, is still not there. In the 
absence of concrete measures in support of gender equality, and with-
out wide-spread political will to create gender responsive fiscal sys-
tems, she argues that sustainable development models will not succeed.
Lucy Bowe observes that tax administrations worldwide face simi-
lar challenges in improving taxpayer services, addressing non-compli-
ance and reducing costs. This chapter discusses the Irish experience of 
Co-operative Compliance (CC), a tax administration initiative which is 
strongly supported by the OECD and has been implemented in over 30 
tax jurisdictions to date. Drawing on Irish Revenue and OECD publica-
tions, public discourse and relevant scholarly work, this chapter reveals 
that, 15 years since its introduction in Ireland, the practical implemen-
tation of CC raises broader questions worthy of further research includ-
ing the motivations of tax administrations in the selection and adop-
tion of new schemes; the performance measurement and management 
systems employed to assess such initiatives; and the impact of CC on 
trust levels of taxpayers, advisers and Revenue. The author argues that 
a more in-depth review of Irish CC is required to enhance our under-
standing of programme specific challenges, motivations and outcomes, 
and also to provide a broader understanding of the multiple variables 
at play in the design, adoption, evaluation and amendment of any sim-
ilar initiative in tax administrations.
Sara Closs-Davies’ chapter contributes to conceptual and empirical 
understandings of tax administration in tax and public sector account-
ing research by analysing how accounting technologies enact relational 
power during encounters between tax authority (HMRC) workers and 
citizens. The chapter applies ethnographic and grounded theory meth-
ods to explore the experiences and encounters of tax credit claimants 
and HMRC workers to show how accounting influence the work prac-
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tices of HMRC workers, through relational processes, ultimately (re)
shaping claimants’ subjectivities and financial outcomes. The findings 
suggest that some tax credit claimants are not financially better off and 
are perversely held responsible and accountable for overpayment prob-
lems, facilitated through their encounters with accounting technolo-
gies. The accounting technologies of the tax credit system dehuman-
ise encounters between HMRC workers and claimants, transforming 
claimants into self-responsible individuals. These findings highlight 
how the tax credit system underlies the targeting of tax credit claim-
ants and sustains a neo-liberal discourse of private responsibility for 
financial hardship through its accounting technologies and everyday 
relational practices.
Benita Mathew observes that taxable presence issues in the digital era 
have, in part, led to the consideration of a market-based approach to 
taxation. This chapter considers the extent to which the market-based 
approach to taxation resolves taxable presence issues that are caused 
or exacerbated by digitalisation. The chapter challenges ‘economic 
allegiance’ justifications between market-based activities and market 
jurisdictions. While the market-based approach is robust at merely 
indicating the presence of economic activity in the market jurisdiction, 
the author argues that it does not match the role of the market-based 
activity in proportion to the value chain as a whole. The analysis in this 
chapter questions the need for a market-based approach in international 
tax if it does not substantially resolve the issues that reform started out 
with. Therefore, the chapter concludes that the market-based approach 
should be reconsidered as a policy option if it is not sufficient in light of 
taxable presence issues and is not aligned with a holistic view of value 
creation. 
Hans Gribnau and Sonja Dusarduij comment that tax complexity is a 
multi-faceted and pervasive phenomenon. Narrow, detailed drafting of 
the law is a particular manifestation of tax complexity. Tax systems have 
become dense thickets of often thorny rules – at the expense of transpar-
ency, certainty and equality. On the other hand, principles-based legis-
lation is sometimes proposed as an alternative regulatory instrument to 
counter both the complexity of detailed tax drafting and tax avoidance. 
The authors elaborate on principles-based legislation, rule-based draft-
ing, and two other drafting styles – legal fictions and standards. This 
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research6
is undertaken from the perspective of (legal) principles, as advocated 
by the legal philosopher Dworkin. These fundamental legal princi-
ples constitute a normative framework for legislation. Importantly, the 
authors comment that none of these drafting styles should be seen as a 
magic formula. Securing the integrity of tax law requires the legislature 
to balance these different legislative drafting styles. In practice, the leg-
islature will have to aim for an optimal mix of these styles.
A final mention must be made of the geographical spread of the 
work presented here. The chapters draw upon the experiences of Ire-
land, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK. While this grouping 
is European-centric, many of the issues raised have wider relevance, 
which underscores the value of the TRN in bringing together tax schol-
ars from Europe and around the world. Indeed, for the first time in 
the history of these volumes, one of the editors of this volume resides 
outside of the UK, which is a testament to the wide reach of the TRN. 
We hope that these chapters will serve as inspiration for future 
research work. We must continue to celebrate, and make visible, the 
rich and diverse perspectives that can be brought to bear on tax issues, 
particularly in light of growing public interest in tax matters. Indeed, 
in a post-COVID world, nations and society generally are beginning 
to turn their attention to how governments will be able to ‘repay’ their 
borrowing. Economic growth is unlikely to be sufficient, placing the 
spotlight on taxation and how additional revenues may be found. 
Finally, we would like to once again acknowledge and thank the 
contributors of these chapters for their commitment to this volume and 
for the considerable patience they have shown in its preparation and 
publication. 
Adrian Sawyer, David Massey and Lynne Oats




Emerging from the Women’s Freedom League in 1909, the Women’s Tax Resist-
ance League (the League) was a small and unique part of the campaign for 
women’s suffrage. Focussing on tax resistance as a form of protest, the League 
campaigned under the banner “No Vote, No Tax”. The League drew members 
from across the spectrum of militant suffragettes and constitutional suffragists, 
and a number of individuals connected with the League have been com-
memorated following the centenary of women’s voting rights in 2018 on the 
plinth under Dame Millicent Fawcett’s statue in Parliament Square. In addition 
to fighting for the vote, the League campaigned for the separate taxation of 
married couples, and sought to highlight the incompatibility of the Taxes Acts 
with the Married Women’s Property Acts of the late 19th century. This chapter 
reviews some of the resistance prior to the formation of the League in 1909, 
the League’s most active years from 1909 to 1914, including some of the cases 
the League took, before concluding with a summary of the League’s final years 
and cessation of activities in 1918 following the passing of the Representation 
of the People Act. The research presented here draws primarily on the League’s 
archives, which are held at the Women’s Library of the London School of Eco-
nomics. The author is very grateful to the Women’s Library for allowing access 
to these archives.
1 Helen Thornley is an independent researcher and a technical officer at the Association of Taxation 
Technicians.
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Celebrating 100 years of voting rights
2018 marked the centenary of the Representation of the People Act 1918, 
the Act which finally permitted some women the right to vote.2
One of the highlights of the centenary celebrations was the unveiling 
of a statue to Dame Millicent Fawcett in Parliament Square in April of 
that year, which the author attended in League colours and wearing a 
replica League badge.
The first woman commemorated in the square, Fawcett’s statue rec-
ognises the work of suffragists who campaigned for the vote on consti-
tutional grounds – Fawcett herself was President of the National Union 
of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) – as well as suffragettes. The 
work of the suffragists has often been overshadowed in the public con-
sciousness by the sometimes violent exploits of the suffragettes of the 
Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU).
As a form of civil disobedience, tax resistance cut across the consti-
tutional/militant divide and drew support from both suffragists and 
suffragettes, with the League claiming members from the NUWSS, 
WSPU, Women’s Freedom League (WFL) as well as women writers, 
graduates and various church leagues (WTRL, c. 1913, p. 8).
In addition to Dame Fawcett herself, a further 55 women and four 
men are commemorated on the plinth beneath. Of those, eight have 
some connection to the League.
  Louisa Garett Anderson – hosted the League’s first meeting
  Emily Wilding Davidson – applied for a job with the League
  Charlotte Despard – tax resister
  Laurence Housman – speaker for the League
  Edith How-Martyn – founding member of the League
  Dora Montefiore – early tax resister
  Adela Pankhurst – tax resister
  Princess Sophia Duleep Singh – tax resister
While the League was never a large organisation, it is pleasing to 
see some of those connected with it commemorated in such a public 
manner.
2  Full voting equality with men was not achieved until 1928.
2: No Vote, No Tax! The Women’s Tax Resistance League from 1909 to 1918 9
A timeline of tax resistance
The idea that payment of tax should be linked to voting rights was not a 
new idea in the early 20th century – the phrase “taxation without repre-
sentation is tyranny” dates from the American Revolution of the 1700s.
In order to set the formation of the League in context, this section 
looks at how earlier campaigners sought to highlight that the link 
between tax and voting rights had been broken for women in the UK.
The first petition
While much suffrage scholarship starts from 1866 (when the first mass 
petition was presented to Parliament demanding the vote) the first peti-
tion from any individual woman requesting the right to vote was pre-
sented over 30 years earlier on 3 August 1832 by Henry Hunt MP. The 
petitioner was Mary Smith, a wealthy widow from Stanmore, in the 
county of York, who specifically referenced in her demand for the vote 
the fact that she paid tax.
Chorlton v Lings
Mary Smith’s petition was triggered by the specific exclusion of women 
from parliamentary voting rights by the 1832 Reform Act. This Act 
excluded women from voting by defining a voter as a ‘male person’.
In 1867, the year after the first mass petition, a subsequent Reform Act 
changed the definition of a voter back to ‘man’. Early suffrage cam-
paigners saw this change as an opportunity to use the provisions of 
an intervening Act – the Interpretation Act 1850 – to get women on the 
register of voters. Under the Interpretation Act words importing the 
masculine gender were considered to include females unless it was spe-
cifically provided otherwise.
The case of Chorlton v Lings concerned the attempts of a number of 
women to be listed on the Parliamentary Register on the basis of the 
interaction of the updated wording of the Reform Act 1867 and the Inter-
pretation Act. Fawcett included the case in her history of the suffrage 
movement, reporting that the case was lost when the Court decided 
that ‘man’ could not import ‘woman’ when a ‘state privilege’ such as 
voting was concerned (Fawcett, 1911, p. 7).
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Even here, taxation was relevant, with Fawcett highlighting the 
implications for women taxpayers: “This judgement, therefore, estab-
lished as law that ‘the same words in the same Act of Parliament shall for 
the purpose of voting apply to men only, but for the purpose of taxation 
shall include women”’ (Fawcett, 1911, pp. 7-8).
Fawcett further reported that The Times considered it a “dangerous 
doctrine that representation need not go along with taxation” (Fawcett, 
1911, p. 8).
The Priestman Sisters and the first act of resistance
It is not until 1870 that the first actual act of tax resistance (as identified 
by the League) was carried out for the suffrage campaign, when sisters 
Anne and Mary Priestman resisted their taxes in protest at their lack of 
a vote (Parkes, c. 1920, pp. 1-2).
Active in the suffrage movement for some years, the sisters were 
Quakers and Crawford (1999, p. 566) describes their protest as “the 
Quaker weapon of passive resistance”. Presumably tax resistance was a 
form of action that could be considered compatible with their faith. The 
result of the sisters’ non-payment was that the authorities seized their 
dining room chairs and took them to auction to settle the debt. In fact, 
the chairs were never sold, but were instead returned after the tax was 
paid by what Kineton Parkes describes as an “interfering sympathiser” 
(Parkes, c. 1920, p. 1).
The sisters tried the same approach the following year, but again the 
tax was paid and their goods returned. Rather than oblige their anony-
mous donor to meet their tax burden again, the sisters decided not to 
resist the following year.
While this was an isolated stand it inspired others, and both sisters 
were said to have taken a great interest in the work of the League until 
their deaths in 1914 (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 2).
Miss Henrietta Müller
The next act of resistance recorded in the League’s history was that of 
Miss Henrietta Müller of 58 Cadogan Place, London in 1884 (Parkes, c. 
1920, p. 2).
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In June 1884, Müller wrote to the Pall Mall Gazette to explain that 
she was refusing to pay tax because, while the Franchise Bill passing 
through Parliament that year was expected to add almost two million 
more men to the register, it made no provision for female voters (A 
Woman’s Argument, 1884).
An active suffragist, Müller viewed her tax resistance as a “practi-
cal test of the sincerity” of her own words, having spoken in support of 
women’s suffrage at many events in the previous five to six years. In an 
echo of the later “Deeds not Words” slogan of the WSPU, Müller wrote 
that “it is deeds that are effectual weapons and not words” (A Woman’s 
Argument, 1884).
Overlooked in the League’s account, but explained by Müller in her 
article, she was not alone in her resistance at that time. Miss Charlotte 
Babb (another Quaker) had been resisting since 1871 and claimed to 
have been sold up nine times, and another woman was known to have 
been resisting until her marriage3 (A Woman’s Argument, 1884).
Accordingly, Müller refused to pay her taxes and, when the bailiff 
called, barred the door against him – an act which required the bailiff to 
obtain a warrant to proceed.
While the authorities did gain access when she was out, Müller man-
aged somehow to defer the actual removal of her goods, buying time 
to advertise the date of the distraint with handbills, placards and men 
with sandwich boards, in order to attract a crowd to witness the bailiff’s 
return. When the date arrived, Miss Müller and Miss Babb spoke to 
those present, expressing their views that tax resistance could be a very 
effective weapon.
A wealthy, well-travelled woman who had been educated at Girton 
and was a member of the London School Board for Lambeth, Müller’s 
actions were reported widely and the story syndicated from London to 
the Edinburgh Evening News, and regional papers such as The Sunderland 
Daily Echo and The Leeds Mercury.
The reports of her actions though were not generally favourable, 
with The Leeds Mercury reporting that “it is impossible to conceive a 
more foolish or more mistaken course” (Politics and Society, 1884).
3 See page 30 for an explanation of why tax resistance as a married woman was more 
challenging.
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The siege of Montefiore
After Miss Müller’s action, there was a gap of 20 years before the next 
resister recorded by the League – Mrs Dora Montefiore (Parkes, c. 1920, 
pp. 2-3).
Montefiore was another suffragist of long standing and she first 
resisted her taxes in 1904. The resistance resulted in distraint, with the 
bailiff seizing items of furniture and a lady’s bicycle and taking them to 
auction. A sympathetic auctioneer allowed Montefiore to speak before 
the sale of her distrained goods (No Vote No Taxes, 1904).
Montefiore repeated the exercise in 1905, with largely the same, lim-
ited, result. By 1906 however, Montefiore had joined the WSPU. Her 
autobiography records that she discussed her actions with Theresa Bil-
lington and Annie Kenney and it was determined that, with the sup-
port of the WSPU, she would barricade herself in her house against the 
bailiff while the WSPU held protests outside. The hope was that this 
way her action would gain much more publicity and educate the public 
(Montefiore, 1925).
The ‘siege of Montefiore’ begin in May 1906 and lasted for six weeks, 
during which time Montefiore and her maid barred the doors against 
the bailiff. A banner “Women should vote for the laws they obey and the 
taxes they pay” was hung from the house, and daily meetings and dem-
onstrations were held outside, with Montefiore lecturing on her consti-
tutional resistance from the upstairs windows (Mrs Montefiore Defying 
the Tax Collector, 1906).
This time Montefiore’s self-described ‘publicity stunt’ gained con-
siderable attention, with her autobiography reporting the press staging 
food being passed over the garden wall, and the receipt of press notices 
from newspapers in the US and Europe (Montefiore, 1925).
While Montefiore’s protest was, like earlier attempts, an isolated 
act of resistance, her efforts were much more successful in attracting 
publicity – presumably thanks to the combined effect of the support of 
a group like the WSPU and a siege of significant duration – and must 
have helped to demonstrate that tax resistance could be an effective 
form of protest.
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The People’s Budget and the Women’s Freedom League
The Women’s Freedom League
As Montefiore’s resistance over 1904 to 1906 had escalated to a siege, 
so the nature of the wider campaign to enfranchise women was also 
changing.
While suffragists campaigning on legal, constitutional grounds had 
existed since the mid-1800s, the formation of the WSPU by Emmeline 
and Christabel Pankhurst in 1903 with their slogan “Deeds not Words” 
introduced militancy – and turned the campaign into a fight.
A few years in and not everyone in the WSPU was  prepared to 
support the growing levels of violence espoused by the Pankhursts and 
their supporters. In 1907, around 70 to 80 of WSPU members (includ-
ing Montefiore) broke away from this group to form the Women’s Free-
dom League (WFL). Members of the WFL were prepared to be militant, 
but not violent, and human life, safety and private property were to be 
respected.
Accordingly, the WFL supported tax resistance as a form of passive, 
non-violent protest and a number of their members, including the Presi-
dent Charlotte Despard, resisted taxes during 1907 and 1908.
In February 1908, the WFL published a leaflet encouraging members 
to “protest against the tyranny involved by the taxation of vote-less 
women”, and proposing the resistance of Income tax, Property Tax and 
Inhabited House Duty, noting that to date efforts had been made by 
isolated women (WFL, 1908).
The People’s Budget
At the same time as the idea of tax resistance as a form of protest was 
taking root, taxation itself was also gaining attention on the wider polit-
ical agenda.
In April 1909, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd 
George, presented his ‘People’s Budget’ to Parliament. Proposing sig-
nificant tax rises including introducing a supertax on high incomes, 
land taxes and increased death duties, it was highly controversial and 
the subject of a major constitutional stand off between the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords.
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The result was that by the summer of 1909, not only did a number 
of members of the WFL have experience in the practicalities and chal-
lenges of tax resistance, but tax itself was high on the political agenda. 
Whether or not the wider, national interest in tax was a driving factor to 
encourage tax resistance, it was the case that supporting tax resisters 
was time-consuming and WFL resources were stretched.
Accordingly, the WFL began to consider setting up a separate group 
to promote this form of protest (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 4).
The formation of the League
A “Preliminary Meeting to consider Tax Resistance” was held Friday 22 
October 1909, hosted by Dr Louisa Garrett Anderson at her premises on 
114a Harley Street (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913).
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss “organised resistance to 
taxation”. The 20 women and one man recorded as attending were:
  Mrs M(argaret) W(ynne) Nevinson (Chair)
  Dr (Louisa) Garrett Anderson (Doctor)
  Mr Herbert Jacobs (founder of the Men’s League for Women’s 
Suffrage)
  Mrs (Mary) Sargant Florence (Artist)(C)
  Dr (Elizabeth) Wilks (Doctor)(C)
  Dr (Kate) Haslam (C)
  Dr (Winifred) Patch (C) (Doctor)
  Miss Cicily (Cicely) Hamilton (C) (Writer)
  Mrs (Edith) How-Martyn
  Miss (Clemence) Housman (Artist)
  Mrs (Bettina) Borrmann Wells
  Mrs (Ethel) Ayres Purdie (C) (Accountant)
  Miss Benett
  Miss Ansell
  Lady (Florence) Harberton
  Mrs (Anne) Cobden Sanderson (C)
  Mrs (Lilian) Hicks
  Miss Carr Shaw
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  Miss (Sime) Seruya (C) (Actress)
  Mrs Kate Freeman
  Mrs Kineton Parkes (C)
All items in brackets are additions to the original minutes. Those 
marked with a (C) were appointed to the initial committee.
Since this group was intending to resist taxes, it was first necessary 
to pay taxes. While this did not mean that all of the attendees were 
wealthy, inevitably some of women present had independent means. 
Others were professional women including doctors, writers, artists and 
actresses.
Crucially, the founding members also included a professional 
accountant – Ethel Ayres Purdie – whose ability to advise on matters 
of taxation was subsequently very valuable to the League (see page 17).
At this preliminary meeting, two competing options were discussed. 
The first was a proposal to form a separate society, the second to have a 
separate committee but otherwise remain part of the WFL (Minute Book 
vol. 1, 1909-1913, 22.10.1909). During the discussion, four of the ladies 
present pledged a total of £100 if an independent group was formed.4 
The question was taken to a vote and the resolution to form a separate 
group was carried nine votes to six. The Women’s Tax Resistance League 
was born.
The objectives of the League
In an early leaflet from circa 1910 titled “No Vote. No Tax”, the League 
described itself as a “non-party Association of constitutional and mili-
tant Suffragists, recruited from all the various Suffrage Societies, for the 
purpose of resisting Imperial Taxation” (Purdie, c.1910a).
While the WTRL did not, according to Kineton Parkes, “hamper 
itself with any constitution” she did identify a number of objectives for 
the League which can be summarised as follows (Parkes, c. 1920, pp. 
5-7): 
  To enrol members prepared to resist payment of taxes until they 
gained the right to vote. Members would be required to pay an 
annual subscription.
4 The subscribers were Mrs Sargant Florence (£50), Dr Elizabeth Wilks (£25), Dr Kate 
Haslem (£20) and Miss Sime Seruya (£5).
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  To promote the principle of tax resistance through the press.
  To provide members with free, expert advice throughout the pro-
cess of resistance, and to speak to the Board of the Inland Rev-
enue on behalf of members.
  To organise protest meetings at the sales of any members’ goods 
and maximise the publicity of the actions of resisters.
  To protect from imprisonment any resisters who did not have 
goods which could be seized.
  To update MPs on cases of resistance and lobby for questions to be 
asked in the House.
  To study the impact of tax law on women and identify and chal-
lenge where any such laws may affect women unfairly.
Building on the efforts of earlier resisters, the main objective of the 
League was to pursue the publicity opportunities from the process of 
distraint.  “Public protest” was its “raison d’être” (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 39).
Auctions of a resister’s goods were a significant opportunity to win 
sympathy for the suffrage cause. Members would turn out in force to 
support the resister, make speeches and hand out leaflets explaining 
why the individual had failed to pay their taxes. Since resisters were 
otherwise law abiding and upstanding members of the community, 
their appearance at debtors’ auctions would attract press attention.
But the list of objectives above show that the League also took seri-
ously the wider impact of the tax system on women, particularly married 
women, and a good deal of effort was directed to the League’s demand 
for the separate taxation of married couples.
The League secretary: Margaret Kineton Parkes
Much of the League’s day to day work towards its objectives, from 
administration to speaking engagements, was carried out by the League’s 
secretary Margaret Kineton Parkes (1865-1920).
Kineton Parkes was working for the WFL when the League formed 
and permission was obtained early on to allow her work for the new soci-
ety (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 29.10.1909). Initially seconded for 
a period of three months, she remained the League’s secretary until it 
wound up in 1918.
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Crawford reports how Kineton Parkes was separated from her hus-
band and that presumably she needed the income for her work for the 
League to support herself and her two children (Crawford, 2014). She 
also occupied the League’s flat when it became big enough to require 
premises.
As secretary, Kineton Parkes travelled the length and breadth of the 
country, with the minutes recording her speaking at public and private 
events not just in and around London, but also in Bath, Bristol, Leeds, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Scotland and Ireland. The League even pro-
duced a postcard of her speaking from the back of a wagon when the 
League joined the WSPU and other societies for a mass rally in Hyde 
Park on Sunday 14 July 1912 (WTRL, 1912).
In addition to speaking, Kineton Parkes managed the League’s cor-
respondence and, for some periods of the League’s existence, additional 
staff including a typist and a office manager.5 Kineton Parkes also wrote 
the history of the League’s work, which the League published with its 
remaining funds when it wound up in 1918 (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-
1918, 5.7.18).
The League’s tax expert: Ethel Ayres Purdie
Another key member of the League was founding member Ethel Ayres 
Purdie (1874-1923). Ayres Purdie was the first woman admitted to any 
professional accountancy body when she was admitted to the London 
Association of Accountants (LAA) in May 1909, a few months before the 
formation of the League (Walker, 2011, p. 79).  Her professional account-
ing skills, together with knowledge and experience of personal tax, put 
the League in a position to offer tax advice to individual resisters.
That she was a member of a professional body at a time before most 
bodies were prepared to admit women,6 was also relevant to the League. 
As Walker reports, such membership gave her rights of representation 
5 On 2 June 1913, Kineton Parkes wrote to the well-known suffragette Emily Wilding 
Davidson returning her testimonials after she applied to work for the League. The letter 
is held in Davidson’s papers at the Women’s Library, LSE (7EWD/A/2/4). The League 
rejected her on the grounds that she was over-qualified for the vacancy they had. A few 
days later and Davidson was dead, having fallen under the King’s Horse at the Derby. The 
League joined the throngs of suffragists and suffragettes at her funeral, marching behind 
a banner of John Hampden draped in purple (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 32).
6 It would be another 10 years before the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 finally 
forced all professional bodies to admit women.
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under the terms of the Revenue Act 1903 and allowed her to represent 
League members before the Special Commissioners of Income Tax, as she 
did in cases such as that of Dr Burns (see page 36) (Walker, 2011, p. 84).
On a practical level, the minutes show that Ayres Purdie attended 
committee meetings regularly and frequently hosted them at her offices. 
She also audited the League’s accounts. She wrote or contributed to 
League pamphlets, researched specific tax queries, accompanied other 
committee members to meetings with the Inland Revenue at Somerset 
House and provided advice direct to members.
Ayres Purdie was particularly concerned about the taxation of mar-
ried women, believing that husbands and wives should be taxed sepa-
rately. A full account of Ayres Purdie’s life and professional practice and 
suffrage work can be found in Stephen Walker’s paper (Walker, 2011).
John Hampden and the Ship Money Case
The League liked to draw on examples of historical resistance in support 
of their arguments, one of which was the refusal by John Hampden to 
pay ship money.
The Ship Money Case
The medieval custom of ship money allowed a sovereign to demand 
from coastal areas either ships – or the money for ships – during times of 
war. In 1634, Charles I sought to help resolve some of his financial prob-
lems by levying ship money based on the prospect of war – rather than 
an actual war. The following year he demanded it not just from coastal 
towns but also inland counties.
The demands became increasingly unpopular and in 1636 Hampden 
refused to make full payment of his liability. He considered the tax was 
unconstitutional as it was being charged without the approval of Parlia-
ment and that taxes should be levied according to the rule of law, and by 
consent. The case went to court in 1637 but, after a six-month hearing, 
Hampden narrowly lost his case on the basis that the King had a divine 
right to levy the tax.
Despite the loss, Hampden was considered to have secured a moral 
victory, and after the case non-payment of the tax increased. Ship money 
was ultimately declared illegal  by Parliament  in 1641.
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From the League’s perspective, Hampden’s position of resisting a tax 
which had not been approved by Parliament fitted well with their objec-
tives, and provided an excellent precedent for their own actions.
Hampden and the League
In addition to referencing Hampden in some of their literature, the 
League sold photographs and postcards of Hampden’s statute in the 
House of Commons, and made a clever reference to the ship money 
case in their logo.
Designed by Mary Sargant Florence (Crawford, 1999, p. 308) the 
League’s logo featured a ship in cream and black riding a rough sea on a 
chestnut brown background, with “No Vote No Tax” printed around the 
edge. The ship image can be seen used on badges, notepaper,7 on ‘prom-
ise’ or ‘pledge’ cards – small, postcard style objects containing messages 
from the League which members could personalise – and, naturally, on 
the menu card for the John Hampden Dinner in December 1911. Over 
200 people attended the eight-course fundraising meal, dining on ‘Vol au 
Vent à la Hampden’ and ‘Bombe Tax Resistance’.
On a number of occasions, the League campaigned in what they 
called ‘Hampden county’ – the county of Buckinghamshire. In 1911, 
they held a series of meetings between 5-19 July in Great Missenden, Wen-
dover, Aylesbury, Chesham and Stoke Mandeville (Minute Book vol. 1, 
1909-1913). They returned again in 1912, borrowing a member’s property 
in Wendover as a base. The minutes also report many trips to Aylesbury 
to attend auctions of resisters’ goods.
On 27 June 1912, the League attended the unveiling of a statute of 
Hampden in Aylesbury. Although the League was refused permission 
to join the official ceremony, 17 members held their own unofficial pro-
cession to lay a wreath on the statue afterwards. The crowd was sup-
portive, cheering them as they did, and the League sold a lot of litera-
ture (WTRL, 1913, pp. 6-7).
7 This can be observed on letters from 1913 and 1914. The League first commissioned 
notepaper in May 1910 (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 28.5.1910) but no examples were 
available to review.
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1910: Building up to resistance
Although a small number of women in the WFL were already resisting 
their taxes, the League itself did not immediately advocate resistance. It 
was decided in early 1910 that those who had previously resisted could 
continue to do so, but that the League itself would take no action until 
it had amassed 500 members (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909- 1913, 25.2.1910). 
Presumably the idea was to seek safety in numbers, as the commit-
tee had previously discussed the serious consequences – including the 
potential for imprisonment – as a result of the actions that they were 
proposing (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 8.11.1909). For much of 1910 
therefore, the League’s main focus was on attracting members. In addi-
tion to contacting other suffrage groups offering to speak, attending 
drawing room meetings, writing to the suffrage press and producing 
various leaflets, the League also sought and obtained interviews with 
prominent suffrage campaigners such as Mrs Pethick-Lawrence. The 
result of those efforts was that by July 1910, League membership had 
reached three figures, with 104 members signed up (Minute Book vol. 1, 
1909-1913, 4.2.1910, 29.4.1910, 9.7.1910).
In July, the League took part in various demonstrations in support 
of the Conciliation Bill which, if passed, would have enfranchised some 
women householders. Funds were raised for a banner of John Hamp-
den in black, white and grey. Designed by Mary Sargant Florence, it 
was ordered from the Suffrage Atelier (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 
6.5.1910). Thus equipped, the League was able to form its own section in 
demonstrations at Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square (Minute Book vol. 1, 
1909-1913, 9.7.1910, 25.7.1910).
By mid-September, concerns were growing that the Conciliation Bill 
would not pass. The League decided that if the Bill fell it would aban-
don its membership target and start resistance immediately (Minute 
Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 19.9.1910). An action plan was drawn up and, in 
October, the League announced its intentions to both the suffrage and 
general press. The League’s scrapbook contains a record of The Times 
(12.10.1910) reporting the League’s request for members to sign up to 
tax resistance if the Conciliation Bill did not pass, and highlighting that 
such action could result in the seizure of goods or imprisonment.
2: No Vote, No Tax! The Women’s Tax Resistance League from 1909 to 1918 21
By the end of October, matters had progressed such that a conference 
was needed to agree the conditions for tax resistance and the League’s 
first annual conference was duly held on 14 November 1910 (Minute 
Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 28.10.1910).
At the conference it was proposed that there should be two levels 
of membership – those capable of immediate resistance and those who 
were prepared to resist once the original target of 500 members had been 
achieved (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 14.11.1910). While the minutes 
are unclear on the outcome of this resolution, Kineton Parkes reports 
(Parkes, c. 1920, p. 9) that the proposal was agreed to. Resistance in ear-
nest was now imminent.
Funds were sought to enable the League to acquire an office and 
shortly afterwards a flat in 10 Talbot House, 98 St Martins Lane was 
acquired, signed for by Dr Elizabeth Wilks and the intended occupant, 
Mrs Kineton Parkes (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 18.11.1910).
On 18 November 1910, Parliament was dissolved and, as a conse-




The League encouraged members to resist what were called the ‘Impe-
rial’ or ‘King’s’ taxes, as these taxes were controlled by Parliament. 
League members were asked to pay local taxes such as the poor rate 
or water rate because women had voting rights at a municipal level 
(WTRL, c. 1913, p. 2).
The Imperial taxes included:
  Income tax
  Property tax
  Land tax
  Inhabited House Duty
  Licences:
  Carriage licences
  Motor licences
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  Dog licences
  Armorial bearings
  Male servants
  Gun and game licences
  National Insurance
  Death Duties
All of the above are direct taxes, as it was not practical to resist indirect 
taxes such as duties imposed on goods. Adopting a principle of refusing 
to pay duties by not buying certain goods (for example, tea) was likely 
to generate little or no publicity, while causing great personal inconven-
ience to the resister.
The League appreciated that not all women would be in a position to 
resist taxes. Many women either did not have sufficient income or assets 
to create a liability or were married, where resistance was more challeng-
ing. Those that could not resist were encouraged instead to lend moral 
and financial support to those who could (WTRL, c. 1913, p. 9).
The process of resistance
In 1913, the League published a pamphlet, The A. B. C. of Tax Resistance, 
setting out in detail all that the potential resister needed to know about 
the practicalities of the resistance process.
The first step was to simply ignore all demands for payment until 
distraint (the seizure of goods) was threatened. This could take many 
weeks, or even months. When the threat of “distraint in 10 days” was 
received, the resister was encouraged to explain their position to the 
tax collector – and warned that it was unlikely that sympathy would 
be forthcoming (WTRL, c. 1913, pp. 3-4). Distraint involved the bailiff 
seizing goods of sufficient value to cover the tax and costs of collection, 
which would then be taken to public auction.
While the League would provide advice at any stage, it was at the 
point of distraint, and the subsequent auction of the resister’s goods, 
where the League would be most able to help. Resisters were asked to 
inform the League when auctions were due so that the League could 
provide speakers and arrange buying-in if required (see page 26).
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Resisting licences
For those resisting licences the process above included an extra step. 
Before distraint was levied the resister would first be summoned to 
appear at the police court.
Resisters were advised to attend court and to use the opportunity to 
explain to the magistrate that their resistance was due to the lack of a 
vote. While some magistrates might be more sympathetic than others, 
the resister could expect to be fined, and members were advised to then 
refuse to pay the fine. At this point either distraint or imprisonment was 
possible (WTRL, c. 1913, p. 7).
While distraint was the most likely outcome, the minutes do contain 
examples of resisters who were imprisoned for failure to pay licences, 
such as Miss Mary Walters who refused to pay her dog licence (Minute 
Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 11.4.1913). For some members, resistance of 
licences and appearance in court became an annual event, with the fines 
for repeat offenders increasing to such an extent that the League became 
concerned about excessive fines, and Ayres Purdie was asked to prepare 
a schedule of maximum possible fines (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 
9.5.1913).
Court appearances, particularly of otherwise law-abiding women, 
generated good publicity. Committee member Mrs Caroline Fagan for 
example was a regular resister of licences and appeared in court in 
October 1912 for failing to pay licences on her motor car, for the use of 
armorial bearings and for her man servant. She received a fine of over 
£12 and her case was reported in The Daily Mail, The Standard and the 
Manchester Courier.
If required, the League would attend the hearing with the resister, 
with Ayres Purdie representing a member at court on a least one occa-
sion (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 2.5.1913). 
Princess Duleep Singh
A particularly notable resister of licences was prominent WSPU member, 
Princess Sofia Duleep Singh. One of the daughters of the Maharaja 
Duleep Singh, the last Maharaja of the Sikh Empire, she lived in a grace 
and favour residence at Hampton Court originally provided by Queen 
Victoria.
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In 1911, the princess refused to pay her licences for five dogs, use 
of armorial bearings, her carriage and one male servant and was sum-
moned to court. (A Princess’s Ring, 1911) Prior to her appearance, the 
princess sought advice from the League, who recommended solicitor Mr 
Leon Castello to represent her in court (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 
26.5.1911). The Princess appeared in Court on 22 May 1911 and was 
fined £1 for each offence (Princess as Suffragist, 1911). Since she refused 
to pay the fine, a seven-stone diamond ring was seized from her home 
and auctioned. The League produced postcards advertising the sale 
and asking the recipient to attend the protest meeting afterwards.8 
Fortunately for the princess her jewellery was bought back by a sym-
pathiser of the League and returned to her (A Princess’s Ring, 1911). As 
the Princess resisted payment of licences again in 1913, she was taken 
to court once more, this time for only two dogs, her carriage and a man 
servant (The Suffragists, 1913). The Princess represented herself and 
was again fined and suffered distraint (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 
9.1.1914).
The seizure of goods
Distraint was the goal of most resistance, with public auctions pro-
viding an opportunity to protest and attract publicity in a variety of 
different ways. During the peak years of the League’s activities – 1913 
to 1914 – there could be up to 10 sales a week.
In order to make a spectacle, resisters were encouraged to advertise the 
sale beforehand to attract a crowd. This could be done by printing and 
distributing leaflets (handbills), advertising in the local paper and, where 
possible, getting a paragraph explaining the reasons behind the resister’s 
actions included (WTRL, c. 1913, pp. 5-6). In April 1913, the minutes 
record agreement to the purchase of a megaphone, to prevent speakers 
being drowned out at auctions (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 11.4.1913).
The committee regularly discussed forthcoming sales and, wherever 
possible, the League would send a speaker and either the resister them-
selves or another League member would attempt to speak before the 
resister’s goods were auctioned. Ideally, the auction would be followed 
by a protest meeting in the vicinity.
8  Postcard held at the Women’s Library, LSE, object reference TWL.2002.638.
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In November 1974, WTRL member Marie Lawson was interviewed 
about her experiences of having goods sold (Lawson, 1974). She 
reported that:
“Our sales were such a burden to him [the auctioneer] year after 
year, with the whole place crowded out with angry suffragettes 
demanding his blood almost. In the end he said he wouldn’t do 
it anymore and the tax inspector couldn’t get anybody to take 
them [debtors auctions] on because they were so annoyed by 
having so many suffragettes howling around the premises and 
holding protests instead and out.”
Auction costs
The value of goods seized had to cover both the amount of tax owed 
and the costs of sale. While these costs varied, the League identified the 
following costs in “ordinary cases” (WTRL, c. 1913, pp. 4-5).
  Levy fee, 3s. 6d.
  Bailiff’s fee, 2s. 6d.
  Auctioneer’s commission, 7.5%
  Carriage costs
Resisters might also be charged with valuation and advertising in 
certain circumstances. 
Carriage costs were charged to cover the cost of transporting large 
and bulky goods to auction. To minimise these costs, the League recom-
mended that resisters should allow jewellery or plates to be seized. The 
items seized from resisters varied greatly, ranging from a silver cup 
(Duchess of Bedford’s Tax Resistance, 1913), to furniture (Suffragette’s 
Effect Sold by Auction, 1912), a Rembrandt (Arbroath Suffragette 
Refuses to Pay the King’s Taxes, 1912) and even a cow, which promptly 
escaped – twice.9
9  Two undated, unattributed newspaper clippings in the League’s archives report that the 
cow belonged to a Miss Lelacheur and had been seized from Lovegrove Farm, Checkendon 
and taken to Henley Market where, having been captured for the second time, it was 
finally sold for £10 12s. 6d (almost twice the tax due) to Mr Abel Dell of Marlow Bottom 
Farm, Marlow. A number of members of the League were present and a protest meeting 
was held afterwards.
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Buying-in
Although distrained items were sent to public auction, resisters did not 
always lose their possessions. On a number of occasions friends and 
sympathisers would ‘buy-in’ distrained property to give back to the 
resister.
Buying in occurred, for example, at the sale of Princess Duleep Singh 
in 1911 noted above (and again in 1914 (Anand, 2015, p. 292)) and in the 
case of the Duchess of Bedford (Duchess of Bedford’s Tax Resistance, 
1913).
The practice was recorded in League minutes and in newspaper 
reports of auctions. The League participated in arrangements to buy in 
and on one occasion, where the League failed to arrange for the resist-
er’s goods to be bought back, the member resigned in protest (Minute 
Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 13.7.1914).
While buying-in allowed non-resisting women to support their 
resisting sisters, there were some concerns that having goods bought in 
reduced the effectiveness of the protest. Although an early WFL leaf-
let in 1908 seeking resisters mentioned the potential for friends to buy 
goods back (WFL, 1908), the League’s own A.B.C of Tax Resistance in 
1913 makes no mention of this as an option.  In 1914, Ayres Purdie sug-
gested that it would be “bad policy” to highlight the practice (Minute 
Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 31.7.1914). Presumably resisters needed to be 
seen to be genuinely risking their possessions for the cause. 
(Wo)man the barricades
Before goods even reached the auction, another way of making a spec-
tacle was to resist entry to the bailiffs. The League knew this to be an 
effective method to gain publicity based on the experience of Dora Mon-
tefiore, and the topic of barricades was raised at the League’s second 
annual meeting in 1912. A number of women present at the meeting 
made suggestions or talked about their own experiences, and the League 
secretary reported that she had already had volunteers to bar the doors 
against the bailiffs (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 7.2.1912).
By May 1912, Mrs Darent Harrison was reported as holding out 
against the tax collector in St. Leonards on Sea (Minute Book vol. 1, 
1909-1913, 3.5.1912) and this, and a second barricade by Mrs Harvey in 
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Bromley, Kent featured in the League’s Third Annual Report published 
in January 1913. Mrs Harrison held out the bailiffs for a month, with 
photos of her hauling up a basket of provisions making the local paper 
(Suffragette Provisioning, 1912), while Mrs Harvey was besieged from 
May to December – a period of almost eight months before the bailiff 
forced his way in via the garden gate (WTRL, 1913, pp. 14-15).
The results of their actions must have been considered worthwhile as 
both Mrs Harrison and Mrs Harvey barricaded themselves in again in 
1913.
This time Mrs Harrison’s siege was ended after only 10 days when 
the bailiff sneaked in to seize goods. The auction was set for 14 May and 
Mrs Harrison arranged for a demonstration involving local Hastings 
suffrage groups and a brass band. However, the crowds were not sup-
portive, the demonstrators were attacked and a riot ensued in which the 
demonstrators had their clothes torn and a number of League flags and 
bands were destroyed (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 16.5.1913; Parkes, 
c. 1920, p. 25).
In November 1913, a battering ram was used to gain entry to Mrs 
Harvey’s property and finally end her siege which had again started 
in May (The Battering Ram, 1913). It would appear that for some of that 
period Mrs Harvey was actually in prison for resistance of National 
Insurance, in addition to her failure to pay Inhabited House Duty which 
had prompted the siege (Parkes, c. 1920, pp. 27-28).
The harder line taken by the authorities in 1913, and the violence 
experienced by the demonstrators in Hastings, may reflect the tougher 
stance that was being taken more generally against the violent actions 
of suffragettes at that time.
The Arrest of Clemence Housman
Not all acts of resistance by League members ended in distraint. As the 
League had discussed shortly after formation, imprisonment was a defi-
nite possibility (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 8.11.1909) and during the 
life of the League both male and female resisters served time in jail. One 
such resister was Clemence Housman.
Clemence was an artist, engraver and writer and used her creative 
talents as a key part of the Suffrage Atelier, which designed and made 
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many suffrage banners and advertisements, including for the League 
(Liddington, 2014, p. 45).
One of the younger siblings of poet A E Housman, Clemence lived 
with her brother Lawrence Housman for all of her adult life (Lid-
dington, 2014, p. 41). Laurence also supported the women’s suffrage 
movement and was a leading figure in the Men’s League for Women’s 
Suffrage. As a writer and noted speaker, he also lent his talents and pen 
to the League.
As a founding member of the League, and a committee member, 
Clemence wished to take part in resistance herself. But, as Liddington 
reports, in order to do so she first had to make herself liable to tax. Since 
presumably her income was too low to attract income tax, in 1909 Clem-
ence took a house at Swanage and thus made herself liable to Inhabited 
House Duty (Liddington, 2014, pp. 68-69).
Liddington recites in detail (Liddington, 2014, pp. 204-206) how 
Clemence meticulously planned her resistance. Having taken a house, 
she then hired the furnishings, in order that the authorities would have 
no goods against which they could distrain.
Inhabited House Duty was levied annually on dwelling houses with a 
rental value in excess of £20. Presumably Clemence received, and failed 
to pay, demands for both 1909 and 1910. However, it was not until 1911 
that the authorities began to take serious action against her and by July 
arrest was threatened (Liddington, 2014, p. 204).
Even the actual arrest took its time, with the League’s minutes on 
Friday 29 September recording with glee “Miss Clemence Housman not 
arrested!”, before going on to report that she had been arrested just 
before that day’s committee meeting (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909- 1913, 
29.9.1911).
Clemence’s arrest had actually been expected on the Thursday and 
so a demonstration had been arranged with photographers present to 
capture the scene (Liddington, 2014, p. 204). The League’s scrapbook 
includes a photo of Clemence, flanked by Laurence and Mrs Kineton 
Parkes and standing in front of a League banner while she awaited 
arrest. Arrest was serious manner – as a Crown Debt imprisonment for 
life was technically possible.
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A clipping from The Daily Express in the League’s archives dated 30 
September reported (incorrectly, since other resisters had been impris-
oned by that point) Clemence’s arrest under the heading “The First Real 
Suffrage Martyr” and noted that she had also refused to pay for a taxi to 
prison. The paper observed that the fare of 4s. 6d, paid by the sheriff’s 
officer was the exact figure as the unpaid tax. In another unattributed 
clipping, Laurence noted that the cost of Clemence’s arrest and impris-
onment was far in excess of the actual tax owed.
Following Clemence’s arrest, the League sprang into action, imme-
diately planning a protest meeting outside Holloway, and receiving an 
offer from the WSPU to organise a procession. Liddington reports that 
Clemence also protested from within Holloway, petitioning the Home 
Office and explaining her resistance (Liddington, 2014, p. 205). Her case 
reached Winston Churchill who was reported to be unsympathetic  and 
in favour of a substantial sentence to deter others.
As reported in the Yorkshire Daily Observer on 7 October 1911, Clem-
ence was envisaging a three-month term. Instead, she was unexpectedly 
released at midday on Friday 6 October after only a week. Her early 
release meant that Clemence was able to join the procession planned for 
that Saturday in her support.
The Eastern Daily Press reported on 9 October that the procession, 
which took place in a “pitiless downpour”, was attended by around 500 
members of the WSPU. Mrs Pankhurst (president of the WSPU), Mrs 
Despard (president of the WFL) and Clemence herself spoke to the 
crowds. Clemence was reported as saying that “when she reached Hol-
loway Goal it seemed like a polling booth, in which she was to record 
her vote against the Government in the only way provided by Parlia-
ment for women”.
That Clemence was released so quickly – and without having paid 
her taxes – was taken to be a great success by the League. Perhaps the 
authorities were concerned that she could have become a martyr. In fact, 
Clemence did not pay her taxes until 1917, when the passage of the 
Representation of the People Act was secured. However, her case illus-
trates one of the major problems with the practice of tax resistance – the 
sheer time it took for resistance to have an impact. Despite commencing 
resistance in late 1909, it was not until autumn of 1911 that the authori-
ties finally took the action which resulted in publicity for the cause.
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research30
The taxation of married women
Most of the taxes resisted by the League were demanded annually and, 
as noted in the case of Clemence Housman, it often took a consider-
able time for the authorities to deal seriously with resisters. As a con-
sequence, outside of the peak sale periods in the summer and autumn, 
members could look at other tax issues, and in particular how married 
women were treated by the taxation system. In 1912, the League formed 
a sub-committee specifically to deal with the subject of Married Wom-
en’s Taxation (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 8.11.1912).
The Income Tax Act 1842
The League had two specific concerns about the taxation of married 
women. The first of these concerned the language of the Income Tax Act 
1842 (ITA 1842) which had reintroduced income tax under Robert Peel. 
Although over 60 years old by the time of the formation of the League, 
many of the provisions of the ITA 1842 were still in force, including the 
following in s 41:
“And be it enacted, that the trustee, guardian, tutor, curator or 
committee of any person being an infant or married woman, lunatic, 
idiot or insane [emphasis added], and having the direction, con-
trol or management of the property or concern of such infant, 
married woman, lunatic, idiot or insane person, whether such 
infant or married woman, lunatic, idiot or insane person shall 
reside in Great Britain or not, shall be chargeable to the said 
duties in like manner and to the same amount as would be charged 
if such infant were of full age, or such married woman were sole, 
or such lunatic, idiot or insane person were capable of acting for 
himself” (Paget, 1842, p. 26).
The educated, professional women of the League objected to be clas-
sified with “lunatics, idiots and the insane”, viewing it as offensive and 
a legal humiliation. 
Married Women’s Property Acts
The League’s second concern was how the ITA 1842 interacted – or 
rather failed to interact – with the Married Women’s Property Acts. 
Under ITA 1842, the income of a married woman was taxable, but it was 
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deemed to be her husband’s for tax purposes, and he was the taxable 
entity per s 45:
“And be it enacted, that any married woman acting as a sole 
trader by the custom of any city or place or other-wise, or having 
or being entitled to any property, or profits to her sole or sepa-
rate use, shall be chargeable to such and the like duties and in 
like manner, except as hereinafter is mentioned, as if she were 
actually sole and unmarried: Provided always, that the profits of any 
married women living with her husband shall be deemed the profits of 
the husband, and the same shall be  charged  in the name of the husband,  
and not in her name, or of her trustee.” [emphasis added] (Paget, 
1842, p. 27).
This provision meant that, in order to comply with his tax obliga-
tions, a husband needed his wife to provide all the details of her income 
to him. In turn, all assessments, demands and correspondence from the 
Revenue concerning their affairs were issued in the husband’s name. 
The wife had no rights. As one Surveyor of Taxes told founding member 
Dr Elizbeth Wilks “Madam, for the purposes of taxation you, as a mar-
ried woman, are non-existent” (WTRL, c. 1914, p. 5).
The problems arose because ITA 1842 pre-dated the Married Wom-
en’s Property Acts of the late 1800s. When it was drafted, a husband and 
wife were one person under the law, and that person was the husband. 
Consequently, a woman lost any legal rights to property or income on 
marriage. From 1870 to 1893, a succession of Married Women’s Property 
Acts gradually restored property rights to married women, eventually 
putting them on a par with single women.10 However, the change in the 
legal status of married women was never reflected in tax law. The result 
was a clash between the Property Acts which gave married women 
rights over their income and assets, and the Income Tax Acts which did 
not acknowledge those rights for tax purposes.
Rebates
The clash between the property acts and taxes acts caused genuine hard-
ship, particularly in situations where a married woman had some invest-
ments in her own name which generated income such as dividends or 
10 In Scotland, similar though less extensive, acts were also introduced during this period 
and through into the 1920s.
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interest. These were usually taxed at source but where too much tax 
had been deducted – perhaps because the deduction was at too high a 
rate, or abatements or allowances applied – then a wife had no way of 
reclaiming any overpayment on her income. Only the husband was enti-
tled to claim the various allowances and abatements against their joint 
income and he could, if he chose, keep any rebate that arose, apply it 
against his own tax liability or simply refuse to claim it.
In a pamphlet published by the League, Ayres Purdie reported the 
case of a woman who had been forced to leave her husband due to his 
behaviour. She took the children with her and had no contact with the 
husband thereafter, bringing them up alone. However, each year until 
he died, he was able to recover the tax on her dividend income and 
retain it for himself (Purdie, c. 1910, p. 10).
Separate taxation
From this clash arose a number of further problems. The League consid-
ered that the law as it stood created a ‘marriage penalty’ because if both 
the husband and wife had their own income, depending on the level 
of that income, they could well be forced to pay more tax as a married 
couple than they did as separate individuals (WTRL, c. 1913a, p. 7).
The League also considered that the law was unfair to husbands 
because in order to make a complete return the husband needed informa-
tion from his wife which he had no right to demand. ITA 1842 made 
no provision for a husband to obtain information from his wife because 
wives had no separate property rights when it was drafted.
In turn, the League considered it unfair that a wife should have to tell 
her husband her income in order to allow him to comply with tax law 
when there was no requirement for him to disclose the same informa-
tion to her (WTRL, c. 1913a, pp. 8-9). The League felt that the only solu-
tion to these problems was to make husbands and wives taxable units in 
their own right and introduce separate taxation (WTRL, c. 1913a, p. 15).
Challenging the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1842
Part of the League’s approach to demanding separate taxation involved 
demonstrating how the clash of the Taxes Acts and the Married Women’s 
Property Acts made a mockery of the law.
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The most aggressive line, set out by Ayres Purdie in a number of 
League leaflets, was to argue that, as the law stood, married women 
were simply not taxable at all (Purdie, c. 1910, p. 3; Purdie, c. 1913a; 
WTRL, c. 1910). As Ayres Purdie explained “the position of mar-
ried women in relation to the direct annual taxes, such as Super Tax, 
Income Tax, Property Tax and Inhabited House Duty is a very simple 
one, and easily grasped. No married woman is liable for any of these 
taxes” (Purdie, c. 1910, p. 2). From this flowed her position that married 
women were not under the smallest obligation to co-operate with the 
Inland Revenue.
Ayres Purdie’s justification for this position was based on her inter-
pretation of s 45 ITA 1842. Since this section deemed a married wom-
an’s income to be her husband’s and charged any tax in his name, in her 
view, married women were not “taxable units” and they should escape 
tax entirely.
The Mark Wilks Case
The case which demonstrates most clearly the effect of the clash between 
ITA 1842 and the Married Women’s Property Acts – and which gained 
the League a great deal of publicity – is that of Mark Wilks.
Mark Wilks was the husband of Dr Elizabeth Wilks, one of the found-
ing members of the League. Both earned their own incomes, Elizabeth 
as a doctor with her own practice in Hackney and Mark as a teacher for 
London County Council. Dr Wilks began her tax resistance in 1908, prior 
to the formation of the League, when she wrote “No Vote, No Tax” across 
her return (Wilks, c. 1912). That she received a notice in her own name 
in the first place is interesting. According to the provisions of s 45 ITA 
1842, it should have been addressed to Mark. The authorities presum-
ably estimated the tax due, as they eventually levied distraint on her 
goods.
Dr Wilks took the same action in 1909, with distraint again levied 
against her possessions (Wilks, c. 1912). In 1910, however, Dr Wilks took 
a different approach, informing the authorities that the return should be 
sent to Mark and not her. By then she would have met Ayres Purdie at 
League meetings, and it is tempting to assume that, through that con-
nection, Dr Wilks became aware of Ayres Purdie’s view that married 
women were not taxable under the law. This may have prompted Dr 
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Wilks to take legal advice on the matter, confirming that the distraint of 
1908 and 1909 should not have been against her goods as she advised 
Lloyd George in 1913 (see page 38) (WTRL, c. 1914, p. 5).
Mark duly received a return, but informed the authorities that he 
could not complete it because he didn’t know his wife’s income and, 
thanks to the Married Women’s Property Acts, she had no obligation to 
tell him (WTRL, c. 1913a, p. 2). Thus, began a back and forth between 
the Wilks’s and Somerset House which was to go on for a further eight-
een months. During that time, according to Dr Wilks, the authorities 
were unclear who to tax, making their claim “sometimes on me, some-
times on my husband, sometimes on us both conjointly, finally on him 
alone” (Wilks, c.1912).
By the summer of 1912, having settled that the liability fell on Mark, 
the Inland Revenue wrote and advised him that, as his return did not 
contain Dr Wilks’s income, it was incomplete. Accordingly, they sub-
jected him to the higher rate of tax on his income, in addition to the tax 
on hers, and demanded a sum in excess of £30. This was a significant 
amount for Mark as Dr Wilks’s income was substantially more than 
his. He explained he had no means to pay but the Revenue rejected his 
arguments and threatened arrest (WTRL, c. 1913a, p. 3).
The first attempt to arrest Mark was made on 3 September 1912, and 
the League secretary recalled (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 3.9.1912). A 
second attempt was made on 10 September, but no arrest was made as 
Mark was off work and in bed with a bad cold (Taylor Collection, Cap-
tain Smithies Taylor to WSPU, 18 Sept 1912).
By this point Dr Wilks’s brother-in-law Captain Thomas Smithies 
Taylor was also involved.11 On 11 September, he met with officials at 
Somerset House, following up with a letter on 14 September explaining 
that Mark had paid his share of the tax, and reiterating that he could 
not afford to pay the share arising on Dr Wilks’s income, nor had he 
any rights to touch that income under the Married Women’s Property 
Acts (Taylor collection, Captain Smithies Taylor to WH Moonan, 14 Sep-
tember 1912). The Revenue replied to reject that his letter reflected the 
points discussed (Taylor collection, Mr Moonan to Captain Smithies 
11  His wife, Dr. Wilks’s sister, Mary Ellen Taylor was also an active campaigner for women’s 
suffrage who took part in window smashing of March 1912, and who had already been 
imprisoned and taken part in hunger strikes that year.
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Taylor, 16 September 1912) and on Wednesday 18 September 1912, Mark 
was arrested (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 18.9.12)
The League swung into action, holding a series of emergency meet-
ings and sending over 600 letters to MPs on the day of his arrest. Three 
days later a protest meeting was held in Trafalgar Square, followed two 
days after that with a procession to Brixton where Mark was being held 
(Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 18.9.12). From within the prison, and with 
his job at risk, Mark petitioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for his release, (WTRL, c. 1913a, 
p. 3) while Dr Wilks petitioned the King, enclosing a leaflet explaining 
the case (Taylor collection, Dr Wilks to King George V, 21 Sep 1912). In 
Nottinghamshire, Captain Taylor wrote to his local MP (Taylor collec-
tion, Captain Smithies Taylor to E Crawshay Williams MP, 20 Sep 1912) and 
received a letter of support in return.
In the second week of Mark’s imprisonment, a public meeting was 
held at Caxton Hall, the home of many suffrage protest meetings. 
George Bernard Shaw spoke, partly seriously to highlight the flaws in 
the law, and partly humorously about the risks to men of their wives 
withholding information and getting their husband’s sent to jail saying 
“If my wife did that to me, the very moment I came out of prison I 
would get another wife” (Suffragist’s Income Tax, 1912). The case was 
relevant to Bernard Shaw as he had been affected by a similar issue in 
respect of supertax and about which he had written to The Times in June 
1910, calling for separate taxation of married couples.
Supertax was an additional income tax levy on income over £3,000 for 
those whose earnings were over £5,000. Bernard Shaw had a wealthy 
wife and had been required to return details of her income to be 
assessed to supertax for the first time in 1910 – information which he 
pointed out to the Revenue he did not have and could not force her to 
tell him. At Caxton Hall, he noted that while provisions had been made 
in 1911 to allow the authorities to assess a wife for supertax,12 no such 
measures had been made for the general income tax affecting the likes 
of Mr and Dr Wilks.
12  The Revenue Act 1911 s 11 contained provisions that permitted the Special Commissions 
to require a return of income from the wife, if the husband had not made a satisfactory 
return.
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Then, suddenly, after two weeks of imprisonment and with the tax 
still unpaid, Mark was released on 2 October 1912. From the perspec-
tive of the League this was a massive success and they celebrated the 
outcome with a special dinner in honour of Mark and Dr Wilks on 11 
November (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 22.11.12).
In addition to generating much publicity, the case reached the House 
of Lords, with Earl Russell speaking at length about the case – some-
thing which the League made much of in their literature (WTRL, c. 1913a) 
– although his concerns appeared to centre more around addressing the 
problem that husbands could be imprisoned at the whim of wealthy 
wives rather than separate taxation per se (HL Deb 14 October 1912 vol. 
12 cc 823-34). Similar demands were made in the House of Commons 
where Chancellor Lloyd George confirmed he would look at the posi-
tion and also that no further action was being taken against the Wilks 
following Mark’s release (HC Deb 09 October 1912 vol 42 cc340-1).
For completeness, it should be noted that there is no evidence that Dr 
Wilks had wished her husband to be imprisoned through her actions, 
which was the concern Earl Russell sought to address. When speaking of 
the case to Lloyd George in 1913, she spoke of it being as much a griev-
ance to a woman as a man “that a man should be put in prison and have 
to pay the penalty for what his wife has done” (WTRL, c. 1914, p. 6).
Living together or apart
Another significant case for the League in 1912 respect of married wom-
en’s taxation also involved a doctor – Dr Alice Burn, Medical Inspector 
of Schools for the County of Durham (WTRL, 1913, p. 5). Originally 
from New Zealand, Dr Burn had moved to the UK to work, while her 
husband remained in New Zealand. Like Dr Wilks, she was refusing 
to pay her taxes on the grounds that, as a married woman, she was not 
liable to the tax, but here the Revenue could make no recourse to her 
husband as he did not live in the UK.
In July 1911, Ayres Purdie and two other committee members vis-
ited Somerset House to discuss her case (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913). 
The following month, the Revenue wrote back to confirm their view that 
since Dr Burn and her husband lived in separate countries they could 
not be said to be living together, and Dr Burn was taxable on her income 
as a single woman (WTRL, 1913, p. 5).
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Correspondence rumbled on, with the League’s minutes recording the 
case ongoing in December 1911. In early 1912, with arrest being threat-
ened, matters came to a head and Dr Burn appealed to the Income Tax 
Commissioners.
The appeal was finally heard in October 1912, with Dr Burn repre-
sented by Ayres Purdie. As previously noted, (see page 17) Ayres 
Purdie had rights of representation in front of the Commissioners as a 
member of a professional body. As Walker reports, Ayres Purdie’s argu-
ment was that, although not living together geographically, they were 
living together in that they were not legally separated. Ayres Purdie 
also produced correspondence between the two to show they had not 
separated (Walker, 2011, pp. 90-91). Dr Burn was a married woman and 
it was offensive for the Revenue to suggest otherwise. The Commission-
ers were forced to agree and held that the liability did fall on Mr Burn 
who , residing as he did in New Zealand, was beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Crown (WTRL, 1913, p. 5).
Walker reports how Ayres Purdie went on to write up what he calls a 
“rather immodest account” of the outcome of the case in a three-act play 
called “A-Red Tape comedy” (Walker, 2011, p. 90).
Deputation to Lloyd George
The League also sought to make direct representations to Government 
on the separation taxation of married women. In February 1911, the 
League drew up a list of names of potential attendees for a deputation to 
Chancellor David Lloyd George. However, it took a significant amount 
of correspondence and it was not until 10 June 1913 that the meeting 
finally took place.
To this deputation the League took, quite literally in one case, their 
star performers:
  Mrs Lena Ashwell 
  Dr Elizabeth Wilks
  Mrs Ethel Ayres Purdie
  Mrs Anne Cobden-Sanderson
  Miss Amy Hicks
  Mrs Caroline Frances Fagan
  Mrs Cecil Chapman
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The deputation also included a shorthand writer so a published tran-
script of the meeting forms part of the League archives (WTRL, c. 1914).
After an opening address by Miss Hicks on the ‘tax on marriage’ – 
being the additional tax costs for married couples with two incomes – 
Mrs Lena Ashwell, actress and manager of the Kingsway Theatre, spoke 
about the indignities of receiving tax papers addressed to her husband, 
highlighting his ignorance of the business of a theatre.
Dr Wilks spoke about her case, using it to illustrate the clash between 
ITA 1842 and the Married Women’s Property Acts and highlighting the 
injustices caused to both husbands and wives. Her concern was that it 
was more tax efficient to live in what she termed an ‘irregular’ manner. 
She also took the opportunity to correct Lloyd George on statements he 
had made about her case in the Commons which she considered to be 
incorrect.
Ayres Purdie followed, but there was perhaps a reason that, despite 
her professional tax expertise, she did not open the presentation. She 
proceeded to rapidly bamboozle Lloyd George with her examples of 
how the law operated unfairly on women with modest investment 
incomes.
In reply to the League’s representations, Lloyd George agreed that 
it was a ‘legal humiliation’ that married women were treated as inca-
pacitated by the Taxes Acts, and agreed that measures had been taken in 
with respect to separate assessments for supertax which had not been 
carried through to general income tax. However, he felt that it was cor-
rect to pool the household income of a husband and wife. The view of 
the Treasury was that separate taxation would cost the Exchequer in 
the region of £1.5 million a year and that was an amount he could not 
afford to lose. Whatever the justice of their cause, the costs of separate 
taxation and the challenges of redistributing the tax bill were simply 
too great. 
Purdie v The King
Throughout the time that the League was seeking a deputation to the 
Chancellor, the League was also pursuing the idea of a test case to 
illustrate the incompatibility of the tax and property laws for married 
women.
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Ayres Purdie initially suggested some possible cases in January 
1911, but it was not until November 1912 that it was agreed to pro-
ceed. (Walker notes that the success of Ayres Purdie in the case of Dr 
Burns the previous month influenced the decision (Walker, 2011, p. 91).) 
The plan was to take a case to challenge the deduction of income tax at 
source from the investment income of a married woman on the grounds 
that, under s 45 ITA 1842, married women were not taxable units. Ayres 
Purdie was authorised by the committee to acquire some English stock 
and foreign bonds in her name and further empowered to spend up 
to £20 commencing the case (Minute Book vol. 1, 1909-1913, 22.11.1912, 
29.1.1913).
In March 1913, Ayres Purdie reported to the committee that she 
had lodged a Petition of Right with the Home Secretary. She had been 
advised that it was not possible to directly sue the Crown for recovery of 
tax deducted at source and hence this unusual approach was required.
But again, matters seemed to stall, and in October 1913 it was 
decided that further proceedings should be postponed until the spring. 
The minutes do not say why this decision was made, only that a short 
report was sent to the press (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 31.10.1913).
The case was picked up in 1914 and it was finally heard on 19 May 
1914 (Purdie v The King, 1914). Ayres Purdie, representing herself, made 
the argument that while it might be correct for the company paying div-
idends to withhold tax from the dividends, since she was not a charge-
able person under the Taxes Acts, she had a right to reclaim the with-
held tax from the Crown. The burden of taxation fell on her husband 
and not her.
The Crown argued that there was a distinction between a personal 
assessment – to which s 45 applied and which had to be in the name 
of the husband as Ayres Purdie said – and the method of deduction 
to which s 45 simply did not apply. Furthermore, if her argument was 
right, all English companies would need to identify how many of their 
shareholders were married women before they could pay any dividends 
which was hardly practical. (Purdie v The King, 1914)
The judge agreed with the Crown, holding that Ayres Purdie’s con-
tention was “based upon a complete misapprehension”. The first part 
of s 45 charged her as if she was unmarried, and the fact that tax was 
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deducted at source was simply the mechanism of collection, it was not 
a charge in her name. The case was dismissed with costs (Purdie v The 
King, 1914).
While this outcome might have seemed a setback for the League, 
Walker reports that the decision received “favourable publicity” – both 
for Ayres Purdie herself and the subject of the case (Walker, 2011, p. 
91). Ayres Purdie’s efforts were therefore not in vain.
1914 to 1918: The final years of the League
England declared war
Although the loss of the test case must have been a disappointment for 
the League, it came at a time when other activities were in full swing. 
1914 had got off to a good start, with a report of 165 new members 
admitted in 1913 – of which 52 were prepared to be resisters (Minute Book 
vol. 2, 1913-1918, 9.1.1914).
That spring and summer many resisters were ‘sold up’ at auction, 
a new leaflet on married women was produced, a new typist engaged, 
more lecture tours were planned for Yorkshire, Oxford and Ireland, and 
there was even the suggestion of engaging a paid organiser for the west 
of England (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-1918). But all this activity came to a 
shuddering halt on Tuesday 4 August 1914, with the minutes recording 
in large letters: “England declared War” (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 
4.8.1914).
That Tuesday, the League secretary had held a meeting in Barnstaple, 
at which a number of new members had signed up.13 The event was part 
of a speaking tour by Kineton Parkes which had started with two weeks 
in Ireland, before going via London to Oxford, then on to Western-
super-Mare and down into the West Country. On receipt of the news of 
war, she headed straight back to London, leaving Ilfacombe at 7am the 
next day and finally returning at 8pm to call an urgent meeting (Minute 
Book vol. 2, 1913-1918).
A crisis meeting was held the following day, with just four members 
of the committee present, including Clemence Housman as chair. Action 
was immediate, with notice given to the League’s two office staff and a 
13 The note of 4 August recorded five new members, while the minutes of 6 August recorded 
that it was a drawing room meeting at which seven new members signed up.
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decision to let the League’s flat. Kineton Parkes was offered a month’s 
salary, after which her position would be reviewed. She promptly 
offered to work for a nominal salary (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 
6.8.1914).
Initial administration completed, the League then had to make an 
important decision of principle – did League members continue to resist 
their taxes or to resume payment to support the war effort?
The decision was not an easy one to make, and a series of urgent 
meetings ensued. While some members felt that the League should 
both suspend activities and pay their taxes, others like Clemence Hous-
man felt equally strongly against resuming payment, considering that 
“resisters should maintain their constitutional position” (Minute Book 
vol. 2, 1913-1918, 18.8.1914). Even the Inland Revenue got involved, with 
members including Marie Lawson (see page 25) reporting the receipt of 
letters urging them to pay at this time of crisis (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-
1918, 18.8.1914).
On 26 August, an extraordinary meeting of the League was called. 
Kineton Parkes reported that members were “sharply divided” with 
even members who had been imprisoned for tax resistance taking oppos-
ing positions in the debate (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 38).
The final vote in the room was exceedingly close, with the resolu-
tion to stop resisting tax carried by just one vote – 18 in favour and 
17 against. When postal votes from those who could not attend were 
included, the position shifted more strongly in favour of cessation with 54 
in favour of resuming payment and 31 votes against.
After that decision, winding down activities continued. Clemence 
Housman and Dr Winifred Patch, who had both been strongly in favour 
of continued resistance, stood down from the committee, Kineton Parkes 
received permission to work for the Women’s Emergency Committee 
and Ethel Ayres Purdie was asked to audit a final balance sheet.
Members were informed of the committee’s decision that activities 
should be suspended (although resistance of arrears could continue) by 
letter, and a testimonial was sought for Kineton Parkes (WTRL, 1914).
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The war years
During the war years, with many members of the League involved in 
war work, a watching brief was kept by a few members of the commit-
tee. This small group met in March 1916 and again in February 1917. At 
the latter meeting Dr Winfred Patch, who was still resisting her taxes,14 
reported the bankruptcy proceedings ongoing against her (Minute Book 
vol. 2, 1913-1918, 13.2.1917).
The final meeting of the League was held on 5 July 1918 at Dr Ger-
trude Eaton’s home in Kensington, a few months after the Represen-
tation of the People Act 1918 received royal assent. While the Act did 
not enfranchise all women, it would have enfranchised many of the 
League’s supporters.
A small gathering of four attended, including founding members Dr 
Elizabeth Wilks and Mrs Cobden Sanderson. It was resolved to dissolve 
the League and use any remaining funds to publish Mrs Kineton Parkes’ 
book on the work of the League. After that, it was a matter of finding 
homes for the remaining banners, minutes and press cuttings – many of 
which thankfully found their way in due course to the Women’s Library 
at the LSE (Minute Book vol. 2, 1913-1918, 5.7.1918).
Beyond 1918: Independent taxation
While the League ceased to exist after the vote was won in 1918, mar-
ried women were still considered to be chattels of their husbands for tax 
purposes, and Ethel Ayres Purdie and the WFL continued the fight for 
independent taxation.
In 1920, Walker reports that Ethel Ayres Purdie was invited to give 
evidence to a Royal Commission on Income Tax (Walker, 2011, p. 93). 
Representing the WFL, Ayres Purdie made a number of points in writ-
ten evidence to the Commission, based on her claim of 12 years of prac-
tical tax experience (Minutes of Evidence, 1919, p. 329).
While by that time the ITA 1842 had been replaced by a new Income 
Tax Act 1918 (ITA 1918) which consolidated earlier acts, it still defined 
married women as “incapacitated persons” together with infants, luna-
tics, idiots or the insane, a position which Ayres Purdie considered 
14  Further details of Dr Patch’s ongoing resistance can be found at https://sniggle.net/TPL/
index5.php?entry=02Mar11.
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“the grossest insult”. The new Act was also still inconsistent with the 
Married Women’s Property Acts, which were by then over 40 years old 
(Minutes of Evidence, 1919, p. 329).
Ayres Purdie also highlighted that while the new Act did allow for 
husbands and wives to report income separately, one or other of the 
parties had to notify the Revenue six months in advance of the 6 May in 
the year of assessment, which was hardly practical – and impossible in 
the year that a woman married (Minutes of Evidence, 1919, p. 331).
In oral evidence Ayres Purdie was invited by the panel – on the 
grounds so few women had appeared – to make a brief statement to 
the Commission before they asked her questions. Initially she resisted 
this special treatment on the grounds that her statement was complete, 
before adding as a practical example of the issues she faced that the returns 
for her own employees were made out in the name of her husband.
While Ayres Purdie’s written evidence was exceedingly clear, and 
evidenced her command both of the legislation and the extent of her 
practical experience, during questioning she soon made a statement 
fatal to her submission. She confirmed that she was, in fact, still resist-
ing her taxes, claiming that she had “never yet made a return of my 
income and no tax has ever been paid upon it” (Minutes of Evidence, 
1919, p. 332).
The Commission took a dim view, calling it evasion and devoting 
most of their questioning to trying – and failing – to understand Ayres 
Purdie’s position that she was prepared to pay her tax, but only pro-
vided that she could be assessed separately from her husband. The 
panel first took convincing that Ayres Purdie’s husband was not com-
pleting returns or paying taxes without her knowledge, before suggest-
ing that she should have used the provisions to report separately to pay 
her taxes. To this Ayres Purdie objected that while reporting was sepa-
rate, the assessment was joint. The panel then suggested that she should 
pay the income tax due to her husband so then he could pay it to the Reve-
nue – to which Ayres Purdie replied that there was no law to compel her 
to do that. Her income was hers under the Married Women’s Property 
Acts. For much of the oral evidence Ayres Purdie and the panel were 
therefore at odds, her admission having fatally undermined her credibil-
ity in their eyes.
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As Walker reports, the Commission ultimately concluded that the 
aggregation of the wife’s income with her husband’s should continue 
(Walker, 2011, p. 93). It was not until 1990 that married women were 
finally separately assessed from their husbands.
Conclusion
It is difficult to conclude on the impact of the League. While it never 
achieved the 500 resisters that it initially aimed for, the League’s history 
records 212 members as resisting their taxes (plus a further three names 
added by hand), some of whom resisted on more than one occasion 
(Parkes, c. 1920, pp. 42-44).
When you consider that this list is not a complete list of all who 
resisted tax for the vote,15 – and that resistance was an act of civil diso-
bedience which put resisters at risk of distraint and imprisonment – and 
given that the League only truly started to hit its stride in 1913 and 1914, 
a figure of over 200 individual resisters is not insignificant when com-
pared to the figure of over 1,300 suffragettes listed as imprisoned from 
1906 to 1914.16
The League’s main goal was as a publicity machine, and the wide 
publicity it achieved is evidenced by the large scrapbook of press cut-
tings held in the League’s archives. The League attracted too an impres-
sive list of resisters and supporters including Princess Duleep Singh, 
the Duchess of Bedford, Louisa Garrett Anderson, Marie Stopes and 
Adela Pankhurst. League members also spoke on platforms including 
Emmeline Pankhurst and other prominent members of the WSPU.
While the attitude of the authorities did harden over time, even 
when the most severe step of imprisonment was imposed, the terms 
were of short duration and resisters such as Mark Wilks and Clemence 
Housman were released with their tax unpaid. Kineton Parkes even talks 
of the authorities leaving alone hardened resisters – threatening distraint 
but not carrying it out (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 35). 
15 For example, Captain Gonne who was imprisoned for refusing to pay Inhabited House 
Duty on behalf of his wife (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 28) is regularly mentioned in the League’s 
minutes but is not included in the list, nor is Emma Sproson who went to prison for 
resisting her dog licences in 1911 (Crawford, 1999, p. 124).
16  Figure taken from the Suffragettes: Amnesty of August 1914: index of people arrested, 
1906-1914. https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C4769024.
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The League was not just localised to London, but had sales as far 
north as Glasgow, Edinburgh and Arbroath, from Bristol to Kent, 
from Leeds to Liverpool, and the League secretary took the message of 
resistance all around England, Scotland and Ireland. The League also 
reached out overseas, with founding member Mrs Cobden Sanderson 
representing the League at the Sixth Congress of the International Wom-
en’s Suffrage Alliance in Stockholm in 1910 (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 10) and at 
the International Woman Suffrage Allowance Conference in Budapest 
in 1913 (Parkes, c. 1920, p. 32). The League was technically skilled and 
beyond the auctions and propaganda were able, thanks to the skills 
of Ayres Purdie, to deal directly with the Inland Revenue at Somerset 
House and even lobby the Chancellor himself.
However, the League was hampered by how long it took for action to 
taken against resisters. It could be months before goods were distrained 
and an auction held, and it took years for Ayres Purdie’s test cases to 
reach the courts. It was difficult to commit to actions which would take 
such time to have effect when, as Laurence Housman wrote in the intro-
duction to the League’s history, that there was always a sense that the 
vote was only just out of reach and that the next Franchise Bill would 
pass (Parkes, c. 1920, p. i).
In the end, the League’s actions, based on a sound basis with signifi-
cant historical precedent, were another weapon in the fight for the vote 
which was fought by many different groups and individual women on 
many different fronts.
In my presentations on this subject I have always concluded with 
Laurence Housman’s words from his forward to the League’s history:
I have always regarded it as peculiarly far-seeing and wise in the 
line it had made its own. For tax resistance was a principle that 
both constitutional and militant were bound to approve, and 
one that British democracy, with its sound traditions and queer 
mental limitations was able to understand. (Parkes, c. 1920, p. iii).
However, in this chapter, I would like to give Margaret Kineton 
Parkes the final word. 
By all true suffragists the attainment of the vote must be 
regarded rather as the beginning than the end of women’s polit-
ical activity. (Parkes, c.1920, p. 41)
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3 Gender Board Composition and Tax Aggressiveness in    
Spanish listed companies    
for the period 2011-2017
Francesco Cortellese1 
Abstract
In this study, we consider whether the gender composition of the board of 
directors could have some relation with tax aggressiveness for a sample of 
Spanish public listed companies covering the 2011-2017 period. Our fixed-
effect models of panel data do not show any significant relation between 
female representation on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness.
Introduction
The frame of this study is the political agenda at the European level on 
gender equality in economic decision-making. In this area, we focus on 
whether the gender composition of the board of directors of a sample of 
Spanish public listed companies has some effect on tax aggressiveness 
for the period of 2011-2017.
We will first analyse the gender diversity of the board of directors in 
some European countries and the evolution of tax aggressiveness in the 
last decade. Then we will review the literature that investigates whether 
a higher level of women on the board of directors produces a lower 
level of tax aggressiveness. After that, we will start with the analysis of 
the Spanish case, with a panel of data and we will run an econometric 
model to see if gender changes in the board of directors affect the level 
of fiscal aggressiveness.
1  Dr Francesco Cortellese is an Associate Professor at the European University of Madrid.
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Background
At the global level, the development of economies and policies to reduce 
inequalities has spread the importance of gender policy. Although, with 
differences between countries due to their cultural and social context, in 
recent decades there has been a progressive change in the role of women 
in society: to one exclusively of mother and wife, has been added the 
role of worker. While for some jobs the share of the female workforce is 
equal to or even greater than that of men, in others the access of women 
is de facto limited. An example of the latter is women directors on a board 
of directors in a multinational company. The importance of including 
women in this position not only responds to an obligation of equality 
and human rights, but also to the need to ensure a factor of diversity in 
the composition of the board of directors. Moreover, ensuring the equal 
opportunity for women will increase the human resources available in 
a country which could have a good impact on business performance 
(Bruno et al., 2018; Tillenius & Lango, 2018).
These are the reasons why, in 2012, the European Commission pro-
posed a directive to increase the number of women on the boards of 
listed companies to 40% (European Commission, 2012b). The aim was 
to produce a drastic change in the low number of women on the boards 
of European companies. However, despite the broad consensus that 
the proposal has received, some European countries believed that this 
would be better achieved through national legislation in which each 
country could decide what type of legislation to adopt and so the direc-
tive was blocked.
In the end, some countries implemented soft legislation, while others 
implemented hard legislation. Soft legislation refers to cases where the 
law does not prescribe any binding quotas. The opposite, hard legis-
lation, brings a variety of administrative penalties in cases where the 
mandatory quota is not achieved. The first case of hard legislation was 
back in 2003 in Norway, where the law states that public listed com-
panies should have a 40% gender quota of the directors of the board. 
From that case, as reported in the table below, several European coun-
tries have produced different legislative solutions to increase the gender 
quota on the board of directors. However, the countries applying hard 
legislation have reached their targets by the given period, while coun-
tries applying soft rules have not reached their targets. 
3: Gender Board Composition and Tax Aggressiveness 51
Thanks to the positive result that binding legislation has obtained, 
the European Commission has stressed the importance of adopting 
one (European Commission, 2016, 2019).
Table 3.1: Different quota regulation 
Country Bill passed Target % Deadline Sanctions 
(Yes/No)
Gender quota 2017
Norway 2003 40% 2008 Yes 46%
France 2011 40% 2017 Yes 43%
Italy 2011 33% 2017 Yes 32%
Belgium 2011 33% 2019 Yes 32%
Germany 2015 30% 2016 Yes 32%
Netherlands 2014 30% 2023 No 22%
Spain 2007 40% 2015 No 20%
Source: Seierstad et al., 2017; Spencer Stuart, 2019.
In the case of Spain, this issue was first addressed in Law No. 3 of 
2007 on Gender Equality, which recommended that companies with 
250 or more employees should achieve at least 40% of women’s repre-
sentation on their boards of directors by 2015. However, as it was not 
mandatory, the target was not achieved by most of the companies. Later, 
in 2014, with Law 31, the Government established that each company 
would voluntarily establish a gender quota to be achieved. Finally, in 
2015, the Code of Best Practices for Listed Companies foresaw that com-
panies should have a 30% gender share of the board of directors by 
2020. However, as those were not binding legislation, most companies 
have not achieved these targets.
With regard to tax aggressiveness, the concept is best understood 
by defining tax planning and tax avoidance. Tax planning refers to the 
use of legislation to reduce the tax burden, while tax avoidance refers to 
mechanisms to reduce the tax burden by using legislation in a different 
way from its purpose. Therefore, in the first case, governments offer 
the possibility of taking advantage of reduced tax liability to maximise 
equality and neutrality in taxation, while in the second case, taxpayers 
take advantage of loopholes in legislation to reduce their tax burden 
(European Commission, 2012a; IHS, 2017). Even if in recent years 
many countries have introduced legislation that defines the cases of tax 
avoidance, it is true that in most situations this requires a case-by-case 
analysis. In other words, the boundaries between what is and is not 
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prescribed by the law are buried, leaving multinational companies to 
adopt tax structures that could be investigated by both the authorities 
and the European Commission, as well as questioned by NGOs and 
society. These practices are what we refer to as tax aggressiveness.
The problem of tax aggressiveness is not a recent one; already in 
1998, the OECD published a report on the side effects of tax competi-
tion based on harmful preferential tax regimes (OECD, 1998). However, 
although in the last decade some countries have taken unilateral meas-
ures to counter tax avoidance practices, it is only with the 2008 financial 
crisis that the problem was addressed at the international level. Thus, 
in 2012, the G20, pushed by the society that was hit by the crisis and 
shaken by the scandals of aggressive tax planning, gave a mandate to 
the OECD to formulate guidelines on taxation. Therefore, the OECD 
decided to launch a project called BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing), which consists of 15 actions containing rules and general princi-
ples for the controversial areas of international taxation. The first set of 
rules was published in 2015. The BEPS project established a turning 
point in international taxation because its work includes more than 
130 countries and jurisdictions and opens the discussion to the private 
sector. It also has required countries to move from unilateral legislation, 
which in some cases was not effective in dealing with international tax 
problems, to cooperative regulation that resulted in the signing of the 
Multilateral Legal Instrument (MLI) in 2018. With the MLI, more than 
90 jurisdictions agreed on a minimum package of tax measures that 
would amend their national legislation and their double taxation con-
ventions to reduce loopholes and minimise double taxation and double 
non-taxation problems.
The European Union has been an important player in this context by 
adopting in 2016 and 2017, two directives specifically dealing with tax 
avoidance practices: ATAD I and ATAD II. ATAD I contains a General 
Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) that states that every member country should 
adopt legislation that handles situations of tax avoidance. The require-
ment comes after a period of relative uncertainty where the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) had included in some of the cases how the 
member cases should have fought tax avoidance and tax aggressiveness 
under the abuse of law principle (De Charette, 2019). Moreover, consid-
ering the fundamental principles of freedom and the competitiveness 
3: Gender Board Composition and Tax Aggressiveness 53
playing field in the European Union, the lack of legislation to control 
tax avoidance or not enforcing it could be equivalent to an implicit, de 
facto, state aid. For this reason, the European Union adopted specific 
legislation addressing this. ATAD I (Anti-tax avoidance Council Direc-
tive I 2016/1164, 2016) set a minimum level for all member countries on 
anti-tax avoidance rules, exit taxation and thin capitalisation. On the 
other hand, ATAD II introduces measures to prevent hybrid mismatch 
arrangements (Anti-tax avoidance Council Directive II 2017/952, 2017). 
Spain, as an EU member state, already included in its legislation all the 
anti-tax avoidance provisions with the 27/2014, reformed in 2018, Real 
Degree no.27 del Impuesto sobre Sociedades. 
Literature review
In the following part we analyse the association between gender com-
position of the board of directors and tax aggressiveness. The role of 
the directors is strictly related to all the decision processes, including 
the amount of tax paid. Some studies have found a negative associa-
tion between gender (women) and tax aggressiveness (Francis et al., 
2014; Lanis et al., 2015; Sour, 2015). In the study conducted by Francis 
et al. (2014), they take a sample of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 public 
companies for the time period from 1998 to 2007 and focus on the rela-
tion between the gender of CFO and tax aggressiveness of the firms. To 
measure tax aggressiveness, they use three different variables: the prob-
ability of tax sheltering, the predicted unrecognised tax benefit and the 
discretionary permanent book-tax differences. In all three cases, they 
find significantly lower levels of tax-aggressiveness for firms with a 
female CFO.
Lanis et al. (2015) arrive to a similar conclusion, where with a sample 
of 416 S&P 500 companies for a period 2006-2008, they find a nega-
tive relation of female representation on the board of directors and tax 
aggressiveness. In this case, the variables used for tax aggressiveness are 
the effective tax rate and the book-tax gap.
Hoseini and Gerayli (2018) also obtain the same result. In this case, 
they use 97 companies from the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2011 to 
2015. The dependent variables chosen are the book-tax gap and the 
effective tax rate. They find a negative relation between the presence of 
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women on corporate boards and the level of corporate tax avoidance, 
especially in larger companies. Moreover, repeating the model for each 
year separately, they find the coefficient of the independent variable of 
the presence of the women being negative for every year.
Another study is the one carried out by Richardson et al. (2016). 
With panel data of public listed Australian companies from 2006-2010, 
they find that the presence of female directors was negatively related 
to tax aggressiveness after controlling with variables like the age of 
directors and financial and tax expertise. So, to promote gender equal-
ity and considering there are no studies on board gender composition 
and tax aggressiveness for Spanish public listed companies, we believe 
this investigation is of interest. In this way, the Government could have 
better information to set binding gender quota on boards of directors.
Methodology
Data
The data is taken from two databases. For the information regarding 
gender, we use EIKON by Thomson and Reuters, while for the finan-
cial information we use ORBIS published by the Bureau Van Dijk. Due 
to the difficulty in the collection of all the data from 2011 to 2017, the 
research was limited to a sample of 26 public listed companies of the 
Spanish stock market, of which 16 are of the IBEX35. We do not select a 
specific sector, although we exclude financial and assurance companies 
due to their particular business and fiscal provisions.
Variables: dependent variable
For the dependent variables, we have selected three proxy variables 
that could represent the tax aggressiveness of companies. The first one 
is the ratio of taxes paid on turnover (TTS). With this ratio, we want to 
determine whether the gender of the directors could influence the strat-
egy of the companies and, therefore, the payment of taxes.
Another variable used as a proxy of tax aggression is the percent-
age of effective tax rates (ETRS) (Francis et al., 2014; Hanlon & Heitz-
man, 2010; Hoseini & Gerayli, 2018; Lanis et al., 2015). The ETR will take 
the tax paid on the earnings before tax (EBT), without considering the 
tax adjustments. The rate is calculated by dividing the taxes paid by the 
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accounting result. For this, we have considered only the cases where a 
positive EBT is found.
The third proxy variable that we have used is the book-tax difference 
or gap (BTD). In this case, the ratio is calculated by dividing the differ-
ence between the EBT and taxable income by the total assets. Taxable 
income is calculated by dividing taxes by the statutory tax rate, which 
in Spain is 25%. Finally, during the period of time, there have been two 
changes in the rate of corporate income tax, a decrease from 30% to 
28% in 2013 and from 28% to 25% in the following year, we use 25% as 
the rate for each year. So, we recalculate the amount of tax for the whole 
period on the basis of a tax rate of 25%.
Independent variables
Our independent variable is gender diversity on the board of directors 
(WBOP), calculated as the percentage of women on the board of direc-
tors. We took this percentage at the end of each of the seven fiscal years.
Control variables
As control variables, we selected different type of financial ratios: profit-
ability, operational and structure ratios. 
Table 3.2: Variables
ETRS Effective Tax Rate 25% = 
 Payable (+) or Refundable (-) Taxes /Taxes Earnings Before Taxes
BTD Book-Tax Difference or gap = (EBT-Taxable Income) / Assets = 
 (EBT- Taxes/ Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate (25%)) / Assets
TTS Taxes on turnover 25% = Payable (+) or Refundable (-) Taxes / Turnover
WBOP Board Gender Diversity, Percent = no woman board / total no board
EBITDAM EBITDA margin (%) = (EBITDA / Operating revenue) * 100
ROA ROA using Earnings Before Tax (EBT) (%) = (EBT / Total Assets) * 100
ROE ROE using Earnings Before Tax (EBT) (%) = 
 (EBT / Shareholder funds) * 100
RLE Total Liability/Equity
RS Solvency ratio (Asset based) (%)
FT Financial expenses / sales * 100
EVE Enterprise Value/EBITDA
Among the profitability ratio we used the EBITDA margin as a per-
centage of the EBITDA on the operating revenue, the Return on Assets 
(ROA) based on the earnings before tax, Return on Equity (ROE) and 
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finally the enterprise value divided by the EBITDA. Taking into con-
sideration the operational ratios, we select the interest paid on turn-
over. This was also included in considering the effect of the financial 
expenses on profit and the amount of tax paid. Finally, among the struc-
ture ratios, we chose the solvency ratio based on asset and the liabilities 
on equity.
Model
We have worked with the panel data of 26 public listed Spanish com-
panies for the period 2011-2017. The panel data, unlike cross-sectional 
data, allows us to consider more than one year and, unlike time series, 
allows us to include more than one individual in the study. So, a panel 
data set has multiple entities, each of which has repeated measurements 
of the same variables during a selected time period. Panel data may 
have an individual (group) effect and time effect which are analysed, 
jointly or individually, by fixed effect and random effect models. As the 
characteristic of our panel, we have a long-balanced panel, and we focus 
on linear regression. Unlike pooled ordinary least square (OLS), panel 
data allows us to correct the heterogeneity of the model that although 
cannot be measured, remains constant during the period.
For the model, we consider only individual effect (one-way) and we 
leave apart the time effect (two-way). With this equation, we run the 
fixed effect and random effect models. And we choose two between 
these two models, applying the Hausman test.
Yit = βXit + ηi + uit
The Y is the independent variable, the X is our independent and con-
trol variables, η is the unknown parameter and the u is the error term. 
Results
Descriptive analysis
The table below reports the mean of the descriptive analysis included in 
the annex for each year for the three dependent variables (ETRS, BTD, 
TTS), for the independent variable (WBOP) and for the control variables 
(WEMP, EBITDAM, ROA, ROE, RLE, RS, FT, EVE). The dependent vari-
ables ETRS, BTD and TTS, have a mean of 18.44, 0.13 and 3.44 respec-
tively. The independent variable WBOP has a mean equal to 17.12. 
3: Gender Board Composition and Tax Aggressiveness 57
This means that women representation on the board is small. Added to 
this, we saw a small increase during the period, from 15.05% in 2011 to 
21.77% in 2017.
Table 3.3: Descriptive analysis
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ETRS 154 19.53 20.42 -99.69 69.30
BTD 182 0.13 6.06 -54.24 33.12
TTS 182 3.44 5.78 -10.68 50.85
WBOP 182 17.11 8.94 0.00 45.45
WEMP 182 12.38 7.87 0.00 33.33
EBITDAM 182 23.49 20.47 -15.37 79.51
ROA 182 6.57 11.43 -39.25 85.00
ROE 182 15.86 46.00 -259.55 180.03
RLE 182 562.69 1467.28 -732.78 9816.70
RS 182 33.82 24.38 -68.39 87.50
EVE 182 10.81 7.22 -30.76 41.15
Correlation analysis
With the Pearson correlation analysis (see the annex), we want to check 
the association of the variables we use. In this case, the association does 
not mean a causality effect but a linear relationship moving from -1 to 
+1 where negative signs showed an inverse relation while a positive 
direct relation. In this first analysis, there is no  association between 
the independent and the dependent variables. However, repeating 
the analysis for each company, we can see that in some cases, the rela-
tion between the dependent variables and the independent variable 
is strong, but with an opposite sign, so when they are combined, the 
individual effects neutralise each other. Added to this analysis, most of 
the financial variables in the control group have an association between 
them and the dependent variables.
Regression analysis
We run three models, one for each of the three dependent variables: 
effective tax rates (ETRS), book-tax difference (BTD) and taxes on turno-
ver (TTS). We did not use OLS because we would have lost the individ-
ual differences that we have in panel data. To decide whether to use the 
fixed or random effect model, we apply the Hausman test. Finally, we 
run the fixed effect one-way model for each of three variables. We also 
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check each model for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation of the residual and each model shows problems of autocorrela-
tion.
Table 3.4: Regression analysis
Panel data fixed effect
Variables ETRS BTD TTS
WBOP -0.375 -0.036 0.028
(0.28) (0.05) (0.05)












EVE 0.219 0.147 0.219
-0.500 (0.04)*** (0.05)***
Number of groups 25 26 26
Number of obs 154 182 182
F (Model) 2.60** 328.48*** 25.11***
Adj R-squared 35.23% 77.15% 69.74%
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
The result of each model is that the gender composition of the direc-
tor board (WBOP) does not affect the tax aggressiveness. In the first 
model, taking the Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) as a dependent variable, 
a positive coefficient will mean a lower level of tax aggressiveness. 
Holding all other variables constant, for one unit increase in ROA, the 
ETRS is expected to increase by 0.77 units, meaning a lower level of tax 
aggressiveness with a p-value less than .01 small enough to reject the H0. 
of non-linear relation between Return on Assets (ROA) and tax aggres-
siveness. In this model, only the Return on Assets (ROA) results to be a 
significant variable.
With the second model, we considered the difference between the 
Earnings Before Tax (EBT) and the Taxable Income (TI) divided by the 
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total assets, as an estimation of tax aggressiveness. Therefore, an incre-
ment in the ratio (BTD) will mean an increase in the level of tax aggres-
siveness. In this model, the ROA presents a p-value less than .01. So, in 
line with the result we obtained in the first model, an increment of one 
unit of ROA will produce an increase in the BTD of 0.46. In this second 
model, we have another variable showing a p-value sufficiently low to 
reject the H0 ratio resulting from dividing the financial expenses by the 
sales (FT). This ratio measures the percentage of sales that are needed 
to cover the financial expenses. Although the ratio is derived by a vari-
ety of factors, a lower level of it is usually associated with a healthier 
company because the cost of external capital would be lower compared 
to the sales. As the coefficient of the variable is negative, a higher cost 
of external capital will be related to a lower level of tax aggressiveness. 
Finally, also, the market value is related to a higher level of tax aggres-
siveness. So, for a given EBITDA, an increment in the enterprise value 
would represent an increment of tax aggressiveness.
In the last model, we have considered as a dependent variable, the 
taxes paid over the turnover (TT). Also, in this case, for the independent 
variable, we do not have enough evidence to reject the H0. However, all 
the other variables have a p-value of the t-test sufficiently low to reject 
the H0. In this case, the high level of the dependent variable means a low 
level of tax aggressiveness. Although the other variables have a p-value 
of the t-test sufficiently low to reject the H0, the signs are not always 
justified by economic reason. The ROE in this model results to be sig-
nificant with a minus sign. Considering that it is calculated taking the 
Earnings Before Tax (EBT), it should be positive, meaning that a higher 
income for the shareholder should be related also to a higher taxable 
income.
Discussion and conclusion
The subject of this research was whether the gender diversity of the board 
of directors affected the tax aggressiveness of companies. We have seen 
that Spain, unlike other European countries, has not yet passed a law 
with a mandatory target. As a result, Spanish companies have adopted 
heterogeneous policies on this issue, and the result is that, on average, 
only 21.77% of the members of the board of directors are women. These 
differences are also reflected in the econometric models that we have 
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run where the gender share of the board of directors was not found 
to be a significant variable to explain the variance of fiscal aggressive-
ness in each model. On other hand, this variance was partly explained by 
the control variables we selected. For this reason, it is believed that the 
Spanish Government should set a mandatory target on gender policy to 
increase the number of women on the board of directors.
In addition, future studies on tax aggressiveness could add other 
variables of the members of the board of directors such as culture, skills, 
age or other characteristics so that the Government can promote a cul-
ture of best practices in tax matters.
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Annexes
Descriptive analysis
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ETRS 2011 19.10 12.19 -15.66 41.74
BTD 2011 0.77 3.41 -9.37 10.08
TTS 2011 2.86 5.03 -10.68 16.70
WBOP 2011 15.05 6.84 5.88 30.00
EBITDAM 2011 23.96 20.05 5.10 76.32
ROA 2011 7.01 11.01 -12.82 49.40
ROE 2011 24.84 45.59 -85.63 180.03
RLE 2011 642.54 1444.86 38.70 7037.04
RS 2011 32.92 19.12 1.40 72.10
FT 2011 4.26 3.78 0.05 14.56
EVE 2011 8.58 3.80 1.63 20.20
ETRS 2012 20.31 9.91 -1.16 37.15
BTD 2012 0.45 3.37 -7.31 7.02
TTS 2012 1.98 4.99 -8.45 15.85
WBOP 2012 15.51 8.37 5.88 40.00
EBITDAM 2012 22.76 20.76 4.29 77.96
ROA 2012 4.88 11.86 -13.86 46.55
ROE 2012 14.15 49.06 -92.51 173.15
RLE 2012 675.37 1709.56 24.37 8761.27
RS 2012 33.98 20.52 1.13 80.41
FT 2012 3.99 3.41 0.07 12.70
EVE 2012 10.79 7.25 1.38 31.15
ETRS 2013 13.41 33.05 -99.69 59.26
BTD 2013 -0.15 4.90 -16.87 6.63
TTS 2013 2.78 4.29 -3.57 16.49
WBOP 2013 15.27 9.39 0.00 36.36
EBITDAM 2013 23.22 20.49 5.08 77.68
ROA 2013 5.02 9.35 -14.70 31.62
ROE 2013 16.80 39.53 -63.97 155.97
RLE 2013 706.49 1901.81 21.18 9816.70
RS 2013 35.16 21.82 1.01 82.52
FT 2013 3.71 3.46 0.07 11.74
EVE 2013 12.60 10.24 -3.04 41.15
ETRS 2014 21.58 21.33 -57.20 69.30
BTD 2014 -0.19 3.37 -11.59 5.18
TTS 2014 3.38 3.72 -0.67 17.30
WBOP 2014 16.56 9.35 5.26 45.45
EBITDAM 2014 23.64 20.69 2.21 76.57
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Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 2014 6.35 7.45 -2.79 30.92
ROE 2014 6.35 19.87 -10.17 75.01
RLE 2014 532.66 1553.58 -681.38 8003.61
RS 2014 34.83 24.55 -17.20 85.55
FT 2014 4.00 4.38 0.06 16.26
EVE 2014 12.18 7.35 -2.54 30.30
ETRS 2015 16.92 23.22 -53.33 58.73
BTD 2015 0.58 5.04 -15.57 14.91
TTS 2015 3.07 4.56 -1.97 17.74
WBOP 2015 16.55 8.82 5.26 41.67
EBITDAM 2015 22.72 22.11 -14.99 79.51
ROA 2015 5.76 9.95 -23.04 29.78
ROE 2015 0.90 74.59 -259.55 69.64
RLE 2015 613.38 1512.35 -698.95 7120.88
RS 2015 34.84 25.41 -16.70 87.50
FT 2015 4.00 4.58 0.06 15.89
EVE 2015 11.21 5.41 -4.88 21.82
ETRS 2016 26.07 8.20 8.29 47.37
BTD 2016 -2.69 10.97 -54.24 3.68
TTS 2016 4.87 5.31 0.51 23.67
WBOP 2016 19.10 9.14 7.69 36.36
EBITDAM 2016 23.80 21.33 -15.37 76.07
ROA 2016 6.09 11.66 -39.25 29.29
ROE 2016 23.18 18.06 -14.80 62.01
RLE 2016 387.61 1055.26 -732.78 5343.10
RS 2016 32.17 31.64 -68.39 86.01
FT 2016 6.29 15.40 0.02 79.66
EVE 2016 9.02 8.87 -30.76 18.06
ETRS 2017 18.47 23.42 -85.99 45.91
BTD 2017 2.13 6.96 -8.49 33.12
TTS 2017 5.17 10.10 -4.57 50.85
WBOP 2017 21.77 9.31 5.88 41.67
EBITDAM 2017 24.36 20.20 5.52 77.11
ROA 2017 10.87 16.73 -0.19 85.00
ROE 2017 12.19 50.87 -224.46 57.16
RLE 2017 380.77 1016.96 -495.77 5169.94
RS 2017 32.83 27.96 -37.87 75.74
FT 2017 4.27 8.50 0.04 42.73
EVE 2017 11.27 5.42 5.17 27.52


































































































































































































































































































































































4 A Gender Perspective on the Role of Tax Law in Support of 
the Sustainable Development 




The chapter investigates the role of taxation in the light of the evolution from 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) in the current European tax law and development landscape 
and in connection with the New European Consensus on Development, paying 
specific attention to the gender and human rights implications of tax systems in 
the achievement of the SDGs. The chapter concludes that a substantive coher-
ent approach that transforms declarations and intents into factual, concrete, 
unambiguous legislation in the field of taxation, reversing its accepted impact 
on gender equality and promoting overall sustainable development, is still not 
there. In the absence of concrete measures in support of gender equality, and 
without wide-spread political will to create gender responsive fiscal systems, 
sustainable development models will not succeed.
Introduction
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission, originally established by the UN 
in 1983 as the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(1987), defined sustainable development as the human ability “... to 
make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”.
1 Cristina Trenta is an Associate Professor in Law at Örebro University. This chapter was 
made possible by the financial assistance of the Torsten Söderbergs Stiftelse. The author is 
grateful to the foundation for their support.
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In 2006, recalling that very same definition, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union (2006) emphasised that sustainable development is an over-
arching objective of the European Union (EU), as set out in the Treaty 
governing all of the Union’s policies and activities. Any activity directly 
supporting sustainable development efforts within the EU or part of 
the Union’s international outreach should respect the principles of 
democracy, gender equality, solidarity and the rule of law. It should also 
respect the fundamental rights as set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EU, 2012), including freedom and equal opportunities for all. 
Furthermore, sustainable development finds explicit acknowledgment 
in EU Treaties along three different dimensions of development which 
have to be addressed together, systemically: economic, social and envi-
ronmental. A life of dignity for all, a peaceful society and social inclu-
sion are, in the view of the EU, at the core of sustainable development 
(European Commission, 2016). 
This chapter investigates the legal dimension of sustainable devel-
opment as it specifically relates to gender, gender equality and human 
rights issues in the context of tax law as one of the elements of a state’s 
policing (Enders & Remig, 2014). While this area of research sits 
squarely within the European, international and national development 
debates, specific attention to the connection between tax law, sustain-
able development and human rights, while gaining considerable rele-
vance and coverage in the mainstream press (OECD, 2018), remains for 
now a topic little explored in academic inquiry (Gunnarsson & Eriks-
son, 2017). 
Theory and goals
According to the UN’s (1986, Preamble) own ‘Resolution on the Right 
of Development’, development is an interdisciplinary area of study and 
intervention as development represents “a comprehensive economic, 
social, cultural and political process”. 
Because of this, the chapter adopts an interdisciplinary legal meth-
odology process, with legal concepts, principles and findings being 
anchored, complemented and supported by conceptualisations and 
observations from ancillary non-legal disciplines. Specifically, the 
study will adopt Lamb’s (2005) interdisciplinary method for taxation 
to identify, analyse and elaborate social data from a tax law perspec-
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tive. The approach is particularly useful when research questions in the 
legal domain are strictly intertwined with a necessary understanding 
of societal issues and factors (McKerchar, 2008). The approach allows 
researchers to evaluate the existing legal framework in detail without 
renouncing the possibility of a lex ferenda perspective, what the law 
should be or how it should regulate a particular situation.
Additionally, the chapter adopts a substantive approach to the issue 
of gender equality, human rights and tax law (Gunnarson, 2011). In this 
sense, it can also be framed as research about law rather than research 
in law.
Sustainable development and human rights
The UN’s (2000) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were a set 
of international goals introduced in 2000 after the UN’s Millennium 
Summit. UN members agreed on fighting poverty and hunger, improv-
ing health and education and promoting gender equality. The MDGs 
process ended in 2015: it has been replaced by the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) framework, part of the 2030 Agenda adopted 
by the UN in September 2015 (UN, 2015). The shift from the MDGs 
to the SDGs acknowledges the novel importance attributed to human 
rights and sustainability for global development. The 2030 Agenda also 
identifies in the worldwide implementation of human rights the way 
to avoid discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinions, national and social origin, property, birth, 
disability or other status”. The preamble of the document explicitly 
singles out the important role the realisation of human rights, gender 
equality and the empowerment of all women and girls, play in the pro-
cess of sustainable development (UN, 2015, Preamble). 
As such, the new 2030 Agenda is much more ambitious and broader 
in scope, and now comprises 17 SDGs and 169 targets. The goals are 
universal goals applicable to all countries, not only to developing ones, 
aimed at creating an inclusive society for all. The Agenda pays specific 
attention to the democratic process and to the rule of law, and is one of 
the most inclusive and ambitious international agreements currently in 
force. The goals and targets are integrated and indivisible, and consid-
ering their systemic integration and interplay, are necessary to achieve 
the Agenda’s overarching objectives (UN, 2015, para. 84, p.34). 
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The EU declared 2015 the year for development (European Council, 
2014) and embraced the UN 2030 Agenda. In June 2017, the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Commission adopted the 
“New European Consensus on Development” (EU, 2017). This docu-
ment recognises that “the evolution from the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflects 
the changing approach to global development.”
Such an approach, based on sustainable development and human 
rights, is “fully consistent with EU values and principles” (European 
Council, 2017). The adoption of a new paradigm for sustainable devel-
opment for the effective implementation of human rights is consistent 
with EU values: human rights and people’s well-being are a core value 
proclaimed in art. 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU, 2012), as 
did the Lisbon Treaty (2007). 
The TEU contains a specific commitment to working for the sustain-
able development of Europe and ties it to economic and social progress 
via the establishment of the internal market: 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for 
the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced eco-
nomic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, 
and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment.” (TEU, art. 3(3)). 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights upholds this promotion of 
balanced growth and sustainable development (EU, 2012, Preamble), 
and adds in the principles of equality and non-discrimination (EU, 2012, 
art. 21).2 The Charter also contains an express commitment to combat 
poverty, and to ensure a dignified life for all those who lack sufficient 
resources (EU, 2012, art. 34). Overall, these documents bind the EU and 
its Member states to promote the universal values of democracy, good 
governance, rule of law and the upholding of human rights for all as a 
necessary precondition to their ongoing sustainable development (EU, 
2017, para. 61, p. 32). 
2 The CJEU has defined discrimination as involving “the application of different rules 
to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations”. 
See Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:46. para. 16.
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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) supports this 
approach: in the European Parliament v Commission case, the Court stated 
that “(t)here can be no sustainable development and eradication of pov-
erty without peace and security and that the pursuit of the objectives 
of the Community’s new development policy necessarily proceed via 
the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights” (Cremona, 
2008; Case C-403/05, 2007).
Gender equality
The upholding of human rights obviously presents a gender equality 
facet. It is important in this context to differentiate between passive non-
discrimination and active promotion of equal rights (Brzezińska, 2009). 
While the EU Charter states that men and women are equal (EU, 2012, 
art. 23), art. 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU, 2012) prescribes instead that “in all its activities, the Union shall 
aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men 
and women”.
The EU and the EU Member states have an obligation to work 
towards gender equality in their legislative, political and administra-
tive activities clearly spelled out in the EU framework (EU Commis-
sion, 2015). Art. 10 of the TEU prescribes an obligation for the Union to 
define and implement policies and activities to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation;  art. 2 and art. 3(3)(2) of the TFEU support and pro-
tect gender equality. Specific recognition is also found in the case law of 
the CJEU and of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR). 
The EctHR (2012, para. 127) maintains that “the advancement of 
gender equality is today a major goal in the member States of the Coun-
cil of Europe and very weighty reasons would have to be put forward 
before such a difference of treatment could be regarded as compatible 
with the Convention”, while the CJEU has repeatedly held that “(t)he 
right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of the 
fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to 
ensure” (Case C-50/96). Additionally, all EU Member states have rati-
fied the 1979 UN “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women” (CEDAW, 1979); consequently, they must 
respect the duties deriving from the Convention (Burri & Anne, 2013, 
para. 4.4, p. 11). 
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The new European Consensus on Development also states that the 
EU and its Member States will proceed in accordance with the fulfil-
ment of obligations under the CEDAW, and firmly embrace the pro-
tection and fulfilment of women’s and girls’ rights (EU, 2017, p. 13). 
The Agenda 2030 commits to (UN, 2015, para. 3) “combat inequalities 
within and among countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive soci-
eties; to protect human rights and promote gender equality and the 
empowerment of women and girls”.
Inequality is closely related to discrimination. The Agenda 2030, 
while on one hand seeks to reduce inequality (Goal 10), on the other 
hand wants (target 10.2) to “(e)mpower and promote the social, eco-
nomic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, 
race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status”.
Goal 5’s specific aim is gender equality and the empowerment of 
women and girls: its target 5.c addresses the need to accordingly adopt 
sound policies and legislation that support both goal and target. In turn, 
this requires not only the achievement of formal equality (UN Women, 
2015), but that of substantial equality, the actual equal enjoyment of 
one’s human rights.
The concept of substantive equality in gender equality issues has 
been positively included in the CEDAW (1979).3 Its art. 3 includes obli-
gations for states to take “(a)ll appropriate measures, including leg-
islation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, 
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with 
men”, while the Committee’s General Comment 25 maintains that sub-
stantive legislative equality is primarily linked to the results and out-
comes of laws and policies and this requires a long-term perspective for 
the evaluation of those changes in the power structures that currently 
affect women and men differently (CEDAW, 2004).
3 CEDAW, art. 1 provides: “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 
‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”.
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Sustainable development, tax law and gender equality
The current SDGs framework positively includes taxation and other 
forms of revenue collection as a means to achieve sustainable develop-
ment. In particular, Goal 17, target 1 of the SDGs maintains that states 
should “strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through 
international support to developing countries, to improve domestic 
capacity for tax and other revenue collection”. 
The UN emphasised the role of mobilising domestic resources as a 
crucial step in the financing of the post-2015 sustainable development 
agenda, as well as in complying with existing commitments to make tax 
systems more pro-poor (UN, 2014, para. 3). This is an important signal, 
and the specific attention paid to the role of taxation in the SDGs has 
been echoed at the EU level. The New European Consensus on Devel-
opment document directly addresses taxation as a tool to achieve sus-
tainable development: 
“The EU and its Member States will promote effective and effi-
cient resource mobilisation and use, including through initiatives 
such as the ‘Collect More, Spend Better’ approach. They will 
address tax evasion, tax avoidance and illicit financial flows as 
well as the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness of tax systems 
and of social protection financing.” (UN, 2017, p. 49).
EU Member states needs to counteract money laundering, corrup-
tion, illicit financial flows and tax evasion and avoidance since they are 
factors that clearly hinder sustainable development (UN, 2017, pp. 28 
and 53), and international obligations mandate contracting states to 
collect financial resources in such a way as to make the upholding of 
human rights more effective.
This is what the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) prescribes in its art. 2(1):4 the duty for 
contracting states to allocate the maximum of available resources, and 
therefore to collect revenue from taxation, in order to secure and make 
the upholding of human rights more effective. The CEDAW itself con-
4 ICESCR, art. 2(1) provides: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research72
tains similar provisions, in art. 2 (CEDAW, 2004)5 and art. 3 (CEDAW, 
2004),6 which stipulate that states have to mobilise resources to sup-
port women’s rights (European Parliament, 2016a). More recently, the 
link between tax and fiscal policy, revenue-raising, expenditures and 
human rights brought forward by art. 2(1) of the ICESCR has been 
acknowledged by the United Nations.
UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, submitted her report on the impact on 
human rights of fiscal and tax policy at the 26th Session of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in June 2014.  The document argues 
that states should “(a)lign fiscal policy with human rights obligations 
[…] including by raising sufficient public revenue in equitable ways, 
allocating and spending revenue to realise human rights for all” (UN, 
2014, p. 22). 
That same document also establishes, (UN, 2014, para. 31), that state 
parties have “an obligation to create an international enabling environ-
ment for the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, includ-
ing in matters relating to taxation”. The document’s Recommendations, 
para. V (UN, 2014), also include:
A commitment to align fiscal policy with human rights obliga-
tions as part of the post-2015 sustainable development frame-
work, including by raising sufficient public revenue in equitable 
ways, allocating and spending revenue to realize human rights 
for all, and strengthening public oversight, transparency, partic-
ipation in and accountability over fiscal policy, tackling tax eva-
sion and illicit financial flows.
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights maintain that while guaranteeing these rights is a matter 
of international law, national states are carrying responsibility for their 
effective upholding (International Commission of Jurists, 1997, para. 2). 
Violations of human rights generated by sub-standard public financing 
5 CEDAW, art. 2 provides: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its 
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women”.
6 CEDAW, art. 3 provides: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, 
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men”.
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shift on the individual state any responsibility of the consequent social, 
and fiscal, injustice (Saiz, 2013). 
While human rights obligations do not dictate the details of taxa-
tion policies, with states maintaining ample discretionary power in the 
area, international treaties such as the ICESCR impose obligations that 
result in constraints to the formulation of said policies (UN, 2014). A 
state would breach its international human rights obligations not only 
by allowing large-scale tax evasion, but also by enabling or by failing 
to amend tax structures that asymmetrically weigh on the most vulner-
able part of the population (De Schutter, 2017; UN, 2014). 
The combined dispositions of the CEDAW and of international 
human rights treaties such as the ICESCR suggest that contract-
ing states have a clear obligation to work towards the realisation of 
women’s rights not only domestically, but also internationally. These 
duties include refraining from issuing laws and policies which not only 
directly, but also indirectly, hinder women’s equal enjoyment of their 
rights (Berne Declaration, 2016).
Sustainable development, tax law and poverty
The connections between poverty and the violation of human rights has 
been made by various UN agencies over the years (International Bar 
Association (IBA), 2013, p. 98). Poverty is both a cause and an effect 
of the breach of human rights (IBA, 2013, p. 99), and women over the 
world are particularly affected by this damaging loop (Kabeer, 2015). 
Under the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing Dec-
laration, 1995), a set of recommendations for the UN adopted at “The 
Fourth World Conference on Women” held in Beijing in September 
1995, states are required to promote women’s economic independ-
ence by alleviating the disproportionate burden of poverty on women 
“through changes in economic structures” (UN, 1995, para. 26). In order 
to address gender inequality, states are required to analyse their poli-
cies and programs, including those related to taxation, from a gender 
perspective, and measure their impact on poverty, on inequality and the 
influence they specifically have on women (UN, 1995, para. 58). 
The European Parliament has more recently issued a Resolution on 
a gender perspective on poverty, where a case is made that not only 
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the number of women in poverty remains higher than that of men 
living in poverty but, given the intergenerational dimensions of pov-
erty, addressing the situation of girls and young women who are facing 
social exclusion is a key factor in addressing the feminisation of poverty 
(Buvinic, 1993; European Parliament, 2016b). 
The UN directly ties good tax policing not only to economic growth, 
but also to improved governance and accountability and to the achieve-
ment of equality (UN, 2018). The Special Rapporteur Cardona herself 
states that tax abuse is not a “victimless practice”, but a harmful prac-
tice which limits resources that could be spent on the eradication 
of poverty and the realisation of human rights (UN, 2014). The UN 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner similarly affirmed that 
high levels of tax abuse undermine the principles of equality and non-
discrimination (UN, 2014; Vanistendeal, 1996). Tax liability should be 
based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay.
Since collecting tax revenue is not the end in itself, but rather a tool 
for economic growth, development and the fulfilment of human rights 
(Bohoslavsky, 2016, p. 10), the loss of tax revenue and all tax–related 
infringements are not only contrary to international human rights obli-
gations, but are also in breach of target 17.1 of the SDGs. Since insuf-
ficient public resources hinder women’s rights and may contribute to 
gender inequality (Grondona & Rodriguez-Enriquez, 2016; NYU, 2016), 
all tax–related infringements also present a very conspicuous equality 
and gender aspect (Seguino, 2016) which is very conspicuously absent 
from mainstream tax conversations.
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are among the main indirect factors 
in the perpetuation of gender inequality. The UN has clearly drawn a 
connection between the decrease of available resources in the national 
budget due to such practices, the manoeuvring of governments to 
increase revenue through alternative means and the increased vulner-
ability of the weaker parts of the population, including women (Boho-
slavsky, 2016, para. 24). 
There are also direct effects that are derived from the loss of public 
revenue connected to tax abuse: the reduction of available public 
resources that states can spend impacts the realisation of substantive 
equality and the accomplishment of the obligations descending from 
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the ICESCR and the CEDAW, simply because these become second-tier 
goals after what are perceived as more pressing public needs such as 
education, healthcare and security. Unfortunately, this only exacerbates 
existing issues and runs counter to the principles of equality and non-
discrimination (Berne Declaration, 2016).
Conclusions
The chapter investigates the gender and human rights dimensions of 
tax law in connection to the objectives set by the SDGs and to those 
of substantive equality. An examination of the primary European and 
international frameworks on gender equality, and of the European and 
international obligations dealing with human rights, presents a contra-
dictory landscape. Treaties and agreements, at both the European and 
international level, insist on the importance of fiscal policies in the crea-
tion of a sustainable future, and how a sustainable future includes the 
end of discrimination. Contracting states not only have a general duty 
to eradicate discrimination: they also have a specific duty to eliminate 
substantive discrimination against women and to actively implement 
legislative measures that support gender equality (EU, 2012). 
On the other hand, a substantive coherent approach that transforms 
declarations and intents into factual, concrete, unambiguous legislation 
in the field of taxation, reversing its accepted impact on gender equality 
and promoting overall sustainable development, is still not there.
The European Parliament Resolution on “Poverty: a gender perspec-
tive” (European Commission, 2018; European Parliament, 2016a) shows 
alarming figures when discussing gender equality. It is enough to men-
tion, just as an example among many, that single-parent families are 
reported to be at greater risk of poverty or social exclusion, and women 
accounted for 56.6% of single-parent households in the Union in 2014. 
Unfortunately, the picture is painted of women themselves as a heteroge-
neous group where often inequality adds to inequality: elderly women, 
single mothers, transgender women, women with disabilities, migrant 
women, women from ethnic minorities. Substantive gender equality for 
all of these specific groups is a daunting but necessary effort, and one 
that has profound ramifications for and within tax policing and tax law. 
This is not a matter of discussion at the EU level (European Parliament, 
2018): the European Parliament 2018 Report on gender equality and 
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taxation policies in the EU acknowledges the gender bias embedded in 
current EU taxation systems, outlines the importance of tax justice for 
gender quality (European Parliament, 2018) and establishes once more 
gender equality as one of the cornerstone EU principles, whose effects 
directly relate to increased prosperity and stability, and one that is cru-
cial for achieving the SDGs and the objectives of the 2030 Agenda (EU, 
2017, p. 7).7  
From a European perspective, human rights are under the protec-
tion of the EU Charter. Such rights can be violated by Member states if 
they are rendered factually ineffective or if legislative measures directly 
breach what is established in the Charter (Grigonis, 2017). Infringe-
ments of the Charter’s provisions may also occur when Member states 
implement or fail to implement EU law (EU, 2012, art. 51). 
From an international angle, the situation does not look differ-
ent. The extraterritorial obligations contained in the CEDAW can be 
breached if a state’s tax legislation impairs the capability of other states 
to mobilise available resources for the fulfilment of women’s rights, and 
as well as for the eradication of gender-based discrimination (Center for 
Economic and Social Rights et al., 2016). 
Since the EU and its Member states should legislate so that a gender 
perspective is systemically included in all policy areas as part of the 
fundamental efforts that need to be in place to successfully achieve 
the SDGs (UN, 2017, p. 15), tax law cannot call itself out. As of today, 
taxes are gendered: an effective, institutionally equal tax framework is 
a necessary part of any effort aiming at substantive gender equality, and 
this includes a methodical integration of a gender perspective through-
out the entire process (OECD, 2014, 2015). Without a satisfactory fiscal 
policy in place, not only will Goals 5 and 10 not be met, but the 2030 
Agenda objectives will not be met as well (Global Alliance for Tax Jus-
tice, 2018). 
Tax policies until the present have focused more on the promotion 
of rough economic growth, through the granting of tax-free zones, the 
7 The European Parliament has also called for the creation of a specific body whose 
mandate would be to develop specific gender taxation expertise and “to promote gender-
equal taxation reforms in all international fora, including the OECD and the UN, and to 
support the creation of a UN intergovernmental tax body with universal membership, 
equal voting rights and equal participation of women and men; stresses that this body 
should be well equipped to develop specific gender taxation expertise”.
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tolerating of tax havens and the establishment of low-taxation coun-
tries. Substantial changes are necessary for substantive equality: as the 
Bogota Declaration on Tax Justice for Women’s Rights has clearly evi-
denced, these policies have directly rewarded male-dominated corpo-
rations (Bogota Declaration, 2017). In the absence of concrete measures 
in support of gender equality, and without widespread political will 
to create gender responsive fiscal systems, sustainable development 
models will not succeed. This rising tide either lifts all the boats, or it 
will be like it lifted none.
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Tax administrations worldwide face similar challenges in improving taxpayer 
services, addressing non-compliance and reducing costs. Initiatives aimed at 
achieving these goals are often adopted across many jurisdictions and sup-
ported by international organisations. This chapter discusses the Irish experi-
ence of Co-operative Compliance (CC), a tax administration initiative which 
is strongly supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and has been implemented in over 30 tax jurisdictions 
to date. CC envisions taxpayers voluntarily working with tax administrations in 
a real-time transparent manner, with the aim of providing benefits for both tax 
administrations and taxpayers. Drawing on Irish Revenue and OECD publica-
tions, public discourse and relevant scholarly work, this chapter reveals that, 15 
years since its introduction in Ireland, the practical implementation of CC raises 
broader questions worthy of further research including the motivations of tax 
administrations in the selection and adoption of new schemes; the perfor-
mance measurement and management systems employed to assess such ini-
tiatives; and the impact of CC on trust levels of taxpayers, advisers and Revenue. 
A more in-depth review of Irish CC is required to enhance our understanding 
of programme specific challenges, motivations and outcomes and also provide 
a broader understanding of the multiple variables at play in the design, adop-
tion, evaluation and amendment of any similar initiative in tax administrations.
1 Lucy Bowe is a Lecturer in Taxation and Accounting at TU Dublin, and a Chartered 
Accountant and AITI Chartered Tax Adviser.
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Introduction
Tax administrations worldwide face similar challenges in improving 
taxpayer services, addressing non-compliance, minimising the admin-
istrative burden on taxpayers and reducing costs. Initiatives aimed at 
achieving these goals are often adopted across many jurisdictions and 
supported by international organisations.2 This chapter discusses the 
Irish experience of Co-operative Compliance (CC), a tax administration 
initiative which is strongly supported by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and has been implemented in 
over 30 tax jurisdictions worldwide to date (Szudoczky & Majdanska, 
2017). Co-operative Compliance (CC), supports the idea of taxpayers 
and tax administrations working together in partnership, to foster a 
collaborative approach to compliance (Bronzewska, 2016). This new 
approach aims to move away from the traditionally confrontational 
interactions between these parties. Instead, its objective is to foster a 
mutually beneficial relationship and build an environment of trust and 
transparency (OECD, 2008).
Ireland was one of the first tax jurisdictions to introduce CC and, 
more than 15 years since its introduction, this chapter provides a timely 
analysis of the Irish CC journey. This chapter draws on Irish Revenue 
annual reports, presentations and tax briefings, the Taxes Administra-
tion Liaison Committee (TALC)3 meeting minutes, OECD reports, public 
discourse and analyses the initiative in the context of relevant scholarly 
work. It reveals that the implementation of CC in Ireland has encoun-
tered many challenges (including resourcing constraints, a lack of data 
to assess its impact and an absence of timely review) but also resulted 
in several benefits for both the Irish Revenue Commissioners (Revenue) 
and participating taxpayers (including increased interactions between 
Revenue and businesses, which led to improved understandings of the 
2 Initiatives including education, assistance, marketing and advertisement campaigns, the 
disclosure of information, and the use of IT to offer enhanced communications options 
to taxpayers, have been supported by various organisations including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations, World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
3 The Taxes Administration Liaison Committee (TALC) is the main forum in Ireland for 
formal interaction between Irish Revenue and tax advisers. Its members are from the 
Revenue, Irish Taxation Institute, Law Society and Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies – Ireland, and it is tasked with reviewing and making recommendations to achieve 
more effective and efficient administration of direct taxes, stamp duties and VAT.
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commercial realities and challenges faced by both parties). This review 
of the Irish experience of CC raises broader questions worthy of further 
research including the motivations of tax administrations in the selec-
tion and adoption of new schemes; the performance measurement and 
management systems employed by tax administrations to assist them 
in planning, implementing and assessing initiatives; and the impact of 
CC on trust levels across the tax compliance triad of taxpayers, advisers 
and Revenue.
A more in-depth review of Irish CC would not only enhance our 
understanding of programme specific challenges, motivations and out-
comes, but would also provide a broader understanding of the multiple 
variables at play in the design, adoption, evaluation and amendment of 
any similar initiatives in tax administrations. 
Background and context
CC is a real-time compliance review process, whereby taxpayers volun-
tarily go beyond their statutory duties by working with tax administra-
tors to resolve tax positions as they arise, before the tax return is filed. 
It is envisioned as a pre-filing conversation, which requires the upfront 
disclosure by the participant of all material tax issues, and a willingness 
to engage with the tax administration in resolving these issues. In order 
to justify the trust which is central to CC, taxpayers must demonstrate 
that there are sufficiently robust systems of internal control in place 
to support the completeness and reliability of disclosures made. This 
internal control system is known as the Tax Control Framework (TCF). 
It was suggested that this new approach could result in benefits for 
both taxpayers and tax administrations (de Widt, 2017; de Widt, Oats 
& Mulligan, 2017; Freedman, Loomer & Vella, 2012). The ability to 
discuss business transactions and strategies, and their associated tax 
issues, with tax authorities in real time provides taxpayers with early 
tax certainty (with a corresponding reduction in tax risk). The initiative 
also promises a faster tailored response and a lower level of post-filing 
interventions. From the perspective of tax administrations, they stand 
to gain increased knowledge of the needs and behaviours of taxpay-
ers, allowing them to tailor services and strategies to maximise over-
all taxpayer compliance. In addition, although the initial investment in 
establishing these initiatives may be significant, it was expected that 
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resource efficiencies would emerge for both parties in the medium to 
longer-term. This would allow, inter alia, tax administrations to allocate 
resources to higher-risk taxpayers.
This new approach has been strongly supported by the OECD, who 
endeavoured to put some shape and a framework on this new concept 
through establishing a working group and publishing three reports 
which provide guidance in relation to emerging best practice (OECD, 
2008, 2013, 2016). CC was first implemented in 2005, with the pioneer-
ing countries of Ireland, Australia and the Netherlands. It developed in 
parallel in several jurisdictions and, thus, has taken differing forms, in 
accordance with diverse legal and cultural frameworks. There has been 
a significant increase in CC initiatives introduced in tax administrations 
internationally in recent years. As noted by Szudoczky & Majdanska, 
over 30 tax jurisdictions worldwide had developed and/or implemented 
some form of CC by 2017 (Szudoczky & Majdanska, 2017). Although 
most of these initiatives are currently operating on a domestic level, 
the launch of the OECD International Compliance Assurance Program 
(ICAP) pilot in January 2018, and roll out of the second pilot phase in 
March 2019, represents the expansion of the scheme to specific cross-
border arrangements.4
However, there has been relatively little critical analysis carried out 
on how CC programmes are functioning in practice. The relatively small 
number of studies carried out have noted many challenges in practice, 
including the lack of data to assess the impact of the initiatives and the 
limited extent of monitoring by tax administrations (Bronzewska, 2016; 
Dabner, 2012; de Widt & Oats, 2017; Freedman, 2011; Hambre, 2019; 
Osofsky, 2012). Concern has also been expressed about the relationship 
between transparency and trust, with caution being urged particularly 
in the context of large corporates (Freedman, 2018, p. 121). Questions 
have also been raised in relation to whether CC is consistent with the 
principle of legal equality (Majdanska & Leigh Pemberton, 2019) and 
4 ICAP aims to facilitate open and co-operative multilateral engagements between 
multinationals and tax administrations to provide early tax certainty and assurance. The 
initial pilot in January 2018 included eight tax administrations; Australia, Canada, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA. Ireland is a participant in the second 
pilot which was announced in March 2019. The scope of ICAP is more limited than CC in 
that the first pilot only covered two types of cross-border tax risk i.e. transfer pricing and 
permanent establishment risk. The second pilot covers a wider range of risks, including 
hybrid mismatch arrangements and withholding taxes.
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European Union (EU) State Aid rules (Szudoczky & Majdanska, 2017). 
Despite these concerns, CC has been expanded to cross-border arrange-
ments (via ICAP, albeit restricted application to a smaller range of tax 
risks) and, in some cases, to other taxpayer groups.5 
The Irish CC journey 
The Irish “Co-operative Compliance Framework” (CC) was intro-
duced in 2005 and was one of the first CC initiatives implemented glob-
ally. This section presents the Irish CC journey to date, as depicted in 
Figure 5.1 below.  
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Figure 5.1: The Irish CC journey to date
Context and rationale for the introduction of CC in Ireland
CC was introduced in Ireland in the context of an extensive internal 
restructuring programme. In 2003, Revenue formed a specific dedicated 
unit for large businesses and high net worth individuals, the Large Cases 
Division (LCD). The reorganisation was a move away from a traditional 
tax-head focused structure to a more holistic risk-focused approach, which 
centralised all information about any one taxpayer for all tax-heads in a 
single division, to facilitate a better overview of their total tax position. 
These themes of restructuring, ‘customer’ focus and an increased empha-
sis on performance measurement are principles of a broader change in 
5 CC has already been expanded to SMEs in The Netherlands, and it is noted that “Tax 
and Customs Administration has, in its administrative enthusiasm and fervour, 
underestimated issues such as the consequences – and, above all, the complications – of 
the rollout of horizontal monitoring to include the SME segment” (Stephens, 2012, p. 5). 
Stephens. (2012). Tax supervision – Made to measure.   
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approach which was taking place in public administration generally. In 
Ireland, these New Public Management (NPM) ideas had been replacing 
old style public administration since the early 1990s. 
This focus on large taxpayers was part of a wider move internation-
ally to include dedicated large taxpayer units in tax administrations. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had 
recommended that member countries establish large taxpayer units to 
increase control and improve large taxpayers’ compliance. The percep-
tion was that even small changes in the tax returns of these particular 
taxpayers could have a significant impact on revenues.6 In addition, the 
Irish Revenue believed that public perception of the fairness of the tax 
system as a whole was influenced by the compliance behaviour of the 
largest taxpayers.7 However, the appropriateness of CC in addressing 
these issues could be questioned. The Irish CC was only made available 
to a small number of low-risk, largely compliant, corporates, and ques-
tions have been raised about the link between CC and public percep-
tions of fairness. Freedman notes that, in the United Kingdom (UK), 
CC had the opposite effect and actually undermined public trust in the 
tax system as it created a perception of close relationships between tax 
administrations and big business (Freedman, 2018). 
In 2004, the LCD adopted a new strategy of proactive engagement 
with large companies with the aim of positively influencing corporate 
compliance behaviour. The new CC was founded on the idea of Rev-
enue and businesses working together to foster a high compliance cul-
ture in exchange for a tailored, timely Revenue response. Importantly, 
the initiative has no statutory foundations, and instead relies on the 
voluntary espousal of the core ideas of mutual trust, understanding 
and transparency.8 Similar to Ireland, other countries’ experiences doc-
6 The Investment Climate Advisory Service notes that “Large taxpayers generally comprise 
less than one percent of all taxpayers in a country but typically contribute over 50 percent 
of tax revenues. For this reason, special units to deal with large taxpayers are of great 
importance to revenue collection” (Investment Climate Advisory Service, 2009, p. 88). 
However, these figures appear to be based on both individuals and companies, and CC 
initiatives have focused predominantly on companies only.
7 “It is also based on a belief that the compliance behaviour of those at the top of the 
taxpayer scale impacts significantly on how the general body of taxpayers view the whole 
tax system” (Irish Tax Review, 2004).
8 The OECD note that, like Ireland, most countries implementing CC have not had to amend 
existing laws. “Instead, the majority of countries formalise the co-operative compliance in 
some kind of agreement with taxpayers” (OECD, 2013, p. 31).
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umented in the literature note CC initiatives are primarily targeted at 
large corporate taxpayers, to the exclusion of individuals and smaller 
businesses,9 and taxpayers are generally either invited to participate 
by tax administrations or can voluntarily opt-in to the scheme (the UK 
being a notable exception). Thus, CC is not accessible to all and this has 
led to concerns that it may be inconsistent with the principle of legal 
equality (Majdanska & Leigh Pemberton, 2019) and EU State Aid rules 
(Szudoczky & Majdanska, 2017).
Revenue’s stated objectives for CC were to promote a collabora-
tive, mutually beneficial approach to compliance; facilitate more effi-
cient use of business and Revenue resources; reduce tax uncertainty; 
and promote a relationship between Revenue and business based on 
trust, mutual understanding, openness and transparency. They claimed 
that both Revenue and companies would benefit. For companies, it was 
contended to result in tax certainty, a faster tailored response from a 
dedicated Case Manager and a lower level of interventions. For Rev-
enue, the aim was to obtain an increased knowledge of businesses and 
industries and realise resource efficiencies which could be directed to 
more high-risk areas. 
Despite the claimed benefits for taxpayers, Revenue were the pri-
mary drivers for the introduction of the initiative, with some concern 
being expressed by both taxpayers and tax advisers. Studies of other 
CC initiatives have noted differing motivations and drivers for the 
introduction of the scheme. According to de Widt et al (2017), CC pro-
grams were introduced in the Netherlands, United States (US) and 
UK to address growing tensions between corporate taxpayers and tax 
administrations in an environment of increased regulatory pressures. 
However, the instigators of the change were predominantly the tax 
administrations in the case of the UK and the Netherlands, whereas in 
the US some corporate taxpayers were demanding changes in how they 
were being treated, which arguably were delivered in part through CC.
In summary, there were several reasons put forward by Revenue 
for the introduction of CC in Ireland in 2005. It was a part of an overall 
restructuring, informed to some extent by NPM principles, to facilitate 
an increased focus on risk management and overall efficiency. In addi-
9 It should be noted,that the Netherlands have included SMEs in their CC program and 
were criticised for underestimating the complications this would bring (see footnote 5).
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tion, as one of the first countries in the OECD to implement a specific 
CC program, it could enhance its position within the OECD as an inno-
vative and leading tax administration. The latter rationale, arguably 
the pursuit by the tax administration of legitimacy internationally, also 
applies to other tax administrations (Boll, 2017; Braithwaite & Wirth, 
2001; Larsen, 2016).10 
Tensions with tax advisers prior to launch of CC
In Ireland, as in most developed countries, tax advisers play an impor-
tant role in the tax affairs of large corporates. The formal interac-
tion between Revenue and tax advisers is mainly supported through 
TALC.11 In May 2005, Revenue presented a draft CC document at a 
TALC meeting, which proposed that participants would enter a Com-
pliance Framework Agreement, which would set out what both Rev-
enue and the taxpayer undertook to do in order to achieve a high tax 
compliance standard. 
Tax advisers raised several concerns about the proposed CC, includ-
ing Revenue’s emphasis on working directly with large corporate tax-
payers (with the implied exclusion of tax advisors) and its intention to 
use the scheme to tackle tax-planning schemes. Tax advisers contended 
that it was not Revenue’s place to determine the legal application of the 
legislation, but rather this was the role of the courts. Further concerns 
included the need for a formal legal agreement, the cost to businesses of 
participating and the issue of the scheme creating a “two-tier” level of 
service (with CC participants receiving a higher level of service to those 
who chose not to participate). Indeed, Sean Moriarty (then Assistant 
Secretary of LCD) had advised “we will try to bias whatever resource 
we have available to help with interpretation towards companies who 
10 International recognition was clearly a motivation for the Australian tax office in 
pioneering the approach. A working paper notes that “When the Tax Office gets 
international recognition for being at the cutting edge of the compliance management of 
large corporations and high wealth individuals, it will bring the Australian people with 
it” (Braithwaite & Wirth, 2001). Boll analyses the adoption of CC in the Netherlands and 
argues that “it seems highly plausible that the adoption and incorporation of the Tax 
Governance program has to do with how the tax administration becomes legitimate in 
the eyes of taxpayers and politicians” (Boll, 2017). Larsen also notes that the “too hastily 
launched” Swedish CC scheme was introduced following visits to the Netherlands and 
Ireland to learn from their experiences. She observes that “even among tax administrations 
there is a certain competition and no one wants to be left behind” (Larsen, 2016, p. 13).  
11  See footnote 3. 
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have agreed compliance frameworks with us” (Moriarty, 2004a).
These discussions between Revenue and tax advisers in relation to 
the proposed CC took place against a background of growing tensions 
between both parties regarding the proposed ways of dealing with large 
taxpayers via the new LCD division. In response to Moriarty’s article 
explaining how LCD would operate, two Ernst & Young tax partners 
set out their concerns about the new approach. They noted a conflict of 
interest in that “an agreed framework of compliance…blurs the role of 
Revenue from that of enforcing our tax laws to a person who is advis-
ing taxpayers, directly, on their tax affairs” (Henehan & Walsh, 2004). 
They also noted a “fundamental flaw” in that Revenue was not treat-
ing taxpayers equally. Further, they disagreed with the new emphasis 
on taxpayers dealing directly with Revenue and claimed that it could 
result in a “wedge of suspicion” being forced between tax advisors and 
taxpayers, and that their services were being attacked. They strongly 
urged companies to reject the new approach.
In May 2004, tensions continued to build with the publication of 
an article in Business & Finance (Ireland’s leading business magazine) 
which compared the anti-avoidance unit in LCD to the A-Team: “Found 
a clever way to avoid paying taxes? Beware! Revenue’s answer to the 
A-Team may soon be on your case” (Moriarty, 2004b). The article also 
served to increase tensions between Revenue and tax advisers, by quot-
ing Moriarty as saying, “A huge amount of what tax advisers do is abso-
lutely legitimate”. Tax advisers felt that this could be taken to mean that 
at least some of what they do is not “legitimate”. Matters continued to 
escalate with suggestions being made by Revenue’s Chairman that the 
current Revenue powers were ineffective for dealing with tax advisers, 
with the implication that more may be introduced. In July 2004, the 
Irish Tax Institute’s (ITI)12 president issued a public statement reacting 
strongly to any suggestion that tax advisers were complicit in tax eva-
sion. These interactions between Revenue and tax advisers, at the time 
of the establishment of LCD and CC, raise questions about the levels of 
trust between them. This is particularly noteworthy, as trust has been 
identified as a key requirement for the successful functioning of CC 
schemes (Mendoza & Wielhouwer, 2015).  
12 The Irish Tax Institute is a representative and educational body for tax in Ireland. It is the 
only Irish professional body exclusively dedicated to tax.
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2005: Launch of CC in Ireland
The final version of the CC document, entitled ‘The Co-operative 
Approach to Tax Compliance’ was published on Revenue’s website 
in October 2005. This document differed from the original proposed 
framework, as Revenue had taken into consideration some, but not all, 
of the concerns raised by taxpayers and tax advisors. Addressing some 
of their concerns evidenced at least an element of co-operation in defin-
ing the features of the scheme. 
The main amendments made included the removal of the require-
ment to sign a CC agreement, with Revenue accepting that action points 
would be agreed by way of letter instead;13 the inclusion of a reassur-
ance in the document that “What co-operative compliance is not, is any 
kind of special treatment for an elite group of taxpayers”; and a change 
in emphasis from participants being heavily discouraged from involve-
ment in aggressive tax planning strategies, to a requirement for open 
and full disclosure of tax planning strategies. 
Similar to CC schemes introduced elsewhere, the key features of the 
CC launched in 2005 in Ireland included voluntary participation, with 
specific low-risk corporates being invited by Revenue to join; a require-
ment for annual tax risk management plans; and a dedicated Case Man-
ager being assigned to manage the relationship and respond promptly 
to queries from participants. Revenue advised they would invite spe-
cific companies within LCD to become involved in the scheme, with a 
view to extending the scheme to other companies in the future. By the 
end of 2005, 25 businesses had agreed to participate in the scheme.14 
2006-2008: Growth of CC in Ireland
By the end of 2006, 46 businesses were formally participating in CC, with 
another 20 companies at an advanced stage of discussions. By the end 
of November 2007, the number participating had increased to over 80. 
In 2007, Revenue’s Chairman noted that the initiative was “providing a 
valuable channel for constructive dialogue” and “building an environ-
ment of trust” (Daly, 2007). He acknowledged the need for a return on 
13 The OECD notes that “the majority of countries formalise the CC in some kind of 
agreement with taxpayers”. Only “a few countries” do not require a formal agreement 
(OECD, 2013).
14 The pilot programmes run in other jurisdictions had similarly low numbers, e.g. Australia 
(50), USA (17), The Netherlands (40) and France (11).
5: Co-operative Compliance in Tax Administration: The Case of Ireland 93
investment for both taxpayers and Revenue, although how and when 
this return would be measured was not addressed. The scheme would 
not be reviewed until 2014, nine years after its introduction.
By the end of 2008, 131 companies were engaged in the CC.15 In the 
2008 Annual Report, Revenue claimed that the initiative was “worth-
while” and “successful” (Revenue, 2008, p. 36). However, no formal 
review of the scheme’s effectiveness had yet been carried out (OECD, 
2008). In the report, Revenue contended that the experience to date had 
been positive, with the scheme proving an effective channel for construc-
tive discussions between participants and Revenue, whilst fostering an 
environment of trust and openness. It further claimed that the scheme 
was offering an opportunity for Revenue to gain a better understanding 
of the needs and behaviours of large businesses. This new knowledge 
was being used to further develop and hone Revenue’s strategies to 
improve compliance. Despite no formal independent review having yet 
been carried out, Revenue claimed that feedback on a case-by-case basis 
had been positive. 
2009 to 2013: Recession 
Despite the 2008 report stating the CC was proving successful, the 
Revenue annual reports for the next five years make no mention of the 
scheme. In late 2008, Ireland fell into recession for the first time since 
the 1980s and the subsequent five years proved very challenging with 
significant impacts on Revenue organisationally and operationally. One 
of the most difficult internal issues Revenue encountered was the loss 
of over 500 staff in a single year. The corresponding loss of expertise 
and corporate memory presented significant challenges. Staff losses, 
redundancies and cost-cutting measures continued through 2009, 2010, 
2011, and 2012. This may explain the apparent lack of focus on CC in 
this period. 
Ireland did, however, provide information to two OECD reports in 
2009 and 2013 about the on-going development of the program. In the 
2013 OECD report, Revenue admit that no formal review of the CC had 
yet taken place but claimed they had carried out an informal evaluation 
15 For the purpose of international comparatives, the US Compliance Assurance Process 
(CAP) had similar numbers of participants, beginning with an initial pilot of 17 companies, 
growing to 174 by 2017. However, the Irish figure of 131 companies clearly represents a 
much larger percentage of corporate taxpayers in Ireland (Revenue, 2008).
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and a formal review was planned for 2013. Despite the lack of formal 
review or evaluation, the report contends that “In Ireland, the approach 
and methods of introducing and implementing the co-operative com-
pliance approach proved to be very successful” (OECD, 2013, p. 81).
2014: First review of CC 
In 2014, nine years after the introduction of CC, Revenue carried out the 
first formal review of the scheme. That this review only took place nine 
years after CC had been introduced is surprising, particularly given that 
timely review and ongoing cost/benefit analysis was acknowledged as 
being important by Revenue’s Chairman in 2007.16 
The review was initiated, designed and carried out by Revenue and 
involved them gathering and analysing feedback from all three key 
parties affected by the initiative i.e. taxpayers, tax advisers and Rev-
enue. Taxpayers and advisors were invited to complete surveys, inter-
nal interviews were conducted with Revenue Case Managers and best 
international practice was also evaluated. It is welcome that feedback 
was sought from all three parties. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the review was initiated, carried out and reported on by Revenue. 
In contrast, the US CC program was independently evaluated by the 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, and the Dutch pro-
gram was reviewed by an independent committee formed specifically 
for that purpose. 
The main issues and benefits identified by Revenue’s review are 
summarised in Appendix A. These included resourcing constraints, 
difficulty in measuring the impact of the initiative, and inconsistency 
in its application, but the review also noted CC had increased inter-
actions between Revenue and participating businesses, which had 
a positive effect on the relationship and increased understandings of 
the commercial realities and challenges faced by both parties. Similar 
challenges and benefits have been noted in the implementation of other 
16 It should be noted, however, that the Irish CC is not the only CC initiative lacking 
timely review. The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring initiative was first reviewed 6 years 
after its introduction and the US CAP program was first assessed by the IRS in 2016, 
with amendments made in 2019. In 2013 the US Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration noted that “despite the fact that the CAP pilot program ran for six 
calendar years and the permanent program is in its second calendar year of operation, the 
LB&I Division has yet to develop and implement a plan to thoroughly evaluate CAP data” 
(TIGTA, 2013, p. 2).
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CC schemes globally. Notably in the Irish context, no marked reduc-
tion in compliance costs for participants was evident. In fact, in some 
instances where CC had not worked well, compliance costs had actually 
increased. These increased participant compliance costs were predomi-
nantly due to the cost of dealing with protracted audits and queries. 
The impact of CC on costs of both taxpayers and tax administrations 
has not yet been empirically proven. It has been contended that CC may 
lead to increased costs in the initial stages of the program, with effi-
ciencies realised at a later stage. However, there has been no research 
conducted to determine when, and in what quantum, these efficiencies 
emerge (IRS, 2018a; TIGTA, 2013).17
In December 2016, Revenue presented the outcome of the CC review 
at the main TALC meeting. The presentation acknowledged that there 
were several issues with the current version of CC including a lack of 
clarity in relation to what the scheme involved, a lack of consistency 
in its application and a lack of distinction between those who are ‘in’ 
the scheme and those who are ‘out’. However, notwithstanding the 
considerable range of issues identified, Revenue were determined to 
continue with CC. Some minor changes were made to the programme, 
which Revenue argued addressed some of the issues raised, and CC 
was relaunched and opened up to all eligible LCD corporates. Letters 
were issued in January 2017 to all LCD corporate groups inviting them 
to apply for the relaunched scheme. 
The Irish CC is not the only CC program to be amended recently. 
The UK launched a revised business risk review model in October 
201918 and the US CAP program was ‘recalibrated’ in September 2018 to 
17 A review of the US initiative suggests it is a significant drain on IRS resources. The US 
CAP recalibration discussion document notes that “While progress has been made in 
several areas, hours charged and months spent have been much greater than expected 
resulting in a program that, on an average return basis, is more resource intensive than 
normal post-filing examinations of similarly sized taxpayers” (IRS, 2018, p.2). However, 
exact monetary figures have not been disclosed. Investment amounts have also not been 
made publicly available for Ireland. This lack of data appears to be a common issue 
internationally, e.g. a review of the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring program noted that the 
contention that implementation costs for the tax authorities would decrease over time had 
not been proven, and the committee has received “insufficient reliable data to test this 
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address its resource-intensive nature (de Widt, Mulligan & Oats, 2019). 
However, whereas the US program was amended to restrict access to 
the program, the Irish CC was opened up to all LCD companies who 
meet the entry criteria. 
2017: Relaunch of CC – What changed?
CC was relaunched in 2017, with a small number of changes includ-
ing the opening of the programme to all eligible LCD companies and 
removing Case Managers from non-participating companies. The entry 
criteria restrict access to companies with at least three years history of 
good compliance (see Appendix B). Similar to CC in other tax juris-
dictions, it continues to be only available to certain (large, corporate 
and already compliant) taxpayers. Importantly, relaunch documenta-
tion draws a clear distinction between those companies opting to be 
‘in’ the scheme, and those companies choosing not to participate (i.e. 
‘out’). Although, each business may choose whether to participate, Rev-
enue were explicit in stating that one of their objectives was to achieve 
resource efficiencies within the scheme, which would enable them to 
focus more resources on higher risk taxpayers (e.g. those companies 
deciding not to participate). Thus, should a company decide not to join 
CC, they were likely to find themselves the subject of a greater level 
of Revenue scrutiny and interventions. In addition, all LCD compa-
nies would have previously benefited from the service of a dedicated 
Case Manager. However, this ‘privilege’ would now only be retained 
by those large companies who participate in CC. Direct caseworker 
access was withdrawn for non-participants from April 2017 with only a 
general enquiry channel being made available to them for future inter-
actions with Revenue. To further clarify the benefits of the scheme to 
companies, Revenue emphasised that, for those who opted to join CC, 
audits would only be carried out in exceptional circumstances, the tax 
refund process would be streamlined, and participants could benefit 
from an annual meeting with Revenue, with customs and transfer pric-
ing staff attending where relevant. 
Whilst changes to the original scheme were few in number, Reve-
nue has been quite clear on the different treatment being given to those 
companies within CC as opposed to those who do not join. Revenue 
did not provide any justification of the specific amendments made, 
5: Co-operative Compliance in Tax Administration: The Case of Ireland 97
or an explanation as to how these amendments would address all of 
the many challenges identified in the review. By way of international 
comparison, the US Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) program fol-
lowed a similar trajectory, in that it ran a pilot program with 17 partici-
pants for six years, and then made the program permanent and opened 
CAP up to all companies in 2011 (subject to meeting certain entry condi-
tions). However, a review in 2013 questioned whether CAP was realis-
ing the resource efficiencies it envisioned, and whether this was impact-
ing on the resources available to audit non-participants (TIGTA, 2013). 
The CAP program did not accept new taxpayers on to the program for 
2018 and 2019, and, in 2020 and 2021, new applications are only being 
accepted from publicly held c-corporations with approved tax control 
frameworks. Recent changes to the program have focused on realising 
resource efficiencies within the program (IRS, 2018b).
By May 2019, 111 company groups were participating in the 
relaunched CC, approximately 25% of all eligible groups. However, 
questions continue to be raised about the benefits of the scheme for par-
ticipants (McCaughren, 2019), with Revenue promising to review the 
CC in 2019.19 At this time, the results of this review have not yet been 
revealed, nor has it been confirmed whether it has taken place.
Discussion
The Irish CC experience reveals a lack of timely review of the scheme. 
Tax administrations have limited resources and whilst new initiatives 
are necessary and should be encouraged, some work very well, some do 
not, newer and better ideas emerge and it is important that tax admin-
istrations operate with the best possible suite of programmes deemed 
appropriate at the time. Ongoing reviews and evaluation are important 
in this context. Notwithstanding uncertainty in relation to the appropri-
ate performance management system to measure the impact of CC as 
noted in previous studies (de Widt, 2017; Job et al., 2007), it is somewhat 
concerning that the guidelines published on Revenue’s website follow-
ing the relaunch in 2017 do not include any commitment to more regu-
lar monitoring of CC. Revenue relaunch documentation provides lim-
ited details on the internal monitoring methods proposed by Revenue, 
noting their intention to measure effectiveness through the number and 
19 Meeting between Irish Tax Institute/Revenue Large Corporates Division (LCD) 1 May 
2019.
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nature of self-reviews, self-corrections and unprompted disclosures 
made by participants. However, it is unclear whether these measures 
are either appropriate or sufficient. The success, or indeed failure, of 
any initiative can only be assessed if outcomes can be measured. Thus, 
there is a need to evaluate the tools and frameworks employed by tax 
administrations to assist them in planning, implementing and assessing 
initiatives.
Trust between taxpayers and the tax administration is a critical cog 
in the wheel of a sustainable tax system in practice (Freedman, 2018, p. 
126). The removal of Case Managers from large cases not participating 
in the relaunched CC may prove problematic in this context. Interac-
tion with tax officials can affect tax morale more generally (Freedman, 
2018), and levels of social interaction impact on trust (Hoffman et al., 
1996). The importance of these Case Managers in keeping channels of 
communication open between corporates and tax administrations has 
been noted in the UK (Freedman et al., 2014). Imposing a loss of per-
sonal contact upon companies who do not opt into CC may have an 
untended impact on trust. It has been noted that trust is multi-layered, 
and increased trust between a tax administration and one group of tax-
payers, can decrease the trust of other groups (Freedman, 2018). A strat-
egy to enhance trust with corporates with a history of high compliance, 
and decrease it with companies who do not meet the criteria to join CC, 
or simply prefer not to, may have unintended impacts on their compli-
ance behaviour.
The Irish experience of CC also highlights the important role of trust 
between tax advisors and Revenue. The 2005 scheme generally failed 
to win the support of tax advisers, which may in part explain the rela-
tively low numbers of corporates opting to join. CC was introduced at 
a time when arguably the trust level between Revenue and tax advisers 
was not as it should be. Yet, trust has been identified as a key require-
ment for the successful functioning of CC schemes. Unfortunately, 
the relaunched CC has not apparently enhanced this trust. In fact, in 
response to the relaunch of CC in 2017, Brian Keegan, director of public 
policy and taxation at Chartered Accountants Ireland, warned that: 
“Cooperative compliance is dangerous because it creates an elite class 
of taxpayers… If one taxpayer is ‘close to Revenue’ then by definition; 
other taxpayers are not ‘close to Revenue’. There is no place in a democ-
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racy for Revenue authorities to treat one taxpayer better than another” 
(Keegan, 2017). Questions remain to be answered about the impact of 
the ongoing CC on trust levels across the tax compliance triad of tax-
payers, advisers and Revenue. This exploration of the Irish CC scheme 
also raises questions in relation to the external forces at play when tax 
administrations consider adopting innovative programmes. Boll con-
tends that the Danish tax administration “experienced direct and indi-
rect coercive pressures from politicians and authoritative organisations 
such as the OECD and IFA” (Boll, 2017, p. 223). The role of the OECD 
in encouraging the adoption of initiatives, and the usefulness of OECD 
guidance and frameworks (e.g. the seven pillars) is also worthy of fur-
ther investigation. Clearly, being one of the first to introduce any OECD 
supported initiative (such as CC) brings its advantages and disadvan-
tages which must be carefully considered by tax administrations. 
Conclusion
The Irish Revenue was one of the first tax administrations to introduce 
CC and, 15 years since its adoption, this chapter provides a timely analy-
sis of the Irish experience of CC in practice. This exploration of Irish CC 
reveals that it has resulted in some benefits but also encountered many 
challenges, and raises broader questions worthy of further research. 
These areas include the motivations of tax administrations in the selec-
tion and adoption of new schemes; the performance measurement and 
management systems employed by tax administrations to assist them 
in planning, implementing and assessing initiatives; and the impact of 
CC on trust levels across the tax compliance triad of taxpayers, advisers 
and Revenue.
In conclusion, there is much yet to be learned through a more in-
depth analysis of CC in Ireland. Not only would such an analysis 
assist in shining a light on programme specific challenges, motivations 
and outcomes, but it would also provide a broader understanding of 
the multiple variables at play in the design, adoption, evaluation and 
amendment of any similar tax administration initiative. 
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Appendix A
Table 5.1: Revenue’s view of the issues and benefits of CC20
Issues from Revenue’s perspective
  Engagement could often be one-sided, with issues arising which had not previ-
ously been signalled by the business. The level of openness and engagement of 
some businesses was low.
  Although Revenue provided pre-notification of the possibility of audit, the self-
reviews performed by businesses following notification could be poor. Overall, 
there was a low number of unprompted disclosures and most disclosures were 
prompted.
  Revenue’s limited levels of resources and staffing issues led to challenges in ade-
quately servicing the programme.
  Some businesses were using the service for low-level queries which was not the 
purpose of the scheme.
  Lack of distinction and differentiation between companies engaging and those 
not engaging in the scheme.
  The success of the programme was difficult to measure.
  There was a poor level of take-up, with Revenue stating that they felt that taxpay-
ers had “largely abandoned the scheme”.
  The lack of legal agreements created a level of uncertainty.
Benefits from Revenue’s perspective
  Fewer mistakes and issues with participants’ tax returns when filed.
  A greater understanding among participants of the consequences of non-com-
pliance.
  Involvement of Revenue in discussions before transactions were undertaken.
  Quicker dispute resolution through better access to key non-tax personnel.
  Increased knowledge through the Case Worker gaining insights on corporate 
governance ethos, and understanding of issues facing the industry, in addition 
to company-specific issues.
  More efficient management of risk.
  More efficient resource management where self-review lead to unprompted dis-
closures (though it was noted that there was a low level of unprompted disclo-
sures overall).
  Encouraged two-way openness, trust and transparency.
20 Information drawn from Revenue presentation to TALC “Outcome of Review of Co-
operative Compliance Framework” on 13 December 2016 and presentation by Eugene 
Creighton on LCD to ITI on 2 October 2014. 
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Table 5.2: Tax Intermediary and taxpayer views of issues and benefits of CC21
Issues raised by tax advisers and taxpayers
  The restriction on entry to the scheme, as Revenue reserved the right to choose 
which businesses would be invited to participate. This reinforced the idea of 
inequity and Revenue treating one taxpayer better than another.
  The experience of CC had been varied across all LCD sectors. There appeared to 
be inconsistency in how it was being applied. In some cases, it had worked well. 
In others, the initial effectiveness of the scheme had decreased in recent years 
due to reduced technical support and responsiveness of Case Workers. Some 
participants’ experience was that it did not work well in their case. The ITI noted 
that “A relaunched Revenue Cooperative Compliance Framework needs to focus 
on providing an open, responsive engagement platform resourced by dedicated 
relationship managers who are commercially aware and will liaise with these 
larger taxpayers and their advisers.”
  There was a low level of awareness of CC by companies in LCD not participating 
in the scheme. There was also a lack of clarity around the benefits of participat-
ing, with no clear distinction between being “inside” and “outside” the scheme.
  Survey feedback indicated that there was no marked reduction in compliance 
costs for participants. In some instances where CC had not worked well, compli-
ance costs had actually increased, predominantly due to the cost of dealing with 
protracted audits, interventions and queries. 
  Some participants felt they were subject to a higher level of scrutiny and inter-
vention than their competitors who chose not to participate in the program.
Benefits for taxpayers identified in the surveys 
  No requirement for a formal legal agreement.  Companies typically dealt with by 
LCD comprise listed companies, large private companies, State owned bodies 
and regulated entities, the majority of whom are subject to formal compliance 
statements under the Companies Acts, or similar obligations. To introduce a sep-
arate formal agreement could lead to duplication of effort and would not seem 
warranted.
  The voluntary nature of the scheme encouraged trust, openness and engage-
ment. The survey raised questions in relation to restricting access to the program, 
having formal consequences for non-participation, possible legislation and writ-
ten agreements. However, the submission by the ITI noted “It is difficult to see 
merit in introducing a legislative basis for co-operative compliance. This could 
21 Information drawn from responses from The Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies – Ireland to CC survey 28 July 2014; responses from the Irish Taxation Institute to 
CC survey 31 July 2014; presentation by Eugene Creighton on LCD to ITI on 2 October 
2014 and Revenue presentation to TALC “Outcome of Review of Co-operative Compliance 
Framework” on 13 December 2016.
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result in duplicative work for business in providing information to Revenue. This 
would increase compliance costs with no corresponding benefit to the Excheq-
uer. A positive approach of encouraging participation is more likely to engage 
taxpayers and promote active involvement.”
  Greater certainty in relation to tax risk due to increased technical support and a 
positive working relationship with Revenue.
  Where there was continuity of Revenue personnel handling the case, strong 
technical support, responsive case management, and a structured and focused 
approach to raising queries and scheduling audits, these contributed to a posi-
tive experience.
  The ITI note that involvement of tax advisors in the process can be beneficial, 
“This ensures that all parties are fully aware of any issues arising and ultimately 
will reduce the level of tax risk.”
Appendix B
Table 5.3: Entry criteria for 2017 CC
  All group companies must have filed all returns for all taxes and duties for which 
they have an obligation to submit, and all tax and duty liabilities must be up to 
date.
  Within the last three years, no company in the group has had a settlement under 
the Audit Code of Practice with a penalty of 15% or more (this settlement test 
does not apply if the full payment i.e. tax, interest and penalty, does not exceed 
1% of the overall group’s tax payments in the calendar year of the settlement).
  If settlement was made within the last 3 years, confirmation must be given that 
new controls have been implemented to prevent future occurrences of the same 
or similar issues.
  Confirmation must be given that, in the last 3 years, no group company has been 
found to be non-compliant with a Customs or Excise authorisation or licence.
  Confirmation must be given that the group has the broad principles of a tax con-
trol framework in place. Although, Revenue have confirmed that if the taxpayer 
confirms that a tax control framework will be put in place, this confirmation will 
be sufficient, and the control framework can be examined at a later stage.
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6 A Study of the UK Tax Credits system: Transforming 
Citizens into Self-responsible 




This chapter contributes to conceptual and empirical understandings of tax 
administration in tax and public sector accounting research by analysing how 
accounting technologies enact relational power during encounters between 
tax authority (HMRC) workers and citizens. It examines the administration of 
the UK tax credits system, which was designed to alleviate financial hardship 
for low-income families and workers, reduce child poverty and stimulate labour 
engagement. However, in practice its accounting technologies seem to be ill-
equipped to engage with the lived reality of its target public and significantly 
worsen financial hardship of some claimants. This chapter draws on the work 
of Miller and Rose (2008) to view accounting as a technology of governance 
and Bartels & Turnbull (2019) to understand the relational processes of frontline 
encounters and their implications on individuals’ lives. It applies ethnographic 
and grounded theory methods to explore the experiences and encounters 
of tax credits claimants and HMRC workers to show how accounting influ-
ences the work practices of HMRC workers, through relational processes, ulti-
mately (re)shaping claimants’ subjectivities and financial outcomes. Findings 
suggest that some tax credits claimants are not financially better off and are 
perversely held responsible and accountable for overpayment problems, facil-
itated through their encounters with accounting technologies. This chapter 
finds that the accounting technologies of the tax credits system dehumanise 
encounters between HMRC workers and claimants, transforming claimants into 
self-responsible individuals. This chapter argues that the tax credits system, as 
an accounting technology of governance, is not a welfare programme, but is 
a governing system which shifts responsibility onto claimants, making them 
1 S. C. Closs-Davies PhD FCCA CTA, Bangor Business School, Bangor University, UK. 
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self-responsible for their success in life.  These findings highlight how the tax 
credits system underlies the targeting of tax credits claimants and sustains a 
neo-liberal discourse of private responsibility for financial hardship through its 
accounting technologies and everyday relational practices.
Introduction and background
“I have experienced a nightmare with tax credits from day one, 
none of it down to my error. I have been left allegedly owing 
£19,670. I have received over 60 different award notices, all with 
different figures on them. It culminated in the break-up of my 
marriage after 21 years, and when they sent me an enforce-
ment notice in November for the full amount of money, I had a 
complete breakdown and tried to commit suicide. I am still on 
anti-depressants now because of the trauma…Tax credits have 
ruined my life. Kim, Southampton, Tax credits claimant” (Voices 
of the Victims, 2011).
The new tax credits (TC) system was introduced by the New Labour 
government in April 2003. It was designed to help achieve the UK gov-
ernment’s aims of reducing child poverty, encouraging people to work 
and providing financial support to working families (HM Treasury, 
2000, p. 14). It replaced the Working Families’ Tax Credits (WFTC) and 
promised to provide simpler and more responsive financial support 
for claimants without causing “unnecessary burdens” (HM Treasury, 
2000, p. 19). Such projections of the new TC system became not only the 
expectations of government but also of claimants.
However, within a few years of its operation, around a third of tax 
credits claimants experienced financial difficulties as they found them-
selves having to repay some or all of their TC income to the HM Rev-
enue and Customs (HMRC)2, known as an ‘overpayment’. According to 
the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (2007):
“Almost a third of all tax credits awards had once again been 
overpaid, and almost half a million awards (494,000) had been 
overpaid by over £1,000; some 25,000 of those by over £5,000 […] 
Of most concern is that a significant proportion of those overpay-
2  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is the UK tax authority that administers tax credits 
in the UK.
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ments (363,000) were again made to those on low or very modest 
incomes, where household income was less than £10,000. “
Overpayments became such a big issue it prompted the government 
to make an intervention3 in April 2006 which resulted in a reduction in 
the number of overpayments to 19.77% in that same tax year (2006/07). 
However, the number of overpayments increased to 28.39% in April 
2015 when the Conservative government made further changes to the 
programme. 
This chapter is part of a bigger research project which explores the 
experiences of claimants claiming TC, getting and having to repay over-
payments. Part of the research project was also to examine the experi-
ences of HMRC workers who administer TC and engage with claim-
ants at the frontline. The aim is to highlight the relational and dynamic 
practices that take place during encounters between TC claimants and 
HMRC workers. It demonstrates the effect of relational power during 
frontline interactions and how this effects claimants’ financial and non-
financial outcomes. To do this, this chapter first examines the first stage 
of a claimant’s tax credits experience: when they find out about an over-
payment. It examines the financial and non-financial effects of getting 
an overpayment on the real lives of claimants who engage with the tax 
credits system. It shows that contrary to its aims, the TC system wors-
ens financial hardship for (at its highest) one-third of claimants. The 
chapter then examines what happens when claimants challenge their 
overpayments by interacting with HMRC workers. It demonstrates that 
HMRC workers are unhelpful and unempathetic towards claimants, 
resulting in some claimants giving up on challenging their overpay-
ments and ending up repaying thousands of pounds to HMRC. The 
chapter then explores the experiences of HMRC workers in the work-
place and offers insights into how these impact on their interactions 
with claimants. It finds an increased dependency on information and 
communication technology (ICT), and the strong focus on performance 
targets in the workplace, makes it difficult for HMRC workers to apply 
discretion and meaningful information and help towards claimants.   
Whereas the TC system targeted the most socially and economi-
cally vulnerable citizens with the intention of improving their lives, 
3 The government increased the disregard limit by ten-fold from £2,500 to £25,000 from 
April 2006.
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it resulted in many claimants experiencing further financial hardship, 
emotional distress and considerable uncertainty as they lived in fear of 
receiving overpayments in future. Overpayments have a tremendous 
impact on claimants who have to find additional money to repay the 
overpayments and readjust their household expenditure by cutting 
back on basic costs such as food and heat. According to some reports 
some individuals chose to refrain from claiming TC (Revenue Benefits, 
2015) because of its impact on their lives, whilst others fell into debt 
to help them through periods of financial difficulty (The Independent, 
2014). It was also reported that some claimants suffered from anxiety, 
depression and contemplated suicide (Voices of the Victims, 2011). The 
consequences of the new TC system in reality go against its main aims 
by intensifying, rather than alleviating, the financial hardship of some 
claimants. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical examination, 
based on an interdisciplinary critical analysis, of everyday administra-
tion of a bureaucratic welfare programme, using the UK TC system as a 
case study; and to highlight how relational power manifests during eve-
ryday frontline encounters between TC claimants and HMRC workers 
which result in reinforcing stigma and inequality for some claimants. 
Most TC research examine TC by adopting a macro-level approach, 
most of which examine take-up rates, types of claimants and financial 
outcomes (Brewer, 2003; Brewer & Shaw, 2006; Brown, 2005; Brown at 
al., 2004;  Greenstein 2005; Greenstein & Shapiro 1998; Holt 2006; 2011; 
O’Donoghue & Sutherland, 1999). This chapter examines the TC system 
at the micro-level, at the frontline of public services, to understand how 
relational power manifests in multi-directional, visible and invisible 
taken-for-granted ways through a web of humans, objects and ICT, and 
how it leads to subjectification (Foucault, 1982), in terms of influencing 
claimants’ minds and behaviour. This chapter draws on main features 
from public administration (Bartels & Turnbull, 2019) and accounting 
(Miller & Rose, 2008) to explain how accounting technologies enact 
relational power and mediate interactions and exercise power based on 
a relational ontology (Closs-Davies et al., 2020). 
In contrary to most existing TC research which adopt positivist 
and quantitative research approaches, I apply a methodological focus 
on emergent and dynamic properties, situated and evolving in socio-
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material networks. This chapter adopts a critical ethnographic (Dubois, 
2009) perspective to reveal how the tax credits system operationalises 
relational power through daily frontline public service practices, wors-
ening financial hardship and inducing feelings of low self-worth and 
disempowerment for some claimants. This chapter is based on an eth-
nographical collection and interpretation of multiple sources of data: 
interviews, participatory observations, documents, statistics, visual 
material and personal reflections. This approach allows the capture 
and examination of relational and dynamic practices between claim-
ants, HMRC workers, materials and information and communication 
technology (ICT) to understand and explain complex human behaviour 
within the unique context of the TC field.  
To sum up, this chapter provides an overview of a bigger research 
project which focuses on relational power that manifests through socio-
material networks of bureaucracy and accountability. This chapter 
highlights the structural asymmetry in power relations between TC 
claimants and HMRC workers at the frontline which sustain neo-liberal 
discourse of private responsibility as claimants become more respon-
sible for their financial hardship (overpayments). Such discourse is 
mobilised through the relational practices of front-line HMRC work-
ers and TC claimants. As a result, their encounters worsen the financial 
hardship of some claimants, ultimately reinforcing feelings of low self-
worth and disempowerment.    
The next section discusses the conceptual framework of relational 
power that forms the basis of this chapter, followed by an explanation 
of the critical-interpretivist methodology adopted and how the ethno-
graphic study was conducted. The chapter then presents its findings 
and offers further discussion, before it concludes by providing a sum-
mary of the findings and its implications for future social policy and 
administration and research. 
Conceptual framework
This chapter adopts a relational approach to examine the dynamic pro-
cesses through which relational power is enacted in practice. Recent 
relational approaches adopted in public administration (e.g. Bartels & 
Turnbull, 2019) literature offer a useful framework for analysing eve-
ryday practices in the tax credits (TC) field. In particular, Bartels and 
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Turnbull (2019) offer three core features to this approach. First, a ‘rela-
tional ontology’ that focuses on networks of relationships, interactions 
interdependence as a unit of analysis. By focussing on interactions 
within networks, this approach moves from viewing public adminis-
tration “itself as interactive, dynamic, and situated” (Closs-Davies et 
al., 2020). Second, it adopts an “epistemological orientation to emergent 
properties”. This approach does not view relationships as transactions 
between static entities; rather “their nature, meaning and value emerge 
from interactions between ‘inter-actors’ and dynamically shape who 
they are and what they do” (Closs-Davies et al., 2020, p. X). The third 
core feature is that it adopts a “methodological focus on dynamic, situ-
ated and evolving networks”. By examining actors “being-in-relation 
with others, underlying mechanisms and meanings of complex flows of 
relationships and changing systems can be identified” (Closs-Davies et 
al., 2020). A key dividing line between relational approaches in public 
administration is whether they attach a normative value to relationality, 
i.e., the qualitative improvements emerging from well-formed relation-
ships.
In contrast to sovereign power, which is centralised by the State 
and enacted through law and punishment, Foucault views the popu-
lation to be governed as a ‘biological problem’, to which he refers to 
as ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault, 1976, p. 245). For Foucault (2008) technolo-
gies governing a population cannot be separated from human bodies 
and minds. This means that power of the State does not stem from the 
oppression of individuals. Instead, it manifests by exposing people to 
administrative mechanisms of public services. Foucault (1977) refers 
to such mechanisms as ‘dispositif’, which enact power on the body 
and mind. Dispositif operate beyond the State, and seep into various 
domains of social life, to include the home, workplace and community. 
Dispositif form a network of subtle relations to shape people in visible 
and invisible ways to benefit the State, and hence constitute the exercise 
of relational power (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 10). 
Foucault (1979) conceived the term ‘governmentality’ to explain the 
mechanisms of relational power through which individuals are sub-
jected. According to Foucault (1996, p. 277) “individuals are subjectiv-
ised through ‘multiple processes’ that constitute power” which operate 
through the self and multiple other sources (dispositif). Governmen-
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tality is an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault, 1979, p. 20). 
It links political rationality (which this chapter views as making citi-
zens self-responsible for their own welfare, tied together by a political 
ideology) to the behaviour and thinking of citizens through complex 
networks of power relationships, mediated by dispositif. 
Dispositif, are not simple static instruments; rather, they manifest 
as calculations, procedures, devices, materials and actions (Miller & 
Rose, 2008). In this chapter, we pay particular attention to the relational 
networks formed between inscription devices, expertise, locales and 
centres of calculation. ‘Inscription devices’ are materials which make 
reality visible, stable and mobile. For instance, HMRC letters, notices 
and computer screens, which make citizens’ lives visible and calcula-
ble. ‘Expertise’ refers to HMRC workers who draw their behaviour and 
actions on inscription devices and citizens (claimants). Such interac-
tions take place at ‘locales’, which refer to HMRC offices and call cen-
tres, where expertise capture and monitor citizen information. Informa-
tion is transferred between citizens, expertise and locales to and from 
‘centres of calculation’, such as HMRC’s ICT systems, with the aim of 
processing and subjecting individuals to calculation, evaluation, inter-
vention, and thus control. 
Miller and Rose (2008) advance this relational understanding of gov-
ernmentality based on Actor-Network theory, which claims that “the 
qualities and capacities of both human and technologies […] are rela-
tional and performative constructs” (Andersen et al., 2018, p. 43). Thus, 
relational power operates through complex networks between human, 
inhuman and non-human actors that cannot be analytically separated 
(Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon & Law, 1997; Latour, 1986, 1987). 
Moreover, the success or failure of the network’s survival depends on 
repetitive instructions that become taken-for-granted, eventually legiti-
mised and normalised through ways of doing and saying (Closs-Davies 
et al., 2020). The network also depends on problems of one actor being 
resolved by another. The network is the ‘emergent property’ of the con-
nection between humans, inscriptions, locales and centres of calculation 
which are so inherently linked through emergent processes, “no-one is 
in control or fully aware of it happening” (Closs-Davies, 2020). 
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The relational interdependence of actors in the network does not 
necessarily constitute “democratic and mutually empowering relation-
ships” (Closs-Davies, 2020; Stout & Love, 2018). The dispositif within 
the networks can separate actors in manageable and calculable units 
(Chow & Bracci, 2020; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Rose, 1991). Foucault 
(2003, p. 126) refers to this as “dividing practice” where “the subject is 
either divided inside himself [sic] or divided from others.”, which iso-
lates the subject within delimited boundaries, referred to as a “sphere 
of autonomy” (Rose, 1993). Thus, the individual becomes governed 
within the network in ways that link yet divide them.
In conclusion, the conceptual framework focuses on relational power 
to examine how relational power is enacted from interactive processes 
between the governed citizen (TC claimants), expertise (HMRC work-
ers), inscription devices (HMRC letters and computer screens), locales 
(HMRC offices and call centres) and centres of calculation (HMRC’s 
ICT system). It enables us to track in detail how these interactions (re)
shape power relations and the financial and non-financial outcomes of 
tax credits claimants. The next section explains the critical-interpretivist 
ethnographic approach to this chapter.
Methodology 
This chapter is part of a bigger research project to examine relational 
practices which take place during frontline encounters between tax 
credits (TC) claimants and HMRC workers. This project was carried out 
between 2013-2019 with the main aim of gaining a deep understand-
ing of the financial and non-financial effects of TC administration on 
claimants. The project explored (1) how and why claimants suffered 
overpayments and its impact on their lives, (2) what happened during 
encounters between claimants and HMRC workers, (3) how HMRC 
workers administered TC, under what conditions and coping mecha-
nisms, (4) how claimants responded to their encounters with HMRC 
workers and their consequences. This chapter provides a summary of 
each of these elements from the project. 
This chapter adopts an interpretivist approach as it critically 
explores and understands the practices of tax credits participants in 
terms of their socially situated and interactively performed meanings. 
Critical ethnography is the method adopted. Following Dubois’ (2009) 
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study on frontline encounters in French welfare offices, the implemen-
tation of social policy and the effect of welfare encounters on recipients 
beg a critical ethnographic approach. Rather than reifying discourse or 
projecting its meanings on specific practices, this chapter takes an eth-
nographic approach to examining the everyday lives of people. Eth-
nography allows the research to be conducted ‘within’ the field (rather 
than studying people under certain conditions) which enables the cap-
turing of deeper contextualised meaning and understanding (Fenno, 
1986; Frissen, 1989; Geertz, 2000; Van Hulst, 2008). Ethnography can be 
used to examine discourse and establish the context in which it is set in 
(Oberhuber & Krzyzanowski, 2008) and thus provides a mode of study 
as an attempt to make sense of practices and processes within the social 
field. It allows an investigation into the way tax credits participants 
view their own socio-political realities within the field, and is reflected 
in the way they feel, act, talk and write.  
The bigger research project collected data from interviewing tax 
credits claimants, HMRC workers, Citizens Advice workers, a Member 
of Parliament (MP), and an MP case worker. Data was also collected 
from observation of participants, fieldnotes, archives and documents 
collected during the fieldwork, such as HMRC letters and notices to 
claimants, HMRC advertising, political manifestos and speeches, news-
paper articles and social media forums. The main source of data col-
lection was unstructured interviews with participants. Claimants and 
HMRC workers were initially selected at random following advertis-
ing of calls for research participants, followed by a snowballing effect 
(Durose, 2011, p. 982; Erlandson et al., 1993). The project mainly relies 
on interviews with claimants (22 claimants) and not HMRC workers 
(four workers). There is a lack of interviews with HMRC workers and 
no observations of workers at work because of a reluctance by HMRC 
to collaborate with the research. The first and last interview questions 
remained the same for all interview participants.4 Other questions 
remained open and flexible to the interviewees’ own story. It is impor-
tant to permit the interviewee to talk about what they want to talk about 
(because this is what’s important to them) in their own words. This will 
always produce better data direct from the interviewees’ own experi-
ences (Weiss, 1994). An interview guide ensured that relevant areas 
4 The first and last questions were different between tax credits claimants and HMRC 
workers. 
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were addressed. ‘Visualizaibility’ was also used to ensure that I under-
stood what was said (Weiss, 1994). The interviewee was encouraged to 
provide rich and concrete data by being asked to walk me through their 
experience from beginning to end, with as little interruption as possible. 
During most interviews, certain questions and/or experiences trig-
gered an emotional response from the interviewee. When this hap-
pened, the interview continued, because interruption may deprive 
the interviewee of expressing their natural emotions. Emotions are an 
important part of the research as they provide a deeper understanding 
of the claimant’s experience. However, I was sensitive towards the sub-
ject from that point on, for example, by using a softer tone and being 
more patient towards the interviewee. If the interviewee became dis-
tressed, I gave the interviewee the choice whether to continue the inter-
view until a later time, and if so, asked if they wanted the researcher to 
contact someone for support.  
Interviews were recorded, transcribed and then analysed using 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory analysis offers 
heuristics to analyse practice without predetermined theories and con-
cepts. Grounded theory is a systematic process using flexible guidelines 
to analyse data. It involves an interactive process of going back and 
forth between data and analysis, so that the researcher becomes closely 
involved in the data and allows the emergence of analysis (Charmaz, 
2006). Relevant themes and codes emerge during the process of data 
analysis. Thus, theories are not specific, detailed and fixed at the start 
of the research, rather they emerge from the data instead. This allows a 
deeper and richer understanding of the tax credits field, led by the expe-
riences of tax credits participants. This process involved initial coding 
of interview transcripts, followed by memo-writing. Coding involves 
the labelling of data based on the researcher’s view of what the data 
is telling her. Initial coding is temporary, transcripts are revisited and 
recoded when further data is analysed, so that codes are refined to best 
fit the data and memos are further developed (Charmaz, 2006). The next 
section presents and analyses the data findings. 
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Analysis and findings
This section discusses the data findings. It is presented in three parts. 
The first explains the government’s aims when introducing the tax 
credits (TC) system in the UK, individuals’ initial expectations and rea-
sons for claiming TC, and real-life consequences of claiming TC. The 
findings show that although one of the aims of the TC system was to 
alleviate financial hardship for low-income families and workers, in 
reality the TC system worsens financial hardship for up to one-third of 
claimants in the UK. The findings further show that the way claimants 
find out about their overpayments cause some claimants to turn to debt, 
reinforcing feelings of victimisation and stigmatisation for claimants. 
The following two parts focus on encounters between tax credits claim-
ants and HMRC letters and notices (inscription devices) and HMRC 
workers (expertise). The first of these parts examines what happens 
when claimants attempt to challenge their overpayments by contacting 
HMRC workers. The findings show that HMRC workers are unhelp-
ful and unempathetic toward claimants. Consequently, disempowering 
claimants to want to challenge their overpayments, which ultimately 
worsens their financial hardship. The last part examines HMRC work-
ers’ experiences when dealing with TC cases and claimants enquiries. 
The findings demonstrate that HMRC workers are structurally disad-
vantaged to be able to help claimants in meaningful and humane ways, 
due to their working environment and office-based culture.  
Aims and unanticipated consequences of tax credits
The UK’s New Labour government announced its long-term goal of 
halving child poverty by 2010 and “to abolish it within a generation” 
(HMRC Treasury, 2002, p. 13). The government announced plans to 
reform its current benefits system, which was reported to be unrespon-
sive to individual needs and had complex administrative processes (HM 
Treasury, 2002), by combining the tax system and benefit system. The 
objective was to ‘streamline’ and ‘modernise’ the ‘interaction of the tax 
and benefits systems’ and to provide a ‘tailored’ (HM Treasury, 2002, p. 
4) financial support system to recipients. The new TC system was part 
of the government’s strategy for achieving this. It replaced Working 
Families Tax Credits (WFTC) in April 2003 and was administered by the 
UK tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
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The new TC system was designed to tackle poverty and also pro-
vide ‘employment opportunity to all’ (HMRC Treasury, 2002, p. 13). It 
operated two separate elements to achieve these goals:  the working tax 
credits (WTC), paid to working individuals; and child tax credits (CTC), 
paid to (non)working individuals who have dependent children. Addi-
tional CTC is awarded when children are placed in childcare whilst the 
claimant is working (known as the childcare element). 
When the TC system was introduced in 2003, it was advertised to the 
public mainly via television adverts and radio. Advertising campaigns 
contained certain rhetoric and phrases, such as “money with your name 
on it” and “if you’ve earned it, make sure you claim it”, suggesting 
that tax credits money is available and easily accessible to claimants. In 
addition, government rhetoric used in political manifestos and budget 
announcements suggested that dealing with the TC system would be a 
seamless and straightforward process for claimants. Applying for TC is 
not compulsory nor automatic. It is the responsibility and choice of the 
individual to apply for TC.
All claimants that were interviewed smile and are excited when they 
describe how they feel when they found out about TC for the first time. 
This was the only time claimants would smile during most of the inter-
views. For instance, Alison5 (employed, single, mother of two children) 
thought the tax credits system is “brilliant”, believing TC would give 
her “a little extra” money that she believes she is “entitled to”. Alison 
believes TC would “help” her.  All interviewees wanted to, and were 
looking forward to receiving, TC at the outset.
However, within a few years of its introduction, a third of all UK 
claimants suffered an overpayment and found themselves having to 
repay some or all of their TC money back to HMRC, worsening their 
financial hardship (see Figure 6.1). 
5 Interview participant information has been anonymised, and names replaced using 
pseudonyms, to protect their identities. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of overpayments to total number of awards 
 
Source: HMRC statistics 
Figure 1 shows a significant drop in the number of overpayments in 2006/07. This was 
caused by Government intervention which extended the disregard limit by ten-fold, from 
£2,500 to £25,000. The disregard limit allowed claimant income to fluctuate within its limit 
without having to reassess a claimant’s tax credit award and avoid triggering an overpayment. 
However, overpayments continued to be an issue for nearly 20% of UK claimants after 
2006/07, which increased from 19.77% to 28.39% by 2014/15 when the New Coalition 
government reduced the disregard limit to £10,000 in 2011/12 and then £5,000 in 2013/14. 
According to HMRC statistics, the average annual overpayment value for one household 
stood at £1,028 in 2003/04. This is a lot of money for a low-income family to have to pay 
back. In 2006/07, when the disregard limit was increased, the average annual overpayment 
fell to £738, but later increased to £1,099 by 2014/15 (similar to the amount experienced in 
2003/04 (£1,028)).  
Nadia (employed, single, mother of two children) found out about her overpayment when 
she was at a checkout at her local supermarket with her children. Her bank card was declined 
when she was trying to buy food for her family. Her “heart sank”. She was “embarrassed” 
and could not understand why she had no money, until she went to a local cashpoint and 
found out her TC money had not been paid into her bank account. She later found out that 
HMRC stopped her TC income because she had an overpayment and the TC income owed to 

























Figure 6.1: Percentage of overpayments to total number of awards. 
Source: HMRC statistics
Figure 6.1 shows a significant drop in the number of overpayments 
in 2006/07. This was caused by the government intervention of extend-
ing the disregard limit by ten-fold, from £2,500 to £25,000. The disregard 
limit allowed claimant income to fluctuate within this limit without 
having to reassess a claimant’s tax credits award and avoid triggering 
an overpayment. However, overpayments continued to be an issue for 
nearly 20% of UK laimants after 2006/07, which increased from 19.77% 
to 28.39% by 2014/15 when the New Coalition government reduced the 
disregard limit to £10,000 in 2011/12 and then £5,000 in 2013/14. Accord-
ing to HMRC statistics, the average annual overpayment value for one 
household stood at £1,028 in 2003/04. This is a lot of money for a low-in-
come family to have to pay back. In 2006/07, when the disregard limit 
was increased, the average annual overpayment fell to £738, but later 
increased to £1,099 by 2014/15 (similar to the amount experienced in 
2003/04 (£1,028)). 
Nadia (employed, single, mother of two children) found out about 
her overpayment when she was at a checkout at her local supermarket 
with her children. Her bank card was declined when she was trying 
to buy food for her family. Her “heart sank”. She was “embarrassed” 
and could not understand why she had no money, until she went to a 
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local cashpoint and found out her TC money had not been paid into her 
bank account. She later found out that HMRC stopped her TC income 
because she had an overpayment and the TC income owed to her was 
being used to repay the overpayment. Nadia had no awareness of an 
overpayment, nor that HMRC had decided to stop her TC income to 
pay it back.  She felt “depressed” and on the “verge of having a nervous 
breakdown”. Nadia was advised to use her local Foodbank to feed her-
self and her children, but she is too “embarrassed” to use it. She says, 
“everyone will know I have no money. I have my pride”.  
Claimants also find out about their overpayments by receiving 
HMRC documents in the post. For instance, Caitlyn (unemployed, 
single, mother of two children) received her usual tax credits award 
notice (inscription device) in the post. But noticed that this particular 
notice showed a reduction in her tax credits payments. She says, “I 
couldn’t understand why my tax credits were so low […] You’re not 
prepared for it”. Caitlyn had not prepared nor budgeted for her loss of 
income and had no savings to help her through it. She has to “cut back” 
on food and electricity usage. She says, it is a “stress on your life. The 
kids suss it out and they get all agitated and they play up when they 
see you stressed. The anxiety hits them as well”. Caitlyn now “dreads” 
claiming TC and opening HMRC documents received in the post. 
Other claimants have similar experiences. Hannah (self-employed, 
divorced, mother of two children) received an overpayment notice 
(inscription device) of £7,000, that “popped through the door” and 
caused an emotional “explosion”, making her feel “fuming” and 
“mad”. Tammy (employed, married, mother of two children) also 
received an unexpected overpayment notice from HMRC in the post 
that showed an overpayment of £12,000, which will take her nine 
years to pay back. Tammy found out about her overpayment when her 
second child was new-born and her husband was diagnosed with ter-
minal cancer. Finding out about an overpayment was the “last thing” 
she needed. Kara (unemployed, married, mother of four children) was 
forced to choose whether to “eat or heat”, and got into debt by apply-
ing for a “crisis loan”. She says, there is “no guarantee what was going 
into your bank account. Therefore, it was difficult to budget” and made 
her feel “scared”. Clara (employed, single, mother of two children) and 
her children are “living on beans on toast […] for months” and had to 
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use a bank overdraft to survive. Overpayments, and the way claimants 
find out about their overpayments, cause extreme financial hardship by 
reducing claimants’ income and not allowing them to be able to budget 
in advance. They also cause anxiety and stress for claimants, and their 
children in some cases. Ultimately making claimants feel victimised 
and stigmatised. 
This part explains the intended aims of the TC system and the real-
life consequences of claiming TC for one-third of claimants in the UK. 
Claimants find out about their overpayments too late, when HMRC has 
already calculated and made claimants accountable for paying back the 
overpayments. Claimants are unprepared and seldom are able to repay 
thousands of pounds back to HMRC and pay for food and electricity 
bills. So much so, some of them get into debt. The next part examines 
what claimants do after they find out about their overpayments, as an 
attempt to alleviate their suffering, by contacting HMRC workers to 
challenge their overpayments and get help and information about them. 
Challenging tax credits overpayments: Getting help from HMRC 
workers 
There are several causes of TC overpayments. These include claimant 
error, fraud and mid-year changes in income and/or household struc-
ture. As demonstrated above, some claimants do not expect nor under-
stand what has caused their overpayments. Yet, HMRC have already 
made them accountable and responsible for paying them back by auto-
matically reducing their future TC income, and in some cases, stopping 
their TC income altogether. Claimants have the right to challenge and 
appeal their overpayments by contacting HMRC. Due to government 
restructuring, underpinned by neoliberal political goals, several local 
tax offices were shut down in the UK (Closs-Davies et al., 2020), forc-
ing many claimants to contact HMRC call centres (locale) by telephone 
instead of engaging in face-to-face conversations with HMRC workers 
(expertise). Thus, most claimants initially challenge their overpayments 
in remote faceless ways. 
Most claimants interviewed for this research project were put on 
hold when trying to speak to HMRC workers on the telephone. Juliet 
(employed, divorcee) was put on hold for up to 50 minutes. This is 
“infuriating” for Sally (employed, married, two children) who ends up 
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ending the call because she “couldn’t get through” and her children 
were “jumping on the beds” and noisy. When Sally called HMRC and 
was put on hold again, she was told by an automated system to call 
back. When claimants want to challenge their overpayments, they are 
forced to deal with automated telephone systems and put on hold for 
long periods of time. Some claimants end up either ending the call, and 
do not get to speak to HMRC workers to question their overpayments.
Some claimants do get to speak to HMRC workers on the telephone. 
For instance, after waiting on the HMRC telephone helpline, Hannah 
eventually speaks to a HMRC worker. She is asked to provide her iden-
tification information, to include her date of birth and national insur-
ance number, before being able to ask questions about her overpay-
ment. The HMRC worker tells her to write a letter (inscription device) 
to HMRC because they are unable to help her on the telephone. This is 
because HMRC computer screens (inscription device) do not provide 
access to this information to HMRC workers (expertise).  Juliet finds out 
about her overpayment by receiving an overpayment notice (inscription 
device) in the post. She phones HMRC to question her overpayment, 
but she is told that they cannot deal with her case and she is passed on 
to the debt recovery department. Juliet describes this experience:
“They were passing it through to their progressive debt depart-
ment, and quite quickly, for the recovery. They’re quite per-
sistent on the recovery […] Things have sometimes escalated 
quite quickly before you’ve got a chance to try and address it.” 
(Juliet)
In Juliet’s case, the HMRC worker could not help her and her case 
was passed on to the debt collecting department. She describes this 
experience as moving from “first stage” to “second stage”. The latter 
she describes as a “more aggressive” worker. This makes it more diffi-
cult for Juliet to challenge her overpayment because they can only deal 
with enquiries that relate to how Juliet is to pay back the money. She is 
unable to get information about the cause of her overpayment to help 
her appeal against it.  
Colin is an advocate and representative of a vulnerable claimant 
(unemployed, single, father of one child) for whom he helps challenge 
their overpayment. Colin sends letters to HMRC, rather than use the tel-
ephone helpline, and over a period of eighteen months, he receives let-
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ters from several different “groups”, “teams” and “floor” departments, 
in each case he has to deal with a different HMRC worker.  Janet and 
Cain (employed/unemployed, married with two children) have had 
several experiences of being passed between different HMRC work-
ers on the HMRC telephone helpline, they believe it is a strategy to by 
HMRC to “make things difficult for” and to put claimants “off” chal-
lenging their overpayments. As a result of being passed on by HMRC 
workers, claimants end up feeling disempowered. 
When claimants engage with HMRC workers to challenge their 
overpayments, some do not get help or empathy from HMRC work-
ers. Nadia speaks to a HMRC worker on the telephone to find out why 
her TC income has stopped (see also earlier about Nadia’s experience). 
The worker tells Nadia, “you’ve been claiming childcare when you 
haven’t been working” and this caused the overpayment. However, 
when Nadia tells the worker that their information is wrong and that 
she has been working, the worker accuses of her “lying” and believes 
that the information shown on HMRC records is correct. Nadia pleads 
to the worker, “please help me. I don’t understand”. But the worker 
repeats the same information. Nadia describes the worker as a “rude 
idiot” and felt they “weren’t listening” to her. Her encounter with the 
HMRC worker is “emotionally draining”. She “lost her temper” and 
“couldn’t be bothered doing anything” further. She stops challenging 
her overpayment.
Kara tells a HMRC worker “I haven’t got any money. My children 
will starve!”. But the worker continues to repeat the same information 
that she has an overpayment which must be repaid. Kara describes 
HMRC workers as reading from a “script” because “they say exactly 
the same thing all the time”. Several claimants share similar experi-
ences to Nadia and Kara who feel HMRC workers do not listen to them, 
are unhelpful and do not show any empathy toward their desperate 
circumstances. Being put on hold, being passed on and dealing with 
unhelpful and unempathetic HMRC workers lead some claimants to 
stop challenging their overpayments, who end up repaying thousands 
of pounds back to HMRC. Ultimately worsening their financial hard-
ship and reinforcing feelings of victimisation.   
Such encounters with HMRC workers not only affected the claim-
ants interviewed for this chapter, but were also experienced by other 
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claimants across the UK. So much so, this prompted some claimants to 
create social media accounts as an outlet to vent their frustrations and 
as a space to help and support each other. For instance, some claim-
ants created a Facebook group named, “Tax Credits Suck”. The Face-
book group captures the experiences of tax credits claimants across the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland from different demographics 
and social backgrounds. Figure 6.2 is an extract of a post that was written 
by a claimant and posted onto the Facebook group’s webpage.  Figure 
6.2 illustrates the experiences of one claimant who suffers an overpay-
ment of £10,000. Several other similar experiences are also shared on the 
Facebook group’s webpage. 
Figure 6.2. Extract from Tax Credits Suck, Facebook, 2015.
The stories examined in this part raise important questions about 
how the TC system is administered at the frontline. But also, how it 
is experienced by HMRC workers who deal with claimants who need 
help and financial support, and are often emotional and anxious on the 
telephone. The next part examines the experiences of HMRC workers 
during their encounters with claimants on the telephone.  
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HMRC workers’ experiences of dealing with tax credits cases and 
claimants
The UK tax authority has undergone several restructuring projects over 
the past 40 years (Closs-Davies et al., 2020). These include the merging 
of Inland Revenue and Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise in 2005 and 
the replacement of local tax offices with large regional offices and call 
centres (locales) thereafter. As a result, HMRC workers (expertise) were 
relocated from an office that was based in the community and consisted 
of a mixture of frontline staff, inspectors and managers, all of whom 
shared their knowledge, experiences and skills, to isolating same-level 
teams of workers far from the community (Closs-Davies et al., 2020). 
As part of the UK government’s goal to restructure public services, tax 
administration became digitised. This meant that tax credits claimant 
information was inputted into an ICT system (centre of calculation), 
from which claimants’ TC awards and any overpayments would be cal-
culated.  
Anna (HMRC worker) has worked for the tax authority since the 
early 1980s and has experienced the changing work practices in her 
office since then. When TC were introduced in 2003, Anna dealt with 
paper-based TC application forms, handwritten letters and paper evi-
dence (inscription devices) provided by claimants. She was also able 
to meet claimants face-to-face in the local community tax office. These 
practices enabled Anna to assess “whether somebody’s not totally 
being honest” by seeing the number of mistakes made on paper and 
the claimant’s body language during a meeting. Claimants were able 
to articulate their circumstances in their own words to Anna. This 
also humanised her interactions with claimants because she was able 
to observe their emotions and any struggles. However, when Anna’s 
office became “paperless” she had to deal with information provided 
to her on a computer screen (inscription device). TC awards/overpay-
ment were calculated by the ICT system, instead of her. She had to com-
municate with claimants on the telephone, or by sending a letter in the 
post which was prepared and printed by the ICT system. This made it 
very difficult for Anna to believe claimants and she does “not feel com-
fortable” making decisions on a claimant’s TC award case and telling 
claimants the outcome of her decisions. This is because claimants end 
up “shouting” at her on the telephone. 
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Other HMRC workers that were interviewed as part of this research 
project share similar experiences. Claire describes the ICT system as a 
“nightmare to use”. Julie says “it was soul destroying […] and takes 
away any discretion” a HMRC worker wants to apply to a case. Accord-
ing to Julie the ICT system, “takes away any grey areas” of a case which 
means that claimants circumstances must fit into pre-determined cri-
teria for it to be considered by the ICT system. Experienced HMRC 
workers were used to dealing with claimants/taxpayers through face-
to-face meetings in their local tax office, or on the telephone when they 
“understood what was going on properly” in a case. However, due to 
digitisation and relocation from the community, HMRC workers found 
themselves having to deal with claimants remotely and through dig-
itised means. Their discretions and decision-making were also taken 
away as claimant information was inputted into an ICT system which 
processed, calculated and presented the information to them on com-
puter screens on a script. 
According to Julie, HMRC tried to reduce the number of phone 
calls received from claimants, “because waiting times […] were pretty 
awful” and workers were not achieving their performance targets, by 
encouraging claimants to either write to HMRC or use their online ser-
vices (ICT system). Some HMRC letters did not include the telephone 
help-line number (Julie). In David’s case, he and his colleagues were 
monitored on how much time they spent on a case. He says, “the pres-
sure was just to get it cleared”. So much so, he “dreaded going in most 
days” and “didn’t dare take any time off [work]”. According to Claire, 
90 percent of the post had to be dealt with within “28 days”. Workers 
are also assessed on how much “yield” they produce, which according 
to Anna means “how much have you brought back [and] saved the busi-
ness”. Anna’s colleague is congratulated by their line manager during 
a staff meeting after finding and charging a £15,000 overpayment onto 
a claimant. Anna says, “you’ve got to think of the people that you’re 
hitting. They’re people of society. This person [claimant] has now got a 
£15,000 overpayment and nobody seems to realise. It’s not just a job [for 
us]; it’s a life changer [for claimants]”. 
Anna, and her colleagues, are monitored and assessed on whether 
they achieve their performance targets on a daily basis, and their line 
managers are also monitored and assessed in similar ways as frontline 
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staff. HMRC workers are awarded for finding and charging tax cred-
its overpayments on claimants, quickly processing cases and telephone 
enquiries from claimants. HMRC workers are sanctioned if they do not 
achieve their performance targets, either by getting relocated to a differ-
ent department, being re-trained, not getting promoted or at worst risk 
losing their job (Closs-Davies et al., 2020).  
Discussion 
The UK has seen a significant shift in UK political discourse, in par-
ticular under Margaret Thatcher’s administration, from a “dependency 
on the state” to “self-dependency” (Peters, 2001). Self-responsibility is 
one of the key themes of neo-liberal governance (Peters, 2001). Draw-
ing from this, the aims of the traditional welfare state of equality and 
fairness for all shifted to a targeting of individuals where individuals 
are subjected to automated, digitised and inhumane public services. 
Making users of those public services self-responsible for helping them-
selves and finding ways to navigate through government financial sup-
port programmes.  
This chapter finds that the UK tax credits (TC) system is one such 
example that demonstrates the stark consequences of the restructur-
ing of the tax authority, underpinned by neoliberal political ideol-
ogy. Paper-based, handwritten application forms and letters (inscrip-
tion device) were replaced by automated letters, notices and computer 
screens. Access to, and encounters with, HMRC workers (expertise) 
changed from face-to-face meetings to faceless conversations on the 
telephone. Locales changed from local-based tax office buildings to 
remote call centres. HMRC workers lost their ability to work out TC 
awards and overpayments and apply discretion and judgement toward 
claimant cases because centres of calculation, in terms of the processing 
of claimant information and making decisions and outcomes, was taken 
over by ICT. This transformation in TC administration makes it diffi-
cult for some claimants to challenge their TC overpayments, often dis-
empowering claimants to pursue their disputes. As a result, claimants 
end up feeling victimised and stigmatised. In addition, this chapter also 
highlights how everyday frontline encounters between HMRC work-
ers and claimants can have profound effects on claimants’ outcomes. It 
shows that although the TC system was designed to alleviate financial 
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hardship, in reality it worsens financial hardship for up to one-third of 
claimants. 
This chapter forms part of a bigger research project which examines 
frontline encounters of UK TC administration by HMRC, with the aim 
to understand how TC administration affects the financial and existen-
tial hardship of claimants. The findings of this chapter suggest that tax 
credits claimants are forced to become self-responsible and accountable 
for TC overpayments. One of the key characteristics of neo-liberalism 
thinking is to force people to become self-responsible. We see aspects of 
this in the previous section, where claimants are forced to become less 
dependent on the state (HMRC workers) for help, advice and support, 
and have to find other ways for coping and dealing with TC overpay-
ments, and thus their own welfare. This means that individuals have 
to invest their own capital (resources), or get into debt, to budget and 
make themselves financially better off, so that the state does not have 
to. Thus, welfare recipients, promoted by the neo-liberal model, are 
encouraged to become privatised objects, who are responsible for man-
aging their own economic state. 
However, this chapter illuminates that this neo-liberal model shows 
significant deficiencies when applied within the TC context. Some 
claimants fail to be successful at being ‘privatised objects’ and man-
aging to improve their own economic state because they are structur-
ally disadvantaged due to constraints caused by HMRC practices. As a 
result, they become permanent residents of the ‘underclass’ and remain 
poor and dependent on welfare. Although claimants try their best to 
challenge and understand their overpayments, they also become por-
trayed as citizens who do not conform towards socio-political discourse 
and become stigmatised. Thus, some claimants are unable to become 
successful at being self-responsible for their own financial hardship and 
become trapped on welfare and debt and the stigma associated with it. 
Conclusion
This chapter examines what happens when claimants find out about 
overpayments, how they deal with their overpayments by engaging 
with HMRC workers, and the financial and non-financial effects of 
such encounters. It argues that some claimants are made financially 
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worse off when they engage with HMRC workers and remote digit-
ised technologies, underpinned by the neoliberal discourse of efficiency 
and performance, which lurk behind the everyday scenes described by 
our interviewees.  One of the main aims of the tax credits (TC) system 
is to make low-income individuals and families financially better off. 
However, this chapter finds that, in reality, some tax credits claimants 
are made financially worse off: claimants struggle to pay for essential 
household bills, are forced to depend on Foodbanks and get into debt. 
For example, Nadia faced having to use the Foodbank to feed herself 
and her two children, Kara had to depend on a crisis loan and Clara and 
her two young children had to survive on beans-on-toast for months. 
Claimants who initially challenge their overpayments are made to feel 
inferior, disempowered and worthless as a result of their encounters 
with unhelpful and unempathetic HMRC workers and digitised tech-
nologies. Claimants lose their pride and suffer from anxiety, worry, 
stress and depression. Nadia lost her pride and suffered from depres-
sion because of the stress tax credits overpayments causes her. Caitlyn 
and Kara feel “worthless” and not part of society. Instead of making 
them financially better off, their engagement with the TC system rein-
force the stigmatisation of claimants who get trapped in welfare pov-
erty and inequality. This chapter finds that the administration of TC has 
become disembodied and dehumanised and that it fails to engage with 
‘real people’ with ‘real lives’. As a result, it sustains an asymmetry of 
accountability: claimants are forced to become self-responsible for deal-
ing with and repaying tax credits overpayments.  
This chapter highlights how the administration of welfare systems 
has less to do with representing basic human needs and protecting 
citizens by improving their economic conditions and social prosperity. 
Rather, it has more to do with governing, surveying and influencing the 
behaviour of public service workers and citizens. Drawing from this, the 
administration of welfare programmes thus becomes a pervasive form 
of relational power as it facilitates the judging of people and themselves 
and their transformation into self-responsible individuals, referred to 
by Foucault as ‘governmentality’. The administration of welfare pro-
grammes transforms human beings (claimants and HMRC workers) 
from subjective emotional living beings, some of whom are in desperate 
need of help and support (claimants), to standardised abstract govern-
able objects. As a result, this dehumanises the welfare system, where 
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human needs and characteristics become of little use and value. This 
goes against the very definition of welfare, which strives to improve the 
wellbeing, good fortune, happiness and prosperity of citizens. 
Looking back at this chapter’s findings so far, this chapter broadens 
our understanding of the role of public administration and account-
ing technologies by determining and analysing the relational processes 
facilitated by accountability mechanisms, to explain the order and con-
stitution of the social world. In this respect, it provides several impor-
tant theoretical leads to further explore. First, we need to further explore 
how discourse is enacted and adapted in practice and with what con-
sequences. There seems to be an intricate relationship between social 
stigma, the complexity and accountability of a TC system and claimants’ 
self-worth. Second, we should look deeper into practices of knowledge/
power inherent in everyday frontline encounters to transforming the 
lives of citizens and public services workers, and the role of digitisa-
tion which seems to lurk behind the scenes. How are understandings 
of deservingness, poverty, accountability for outcomes and acceptance 
of outcomes crafted through relational practices? This chapter calls for 
further additional study of systematically examining the nature, quality 
and real-world consequences of encounters between citizens and public 
service workers, and how this (re)creates and sustains socio-political 
discourse through every day relational practices. 
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Taxable presence issues in the digital era have in part, lead to the consideration 
of a market-based approach to taxation. This chapter considers the extent to 
which this approach resolves taxable presence issues that are caused or exac-
erbated by digitalisation. In comparison to the Permanent Establishment rules, 
the market-based approach will have a remedying effect on some tax issues 
while giving rise to new issues and leaving some issues unresolved. Current 
rules are not robust at reflecting the presence of significant business activity in 
the digital era. Does the market-based approach tackle this inability to capture 
significant digital business activity? 
The chapter challenges ‘economic allegiance’ justifications between mar-
ket-based activities and market jurisdictions. The market-based approach is 
robust at indicating the presence of economic activity in the market jurisdic-
tion, but, it does not match the role of market-based activity in proportion to 
the value chain as a whole. Thereby, the market-based approach to taxation 
risks exceeding the significance of market-based activities to the business as a 
whole. Within and beyond the market-based approach, taxable presence and 
corresponding tax rights allocation should acknowledge the role of the mar-
ket-based activities in the value chain of the business as a whole. Market-based 
activities are key value creators for certain types of business models, but this is 
still not desirable if market-based tax policy leads to ring fencing such models.
The analysis in this chapter questions the need for a market-based approach 
in international tax if it does not substantially resolve the issues that reform 
started out with. Therefore, it concludes that the market-based approach 
should be reconsidered as a policy option if it is not sufficient in light of taxable 
presence issues and is not aligned with a holistic view of value creation.
1 PhD Student, University of Surrey. Supervisors: Dr Ira Lindsay and Dr Carla Bonina. I am 
thankful for the opportunity to discuss and receive feedback for this paper at the 2020 Tax 
Research Network Conference.
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Introduction
The first section of this chapter notes key market-based factors, the 
interpretation of “market-based” and recognises how “market-based” 
is different from marketing intangibles. The second section explores 
the extent to which the market-based approach tackles taxable presence 
issues, namely, Scale without mass, Performance of business activities 
directly without the need for a local PE, Lack of a suitable proxy and 
Avoiding taxable presence for significant market-based transactions. 
The third section 3 considers whether market-based factors reflect core 
value creation activities of the business.
The analysis in this chapter questions the need for a market-based 
approach in international tax if it does not substantially resolve the 
issues that reform started out with. Yet, if the market-based approach 
does not materially tackle taxable presence issues and does not recog-
nise the significance of the market-based activity in light of the business 
model, we will have to question again the purpose of rearranging or 
adding a market-based approach to the current tax framework, in light 
of other advantages or policy goals.
Therefore, the chapter concludes that the market-based approach 
should be reconsidered as a policy option if it is not sufficient in light of 
taxable presence issues and is not aligned with a holistic view of value 
creation.
The market-based approach
The following table compiles a non-exhaustive list of proposals that use 
market-based factors to recognise taxable presence and allocate taxable 
income. Market based factors are used across both long-term and short-
term proposals:
1 OECD Pillar 1 (OECD, 2019a)
2 Marketing intangibles (OECD, 2019b)
3 Digital services tax (European Commission (E C), 2018a)
4 Significant digital presence (European Commission (E C), 2018b)
5 Withholding tax methods and equalisation levies2
2  For example, India, Hungary, Malaysia (KPMG, 2019). 
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Table 7.1: Proposals using market-based factors to recognise taxable presence 
and allocate taxable income
Market based factors suggested by the 
proposal
Factors used for taxable presence 
or taxable income allocation
OECD Pillar 1
User/market jurisdictions - “market jurisdic-
tions”
“MNE group sells its products or services
Provides services to users
Solicits and collects data or content contribu-
tions from users” (OECD, 2020a)
Taxable presence is not compul-
sorily established before taxable 




User and customer base
Other marketing intangibles. It is not clear that 
these marketing intangibles are recognised in 
financial statements and what they specifically 
comprise of (EY, 2019; OECD, 2019c).
Taxable presence and taxable 




Advertising targeted at users of a digital inter-
face
Transmission of data collected about users 
(also from user activity on the interface)
Intermediation services through a multi-sided 
digital interface (E C, 2018a) 
Revenue from these activities 
become taxable in the absence of a 
taxable presence. 
Therefore, indirectly profit alloca-
tion or re-allocation takes place.
Significant digital presence
Revenues from providing digital services to 
users, or number of users of a digital service, 
or number of business contracts for digital 
services (B2B) in a jurisdiction (E C, 2018b)
Taxable presence
Withholding tax methods and equalisation levies




Hosting or maintenance of websites
Providing any facility or service for uploading, 
storing or distribution of digital content
Online collection or processing of user data,
E-commerce supplies of goods and services in 
the country (KPMG, 2019)
In the absence of a taxable pres-
ence. 
When viewed together with other 
corporate tax mechanisms, indi-
rectly affects taxable income allo-
cation across jurisdictions.
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The factors used to ascertain taxable presence and allocate taxable 
income across the above examples are representative of market and 
output-oriented activities. While being emphasised in these proposals, 
the market-based activities are carved out of whole business activity. 
Such exclusive treatment is a significant shift in tax policy design.
Prior to these proposals, the PE rules, that are used to establish tax-
able presence in the source country, did not differentiate based on the 
type of business activity but considered the relative significance of the 
business activity. It is the significance of an activity to the business as a 
whole (OECD, 2020) which impacts the recognition of a taxable pres-
ence in the form of a permanent establishment, not the type of activity.
The current rules under OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions does 
not discriminate on the type (market/production/inputs), proximity of 
the activity to revenue, direct income generating nature of the activ-
ity or the participants of the transaction. The market-based proposals 
increasingly refer specifically to users and customers as participants for 
business transactions.
A common understanding of ‘market-based’?
The market-based approach is not pre-defined and does not hold the 
same definitions across prior (Avi-Yonah, 2015; Devereux & de la Feria, 
2014) and more recent proposals. The term includes jurisdictions where 
demand for a product is present, location of the customer and the desti-
nation approach (Barker, 2012). These three types of market-based fac-
tors are different but related.
For example, jurisdictions where digital users contribute user 
generated content for a product and view advertisements indi-
cate jurisdictions where there is a demand for the product. 
 Such activity is different from the location for an online purchase of a 
digital service or good. Again, both these activities are different from 
the location where the purchased good is finally consumed. The fol-
lowing figure clarifies the difference between jurisdictions of various 
market-based factors.
At the same time, monetisation also varies across market-based fac-
tors. For example, a social media platform business can have a strong 
user network in one jurisdiction, but they may not generate significant 
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or proportionate income from that jurisdiction. The advertising reve-
nue per user ratio (as per the table below) has been calculated for the 
month of December 2013, 2014 and 2015 from the Facebook 10 K report 
(Facebook, 2015a).
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Figure 7.1: Difference between the jurisdiction of the customer and jurisdiction 
where the value creating activity is performed. Author’s own compilation.
 Table 7.2: Facebook data on advertising revenue
Daily active users in millions (December) 2013 (p. 37) 2014 (p. 33) 2015 (p. 33)
US and Canada DAU 147 157 169
Europe DAU 195 217 240
Advertising revenue in millions (December) 2013 (p. 41) 2014 (p. 37) 2015 (p. 37)
US and Canada $1,068 $1,709 $2,811
Europe $658 $960 $1,391
Advertising revenue per user ratio = Advertising revenue/Daily Active Users
US and Canada 7.26 10.88 16.63
Europe 3.37 4.42 5.79
The report indicates that daily users are consistently higher in 
Europe than in the US and Canada. However, the revenue per user ratio 
is consistently lower in Europe. The analysis shows that the accounted 
income generated per jurisdiction is not always proportional to user 
population or digital presence within an economy (EY, 2017).
The point of contact between corporations and consumers/custom-
ers are common across market-based proposals however, the taxable 
presence and taxable income allocation results will vary depending 
on the market-based factors used in the proposals (Avi-Yonah, 2000; 
Devereux & de la Feria, 2014).
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If the market-based approach is to conform with the current ‘signifi-
cance’ approach, it should be assumed that these factors represent the 
significant engagement of the digitalised business in the economy of 
the jurisdiction and be core value creation activities for the digitalised 
business model as a whole. These would be far-reaching assumptions.
Marketing intangibles and market-based activities
The concept of ‘marketing intangibles’ (OECD, 2019c, p11) is often con-
sidered synonymous with or parallel to the market-based approach. 
The concept encompasses a wider scope of market facing activities as 
it aims to reflect the participation of the business in the market. It has a 
wider scope than the Digital Services Tax and market specific withhold-
ing taxes. The business will engage in marketing, advertising and other 
customer facing activities in the process of building this market and 
building the “positive attitude in the minds of customers” (Kibirige, 
2019; Lowry, 2019) to lead up to a marketing intangible.
Marketing intangibles go beyond income generating market activi-
ties to the potential market. The marketing intangible may be built by the 
business for their own product. However, only a percentage of the mar-
keting intangible would be monetised in one financial reporting period. 
The income arising from the market-based activity is a key differentia-
tor between the marketing intangible and the location of the purchas-
ing customer and destination factors. The monetised aspect should be 
relevant for taxation, not the potential market or market yet to be mon-
etised. Market interactions of the business do not translate directly into 
income. Reform should therefore be careful in relying on the market 
interactions of the business to recognise nexus and taxable value.
Taxable presence issues in the digital era
The permanent establishment is considered to be insufficient and 
outdated for digitalised business activities. This section explores the 
effectiveness of the market-based approach in tackling taxable pres-
ence challenges (Olbert & Spengel, 2017). The analysis takes a targeted 
approach, conscious of the detailed composition of digitalisation tax 
issues, enabling a critical review of proposed policy reform. The fol-
lowing four issues are components of the taxable presence challenge, in 
light of digitalisation. 
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Scale without mass
This issue is exacerbated by digitalisation (Bundgaard & Kjaersgaad, 
2020; OECD, 2018a, 2018b). Scale without mass is not a feature of busi-
ness but a perspective towards understanding business operations 
in various jurisdictions. In this case, scale refers to business activity 
whereas mass refers to physical presence closely linked to the corre-
sponding business activity, which is usually locally established. In 
many ways the ‘mass’ continues to exist in digital form.
The issue is that ‘mass’ in digitalised business models are not locally 
established close to the business activities in a jurisdiction, i.e., ‘scale’. 
The network effects are not the digital version of mass. The main iden-
tificatory characteristic of mass in both digitalised and traditional busi-
nesses is the local presence enabling local business transactions.
Both scale and mass influence each other across the value chain. 
Business entities strategise the mass to meet scale targets and continue 
to adapt the mass to be efficient in proportion to the scale. Scale is a 
result of the efforts of the business in the value chain, reached through 
mass. Mass includes establishments, software developers, digital and 
managerial business infrastructure, offices and factories which are used 
to maintain and sustain the scale.
International tax policy has traditionally been based on ‘mass’. The 
permanent establishment concept was initially focussed on physical 
presence which represents mass. This view has evolved over time to 
consider the significant character of business activity beyond direct 
physical presence (OECD, 2015a). Therefore, scale without mass results 
in issues for a policy that is based on ‘mass’. The focus on mass has led 
to issues concerning commissionaire arrangements, fragmentation of 
activities and specific activity exemptions.
The distinction between scale and mass activities are beyond digital-
isation. It is true that digitalisation renders the scale mass relationship 
more efficient, however, digitalisation is not the cause of the scale mass 
distinction. Why should business efficiencies in the scale mass relation-
ship and the distinction between scale and mass be confronted by inter-
national tax policy, on the advent of digitalisation?
Market activity and the corresponding revenue is a result of pre-
ceding activities in the value chain that are not necessarily customer 
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facing. Keeping taxation aside, if the value chain of the business is to be 
rewarded with income arising from market activity, large proportions 
of the income would be allocated to much deserving activities earlier in 
the chain. In other words, the background activities that occur earlier in 
the chain provide the material to take to the market.
Such earlier activities in the value chain were visible in the form 
of physical establishments, factories or offices that continue to exist 
in invisible digital form. An example is the skilled IT workforce who 
develop and manage the software essential to the digitalised business. 
Some of the earlier activities in the value chain may be covered by a 
‘routine’ profit allocation (Devereux et al., 2019) for functions and activ-
ities that lead into market activity. However, the profit or loss reported 
in the financial statements are a result of routine and non-routine resid-
ual or market-based activities.
The design of the value chain is unique to each business. Cross prior-
itisation of market and non-market activity does not match the under-
standing of a business about their valuable and unimportant activi-
ties. Market activities hold varying proportions of investment and cost 
across value chains (OECD, 2015b). In fact, market activities are often 
less investment intensive, comprise of current costs and lower risk than 
development of technology, knowledge and competency management 
and product development.
The simplicity  in recognising, validating and valuing market-based 
activity is administratively advantageous and easier than for non-mar-
ket activities. However, market-based activities, particularly sales activ-
ities, have an evident value on their own, which is apart from but not 
independent of the mass. Whether this advantage should overpower 
the value that the tax system finds amongst non-market business activ-
ity should be reconsidered.
It cannot be assumed that market activity and associated routine or 
background activity should both be in the same jurisdiction of opera-
tion. The advantage and purpose of the multinational design for busi-
ness operations would be extinguished by this assumption (Brynjolf-
sson et al., 2008). It is natural for scale to be without mass and mass 
to be without scale in either jurisdiction. The differentiation between 
scale and mass is not parallel with business strategy and will result in 
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an uneven prioritisation of scale or mass across industries and also tax 
policy (OECD, 2020c, pp. 11, 23).
The market-based approach responds to the ‘scale without mass’ 
issue by focussing on scale instead of mass. Tax policy focussed on 
either scale or mass will be met with tax planning to artificially avoid 
the relevant scale or mass. The allocation of profits to both routine activ-
ities and market jurisdictions equitably can help avoid the problems 
from prioritising any one over the other.
A focus on business activity across scale or mass distinctions will 
help tax policy remain flexible towards each unique business model, 
without being influenced by the level of digital technology employed 
by the business to implement the relevant mass or scale.
Performance of business activities directly without the need for a local PE
Artificial segregation of income is different from the natural and accept-
able absence of a permanent establishment. This issue is relatively new 
and largely introduced by digitalisation. Not every business activity 
leads to the recognition of a permanent establishment because every 
activity does not cross permanent establishment thresholds. In this sec-
tion it is assumed that objectives of tax avoidance are not influencing 
the absence of a permanent establishment in a jurisdiction. Instead, this 
section considers business activities that naturally, do not form a per-
manent establishment on their own.
Concerning the delivery of services in the jurisdiction of the cus-
tomer, the OECD 2017 update in particular (OECD, 2017a), states that 
the mere import of goods and services do not meet the requirements to 
form a permanent establishment and therefore a taxable presence in the 
jurisdiction of the customer. On the other hand, the UN had recognised 
the absence of standard mechanisms to tackle non-taxation of imported 
technical, consulting and digital services (UN, n.d.). Article 12A and 
proposed article 12B under the 2017 UN Model Tax Convention indi-
cates a form of withholding tax that should not exceed an indicated 
percentage for 12A – technical services fees and 12B – automated digital 
services. Managerial, technical, consultancy services and services of a 
digital nature can become taxable to a limited extent in the jurisdiction 
of the customer who is consuming these services (UN, 2017). Such with-
holding taxes on service imports are crucially different from taxation 
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as a permanent establishment after significance thresholds have been 
crossed.
Exported goods are an example of market-based activity which 
does not give rise to a permanent establishment for the foreign export-
ing business. Permanent establishments are not avoided but deemed 
unnecessary for certain market-based activities under current rules. 
The underlying guidance is that activity performed by a PE should 
be “essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise as a 
whole” (OECD, 2017).
If exports are not eligible to be recognised as permanent establish-
ments, why would remote sales or exports of digital goods become tax-
able under a dedicated market-based approach that directly captures 
sales activity? Despite digital goods being invisible, the rights of a con-
sumer over a digital good are not the same but similar (Bradgate, 2010) 
to rights over a purchased tangible alternative.  The difference in rights 
are not significant enough to justify the independent categorisation of 
digital sales. Therefore, the export of tangible goods can be viewed in 
parallel to the export of digital goods. In this case, market-based taxable 
presence would go beyond the tackling of base erosion to base acquisi-
tion of income which was previously not taxable under a PE. The design 
of market-based tax rights will influence the reach of tax reform over 
previously untaxed business activities.
Apart from sales, other remote activities that do not currently war-
rant a PE, including user participation and digital marketing, can be cap-
tured under the market-based approach. The market-based approach 
does not verify that these activities are essential and significant to the 
business as a whole. The market-based approach only verifies the digi-
tal, consumer facing aspect of such transactions.
If digital goods exports, which were previously not forming a taxa-
ble presence are performed together with other activities that are signifi-
cant to the business as a whole, the place of business could form a single 
permanent establishment whereby the profits attributable will be for 
both preparatory and significant activities combined (OECD, 2017b). 
The combination of user participation, marketing and sales activities 
together are therefore capable of constituting taxable presence in the 
market jurisdiction.
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It is not certain that the significant digital presence proposal (Euro-
pean Commission, 2018c; EU, 2018) and the OECD Pillar 1 consider each 
activity separately or in combination with other digital activities, in the 
market jurisdiction. In particular, the OECD proposal for a ‘Unified 
Approach’ under Pillar 1 identifies the mere sale of digital goods and 
services by Q Co. remotely to customers in Country 3 adequate to form 
a taxable presence. The proposed taxing right, Amount A, allows this 
in the case of ‘sufficient sales’ and allocation key (OECD, 2019a; 2020a). 
The standalone activity of digital goods export would not have formed 
a permanent establishment in the absence of marketing and distribution 
activities by Q Co. in Country 3 under current rules. Alternatively, the 
addition of sales to other significant marketing activities can be consid-
ered together to form a taxable presence under current PE rules.
Lack of a suitable proxy
The lack of a suitable proxy is relatively new and largely introduced by 
digitalisation. This issue is distinct from the above issues, and involves 
the lack of a visible, tangible or identifiable proxy for digital business 
activities taking place within a jurisdiction. This is a practical issue 
faced by tax administrations at the level of implementation.
The market-based approach across SDP, DST and Pillar 1, name 
and list activities to be used as a proxy to determine taxable presence. 
However, these proposals do not clarify how the identification of these 
activities will be enforced. Contracts between users and digital platform 
owners, viewing and engaging with advertisements, user participation, 
sales of digital goods and services cannot be isolated from the website 
which is hosting these activities ‘as a whole’. Governments may order 
access to certain webpages to be restricted by Internet Service Providers 
but cannot isolate the performance of each one or other activity indi-
vidually within a single website.
There are two ways in which digital business activity within a juris-
diction can be identified. First, as reported to the host jurisdiction by 
the international business themselves. Digital businesses will maintain 
access to information that helps them strategise business operations in 
a foreign market. Information used for this purpose includes user par-
ticipation, advertisement eyeballs, user tastes and trends, sales values, 
advertisement to sales actualisation ratios and more (Google Ads Help, 
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n.d.). Such information about digital activities will be reliable and used 
within the business to determine the nature and extent of participa-
tion, boost presence in the foreign market or to build presence in a new 
market. To the extent that the business uses this information for man-
agerial decision-making purposes in the interest of profit generation, 
the information will be reliable and verifiable. Second, as reported by 
Internet Service Providers or cyber monitoring systems employed by 
the government. 
Governments have the power to control activities on the network 
within the jurisdiction through Network Service Providers (NSPs) and 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (Shuler, 2002). Websites or applica-
tions can be banned, and ISPs can be ordered to block access within 
the jurisdiction to certain digital services. For example, Facebook and 
Twitter were blocked in China (Carsten, 2013). However, new technolo-
gies like high-altitude platforms and internet beaming satellites can 
affect government control over the networks. Tax regulation concerns 
arise as controls that were placed on local ISPs cannot be imposed as 
easily on a global ISP (Shuler, 2002) when network access is governed 
by a combination of international and local regulation. The technology 
would provide global network connectivity such that a single jurisdic-
tion is not bearing all the costs of providing network infrastructure to 
the digital business. The blurred jurisdictional network boundaries 
would raise issues for the taxation of private global ISP businesses as 
well (Handwerk, 2013). The regulatory concerns are not far off as a batch 
of Starlink satellites beaming internet from space were launched in May 
2019 (Amos, 2019; John, 2016). Further, this would weaken the relation-
ship between the jurisdiction and the digital business on the grounds of 
the benefits provided by the jurisdiction.
Tax challenges would arise as users or digital customers cannot be 
associated with a jurisdiction when satellite internet connections allow 
the user to bypass traditional hierarchies of internet infrastructure 
(Shuler, 2002). A jurisdictional border is not enforceable on the network 
as access to the internet could be sold by the global satellite ISP directly 
to individuals in any jurisdiction (Floreani & Wood, 2005).
The use of cyber monitoring methods to determine the time and 
presence of a website within the local network would result in a costly 
exercise for governments. Furthermore, the reports indicating the 
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participation of a software or webpage within a jurisdiction will need 
to be conducted across several small, medium and large enterprises. 
This information will then need to be analysed for all digital business 
activities before concluding about the eligibility or threshold to form a 
taxable presence. In addition to the acquisition and processing of such 
information, the human resource considerations will pose a challenge 
to tax administrations, particularly in developing jurisdictions.
In comparison to other activities, digital sales activities are easier to 
trace through online banking transaction reports. Funds used to pur-
chase a digital good or service are presumably sourced from the local 
account of the customer that is likely to be linked to the earnings from 
employment within the jurisdiction (McKinsey & Company, 2018, p. 
18). Hence it is possible to assign a jurisdictional identity to the finan-
cial resource, although the links between financial resources and the 
local jurisdiction would be difficult to validate when another globalised 
business is the customer. Increasing adoption of cryptocurrencies based 
on blockchain may further complicate the situation as they need not be 
affiliated with a jurisdiction. Another upcoming development that could 
potentially challenge the link between a transaction and the tax juris-
diction is the concept of Self-Sovereign Identity that is also based on 
blockchain technology. Self-Sovereign Identity could render a digitally 
extensive e-commerce transaction anonymous as the link between the 
customer and their banking or residence jurisdiction is secured from 
the public (Radocchia, 2019).
The lack of enforceable proxies is therefore not resolved by the mar-
ket-based approach. Instead, the market-based approach only narrows 
the attention on proxies of a consumer facing nature. It is not certain 
how the thresholds for market-based activities can be enforced or iden-
tified across the vast network in today’s globalised market.
Avoiding taxable presence for significant market-based transactions
This issue is exacerbated by digitalisation. First a taxable presence should 
be established before income is allocated for taxation. Market based 
activities are one of the easiest activities for which a PE can be avoided, 
such that even income reallocation mechanisms are ineffective. Exam-
ples of the issues explored here include, commissionaire arrangements, 
independent agents and fragmentation of activities. When planning to 
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avoid tax, the challenge of PE recognition is not unique to digitalised 
business groups, however, it is more easily tackled with tax planning 
in digital groups than business groups who distribute physical goods.
The market-based approach certainly resolves issues where a per-
manent establishment should have been recognised. The issue here is 
not the lack of a proxy or uncertainty concerning the significance of an 
activity in the market jurisdiction. This issue assumes that the test for an 
activity to be ‘essential and significant’ in substance and value has been 
met for an identifiable activity, despite which a PE was not formed in 
the market jurisdiction.
A PE can be avoided in market and non-market jurisdictions by 
a combination of tax avoidance planning methods. In particular, the 
absence of a taxable presence in a market jurisdiction when one should 
have been recognised is an issue resolved by the market-based approach 
to a very large extent. The market-based approach is a positive tool to 
tackle this issue.
The advantage for the market-based approach is that it does not 
face the same limiting challenges faced by the PE rules in capturing 
significant digital market-based activities. Market-based taxable pres-
ence does not have the need to tackle the question of significance or 
fragmentation of market and non-market activities. All significant and 
insignificant market-based activities will be directly captured under the 
new approach and taxable income will not be distorted by considera-
tions of significance. In many cases the market-based approach avoids 
ambiguities over the threshold requirements for a taxable presence. The 
ambiguity over being categorised as ‘essential and significant’ (to the 
business as a whole) in substance, is resolved with numerical revenue, 
user, sales or contract thresholds identified by many market-based pro-
posals (as referred to in Table 7.1).
However, this advantage does not rule out the recognition of taxable 
presence in jurisdictions where market-based activity was significant as 
per the external threshold, but not significant to the business as a whole 
(internal). It is a misunderstanding that this issue is avoided by market-
based proposals by way of revenue, user, contract and sales thresholds 
defined in currency (Khan, 2018). These thresholds will help ensure that 
smaller scale market business activity will not be burdened to comply 
with additional tax compliance requirements (European Commission, 
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2018d). The scale of one business will compete with the scale of another 
business under this mechanism. Previously, PE thresholds were not 
aimed at differentiating between big and small international business 
scales but between significant and preparatory/auxiliary activities 
across both big and small international businesses.
As the market-based approach will shift the focus onto scale size, 
businesses will be discriminated on the scale size in a jurisdiction. Big 
multinational businesses would face a market-based discriminatory 
playing field against medium and small businesses (Buzzell et al., 1975) 
for whom market-based activities might be significant to the ‘business 
as a whole’ but small in size (OECD, 2020a). Becoming taxable for being 
a big business is different from becoming taxable for doing big business.
The issue tackled by market-based taxation is the lack of proxies, 
but the new problem is that the proxies are not measured against inter-
nal but external thresholds. In contrast, under the traditional PE rules, 
keeping aside the lack of proxies, only ‘essential and significant’ mar-
ket-based activities of the small, medium or large enterprise would be 
eligible to form a taxable presence.
The market-based approach is capable of capturing value created 
by market activities, however thresholds targeted at big multination-
als are motivated by the anti-tax avoidance outlook of the market-based 
approach. Targeting of large-scale businesses is an appealing policy 
consideration for the aggressive tax avoidance culture amongst large 
multinationals. Tax avoidance methods are available also to medium 
sized multinationals. A long-term shift to market-based taxation may 
be responsive to this culture but is not a proactive strategy for reform. 
The tax avoidance response can come in the form of fragmentation, out-
sourcing and other strategies directed at staying below the defined type 
of market-based activities.
In comparison to medium sized enterprises, larger multinationals 
may find that market-based activity holds a lower proportion of value 
in the value chain. Larger businesses engage in other activities that can 
hold a higher proportional value in the value chain. Some examples of 
such activities are product innovation, development and maintenance 
of technological intangible assets and acquiring of new intangible assets 
through mergers.
The proportional contribution and value of market-based activities 
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will vary not only across value chains but also across jurisdictions. Digi-
talisation trends for business processes vary amongst developed and 
developing jurisdictions. Expansion of network infrastructure offers 
improved network connectivity which allows digital businesses to 
access larger markets. As this empowers a previously less connected 
segment of the population, the divergence between the digital user and 
digital customer (purchasing) population would initially be increased 
(BCG, 2018; ET Bureau, 2018). For example, emerging markets’ user 
populations are in the process of building up to the maturity of digital 
advertising markets in developed economies such as United States, 
Canada and Europe (Facebook, 2015b, p. 36). This divergence would 
subsequently affect justification of tax rights and the taxable income 
allocated to a jurisdiction when tax policy is based on market-based fac-
tors like user numbers or customer populations. Figure 7.1 is an example 
of this relationship where each circle represents different market-based 
interactions for the sale of the service, service delivery and collection of 
digital raw materials.
Market-based factors and core value creation activities for business
The market-based approach does not match the role of the market-
based activity in proportion to the value chain as a whole. Market based 
activities are only one part of the value chain for the digitalised busi-
ness. We earlier explored examples of market-based activities and how 
market-based activities are not all directly income generating.  This sec-
tion considers whether the market-based factor reflects core value crea-
tion activities of a taxable business.
Assuming that the market-based approach tackles taxable presence 
issues to a large extent, why would the anomalous use of market-based 
factors be justified as a new taxing right in addition to (OECD, 2020a) or 
as a replacement of the current permanent establishment rules?
The current permanent establishment rules may be weak but have a 
wide scope to recognise a range of activities that are significant to the 
business as a whole in the 21st century. The PE rules do not limit or pri-
oritise business models for which market-based factors represent sig-
nificant value creating activities. Whereas, the market-based approach 
assumes that market-based activities are significant to every business 
in the 21st century. It is true for digitalised business models that rely on 
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users and user data, but not for other digitalised business models and 
certainly not for all business models in every industry.
Market-based activities hold different proportions of value creation 
across business models and industries. The proportion of value created 
by market-based activities in digitalised businesses are different from 
that of market-based activities in pharmaceutical, retail or extractive 
industries. Marketing is only one of the market-based activities (Govin-
darajan et al., 2019; Moorman, 2017; Socolar, 2015, p. 7). Therefore, the 
recognition of the significance of a market-based activity for a business 
can vary across business models but the market-based approach does 
not consider this variation when recognising a taxable presence (cf. 
to Porters Five Forces). Both specific and wide-ranging market-based 
approaches would thereby overlook the contributory participation of 
market facing activities within the value chain (Alvarez et al., 2018; 
Moorman, 2017; Roche, n.d.). The PE rules are more comprehensive at 
tackling the limitation in scope and assumption of significance brought 
by market-based proposals; however, they continue to face problems in 
the digital era as discussed earlier.
As an example, costs can be used to understand the significance of 
an activity in proportion to the costs incurred across the value chain as a 
whole. The following table shows the proportion of marketing and sell-
ing expenses in comparison to revenues across four business groups.
The expenses incurred by the business for marketing and market-
based activities vary across businesses within the same industry and 
across industry types. This table establishes that quantitative signifi-
cance will vary on the basis of a cost to revenue ratio.
Further, the qualitative significance of the activity to the business as 
a whole will also vary across industries and business models. Where 
does the business model use their core competency? Digital platform 
models use their core competency for market facing activities. Alterna-
tively, other business models use their core competencies for produc-
tion-based, raw material-based or labour-force based activities. Despite 
this variance, the market-based proposals uphold market-based activi-
ties in special regard.
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Table 7.3: Proportion of marketing and selling expenses in comparison to rev-
enues across four business groups
Business Marketing and selling cost to revenue ratios for 2018 (Alphabet 








* Facebook, 2018, p. 42 – “Our cost of revenue consists primarily of expenses associated 
with the delivery and distribution of our products. These include expenses related to the 
operation of our data centers, such as facility and server equipment depreciation, salaries, 
benefits, and share-based compensation for employees on our operations teams, and 
energy and bandwidth costs. Cost of revenue also includes costs associated with partner 
arrangements, including traffic acquisition and content acquisition costs, credit card and 
other transaction fees related to processing customer transactions, and cost of consumer 
hardware device inventory sold.” Whereas, “marketing and sales” includes “Our 
marketing and sales expenses consist of salaries, share-based compensation, and benefits 
for our employees engaged in sales, sales support, marketing, business development, and 
customer service functions. Our marketing and sales expenses also include marketing and 
promotional expenditures, and professional services such as content reviewers.”
Jurisdictional benefits consumption, market-based activities and significance
Benefits consumption, significance considerations and market-based 
activities are three different elements of a transaction that is considered 
for taxation. For example, let us consider an exporter of music CDs, 
which are now digital in form.  The benefits consumption in the cus-
tomer jurisdiction, through exports, is minimal in comparison to the 
jurisdictional benefits consumed in the jurisdiction where the music is 
recorded, edited and produced.3
In terms of significance, qualitatively and quantitatively the produc-
tion of the music is more significant. Qualitatively, the process of selling 
and marketing is not the core competency of the music producing busi-
ness. Quantitatively, the marketing and selling/exporting involves the 
additional expenses incurred and resources consumed to achieve rev-
enue. Without the marketing and selling expenses the product would 
not reach the final consumer, would stay in stock and would not trans-
late to revenue income for the business.
3  Research and development, production and IT skilled labour are examples of background 
activities that are the least market facing/consumer facing.
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The market-based activity in this transaction is the sale, export and 
consumption of the music CD. The recording, production and editing 
of the music is not a market-based activity.
The current rules establishing a taxable presence are most con-
cerned with the second element – significance to the business as a 
whole (OECD, 2017b). Whereas the market-based approach overtakes 
this consideration on the grounds of the third consideration, type, the 
market or non-market type of the activity. The market-based approach 
does not match the role of the market-based activity in proportion to the 
value chain as a whole in cases where the market-based activity is not 
associated with the core competency and mission of the business. This 
is where a key difference should be highlighted. The terms economic 
allegiance, source of income and digital market presence are different 
and are not synonymous.
Economic allegiance is the concept which links the business entity 
to the jurisdiction. Economic allegiance embodies the relationship 
between the business and the jurisdiction (Avi-Yonah, 2005). Benefits 
consumption and significance of the activity to the business as a whole 
is relevant here, not the market or non-market type of the activity. Per-
manent establishments are a representation of economic allegiance rela-
tionships.
Whereas, the source of income and digital market presence are con-
cepts linked with the market-based activity. Source of income (Kane, 
2015) in this paper covers jurisdictions that are the direct source of rev-
enue income (sales). For example, for a customer who pays to advertise 
on a platform, the market jurisdiction will be the source of income for 
the sales income, i.e., location of the customer. Digital market presence 
includes jurisdictions that are a source of revenue income and a source 
of market for their product, leading to revenue income, for example, 
marketing to acquire potential customers and user networks on a plat-
form. Digital market presence is related to marketing intangibles, where 
only a portion of marketing intangibles are monetised or can be mon-
etised immediately.
Therefore, the market-based proposal does not check the economic 
allegiance of a business with the market jurisdiction and instead directly 
recognises a taxable presence and/or taxable income allocation on the 
basis of income source or market-based activities.
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The market-based approach to taxation risks granting a taxable pres-
ence to market-based activities that consume low benefits and are less 
significant to the business as a whole.
Technologies like 3D printing (McCue, 2018) raise questions as to 
what extent the software vendor is linked to the customer jurisdiction. 
The customers own the printer and materials locally but buy software 
and designs online from the taxable digital vendor. Employees and 
intangible assets are not necessarily based within the jurisdiction where 
the digital service or product is consumed (Heeks & Nicholson, 2002). 
In such cases, when customers of a service become the focus of ben-
efits consumption within a jurisdiction, how can economic allegiance 
between the tax paying business and the jurisdiction be established for 
the market-based activity?
The absence of observable ‘mass’ for digitalised business models is 
not sufficient to justify a significant shift of tax rights to the market juris-
diction, leaving behind core aspects of economic allegiance when seek-
ing taxable presence.4
Electricity can be viewed akin to coal or water in a 19th century fac-
tory, without which a digital good cannot be produced, delivered or 
consumed. Although electricity is a jurisdictionally insulated resource, 
the user or customer exercises control over the consumption of electric-
ity. Therefore, the market-based approach correctly and directly identi-
fies these digital market-based activities, however, it does not justify the 
economic allegiance between the business and the market-jurisdiction.
Under the benefit of the regulatory environment, an online sale 
would be illegal if the vendor does not have a business permit allow-
ing them to sell online to a customer within the jurisdiction (Wolters 
Kluwer, 2018). Does the mere availability of a regulatory business 
environment contribute sufficiently to establish taxable presence or tax 
rights in a jurisdiction? The challenge in estimating the contribution of 
a good regulatory environment arises as the investment climate main-
tained within a jurisdiction is less relevant for a digital business unlike 
4 Situations where market-based activities and other non-market activities take place within 
the same jurisdiction is not considered here. Performing these activities under a single PE 
or under different PEs will be relevant to force of attraction rules. Digital market-based 
activities are in most cases the only links between the jurisdiction and the international 
digital business group.
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traditional businesses as transactions are not reliant on locally managed 
investments (World Bank, 2005, p. 97).
Both digital goods and services sold to customers in the source juris-
diction will be directly captured under the market-based jurisdiction. 
However, the market-based approach may not be justified in the above 
scenarios. Such direct capture of market-based activities will be justified 
to the extent that the sales are making use of the permissive regulatory 
environment of the customer jurisdiction.
This analysis does not suggest that market-based activities are insig-
nificant or do not deserve tax rights. The analysis instead clarifies that 
the significance of market-based activities to the business as a whole 
should be considered and that tax rights allocated in light of market-
based activities should be proportional to their role within the value 
chain. Physical presence (Escribano, 2019) is not the distinguishing 
factor here for the recognition of economic allegiance.
Taxable presence can be built on economic allegiance, market state of 
source or market presence. We still have time to make this choice.
If taxable presence is to be built on economic allegiance, the signifi-
cance of the market activities and benefits consumed by these activities 
in proportion to the business as a whole become relevant. The perspec-
tive of the business and the value of the activity to the whole value 
chain is influential here. Whereas, the location of the market activities 
and sales revenue income alone become relevant for a market presence 
built on source of income concepts.
The term ‘significant’ digital presence should not be confused with 
the concept of economic allegiance.
For example, the EU ‘significant’ digital presence proposal is mainly 
built on the source of income not economic allegiance. The indicators 
used by the EU ‘significant’ digital presence proposal (European Com-
mission, 2018b) do not consider the significance of revenues, users and 
contracts in proportion to the value chain and business as a whole. The 
proposal considers what is significant against an external threshold 
across member states and not internal thresholds to the global business 
value chain as a whole. The perspective of the business is hardly con-
sidered here (OECD, 2020s).
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An introspective consideration of significance can bring the pro-
posal closer to economic allegiance. It is not enough for the economic 
relationship to be big, but the economic relationship should matter to 
the business as a whole. The focus on member states alone limits this 
consideration.
The market source of income together with market-based activities 
will limit the relevant taxable presence to the output delivery and rev-
enue receiving/collecting type of activities. Such a group of activities can 
be split from the value chain as a whole and outsourced (Devereux et al., 
2019). Martal Group and EBQ are examples of businesses who perform 
outsourced marketing and sales activities for digital and digitalised 
business models (EBQ, n.d.; Martal Group, n.d.). The issue highlighted 
here is not that these activities can be split from the business but that the 
market-based approach ring-fences a category of activities on the basis 
of their type and what the activity achieves on its own. The market-
based activities have an objective of their own, independent of the busi-
ness, that is to reach users and customers.
Further, the market-based approach does not clarify the treatment of 
a globalised customer. For example, a B2B cloud service can be deliv-
ered remotely over the internet and be accessed by any employee of the 
business customer across the globe. The purchase may be limited to one 
location whereas the consumption takes place across various jurisdic-
tions through a digital network, internally on the network of the cus-
tomer or externally on the network of the provider.
To summarise the analysis in this section, the PE rules have a wider 
scope than market-based factors to recognise significant value creating 
activities. Market-based taxation does not have a strong consideration 
of significance to reflect value creation that is ‘core’ alone. The market-
based factors can recognise a taxable presence for core and non-core 
market-based activities. From this perspective, the issue is not that cur-
rent rules to establish taxable presence have a poor scope, but that these 
rules lack a proxy to recognise the taxable presence. Meanwhile, the 
market-based approach changes the scope under which to recognise 
the taxable presence.
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Conclusion
The ‘new’ taxation of activities that previously did not form a taxable 
presence should be reconsidered with caution. This chapter explores 
two key questions:
1 To what extent does the market-based approach tackle taxable 
presence issues?
2 And, are market-based factors reflecting core value creation 
activities of the business?
The analysis for Question 1 is summarised below in Table 7.4.
Tax reform should be careful at the addition of market-based 
approaches to recognise taxable presence. The market-based approach 
risks an unparalleled recognition of ‘market type’ business activities 
without checking their significance to the business as a whole. Current 
rules may be outdated, however, powerful principles and concepts 
underlying taxable presence should not be left behind by new propos-
als in the race to reform. The relationship between jurisdictional ben-
efits consumption, economic allegiance, source of income, significance 
and market-based activities are explored under the last section of this 
chapter.
Further, such ring-fencing of market-based activities can lead to 
a ring fencing of digital and traditional business models that rely on 
market-based activities to create value. Both digital goods and services 
imports should be subject to the same tax treatments as tangible goods 
and remote services imported by residents of a jurisdiction.
Should the tax systems recognise that market-based activities are 
default core value creating activities for businesses, across industries 
and business models in the 21st century?
Users and customers of the digital business are more reliable proxies 
related to a jurisdiction when compared to other elements of a trans-
action. However, whether the international tax system would like to 
continue to reinstate longstanding concepts like economic allegiance or 
focus merely on the presence of business activities in a jurisdiction by 
using a market-based approach is the new question.
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8 Principles-based Tax Drafting and Friends: On rules, standards, 
fictions and legal principles1
Hans Gribnau and Sonja Dusarduijn2 
Abstract
Tax complexity is a multi-faceted and pervasive phenomenon. Narrow, detailed 
drafting of the law is a particular manifestation of tax complexity. Tax systems 
have become dense thickets of often thorny rules – at the expense of trans-
parency, certainty and equality. Principles-based legislation is sometimes pro-
posed as an alternative regulatory instrument to counter both the complex-
ity of detailed tax drafting and tax avoidance. In this chapter we will elaborate 
on principles-based legislation, rule-based drafting and two other drafting 
styles – legal fictions and standards. This is done from the perspective of (legal) 
principles as advocated by the legal philosopher Dworkin. These fundamental 
legal principles constitute a normative framework for legislation. None of these 
drafting styles should be seen as a magic formula. Securing the integrity of tax 
law requires the legislature to balance these different legislative drafting styles. 
In practice, the legislature will have to aim for an optimal mix of these styles.
Introduction 
Tax complexity is a multi-faceted and pervasive phenomenon. 
Narrow, detailed drafting of the law is a particular manifestation of 
tax complexity. Precise, detailed rules are thought to secure legal 
certainty and equality for citizens. However, nowadays tax legislatures 
often try to control and regulate every conceivable situation (partly 
to prevent tax avoidance) by issuing very specific rules covering the 
1 This chapter is a sequel to Dusarduijn & Gribnau (2018). The authors wish to thank the 
participants for their comments. The authors are especially grateful to Justin Dabner, 
Judith Freedman and Adrian Sawyer who commented on a previous draft of this chapter.
2 Professor of Tax Law, Tilburg University & Leiden University; Assistant Professor of Tax 
Law, Tilbury University.
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full range of circumstances. Consequently, the tax system is populated 
by dense thickets of often thorny rules. This has become increasingly 
problematic: voluminous catalogues packed with detailed tax rules lack 
transparency and go at the expense of certainty and equality.
Principles-based legislation is sometimes termed as an alternative 
regulatory instrument to counter both the complexity of detailed tax 
drafting and tax avoidance. We aim for a realistic approach: principles-
based legislation should not be seen as a magic formula but rather as a 
helpful addition to the legislature’s toolbox. 
In this chapter we will elaborate on principles-based legislation, rule-
based drafting and two other drafting styles – legal fictions and stand-
ards. This chapter will investigate the meaning of these three ‘friends’ 
as alternatives, or supplements, to precise rules from the perspective 
of (legal) principles as advocated by the legal philosopher Dworkin. 
These fundamental legal principles constitute a normative framework 
for legislation. 
It will be argued that securing the integrity of tax law requires a bal-
ancing act between different legislative drafting styles such as fictions, 
standards and principles-based legislation. In practice, the legislature 
will have to aim for an optimal mix of these styles.
Tax complexity, detailed rules and other drafting styles 
Tax complexity is a pervasive phenomenon. Several powerful causes 
are playing a part. Some are inherent in tax law. Complexity arises for 
example from trying “to fit rules of law around the natural facts of eco-
nomic life” (Prebble, 1994, p. 390). Before giving a very brief overview 
of the causes of tax complexity it therefore is important to note that it 
would be naïve to think that the tax systems can get rid of complexity. 
A realistic approach to complexity would rather require “to identify 
unnecessary complexity as opposed to complexity necessary to ensure 
the tax system is reasonably fair, efficient and certain” (Budak et al., 
2016, p. 3). Subsequently, tax complexity should be reduced, wherever 
possible aiming for consistency with other objectives (Freedman, 2015).3
3  Where this reduction cannot be achieved, “there should be mechanisms to help taxpayers 
and revenue authorities to navigate around the remaining intricacies”. 
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An important cause of tax complexity is that today’s society itself is 
complex. The tax legislature strives for tax laws that do justice to this 
complex world and therefore moves along with all kinds of social, eco-
nomic, and technical developments, such as individualisation, globali-
sation, digitisation and computerisation. Moreover, there are develop-
ments in international and European law to which the tax legislature 
must respond. Legislation is constantly refined and supplemented, 
with exceptions and deviations often added in the legislative process 
itself, partly to avoid undesirable side effects of proposed regulations 
(de Cogan, 2020, p. 107).4 Additionally, the complexity of tax law is 
increased by measures to prevent unintended use and avoidance. 
Instrumentalism, the use of tax legislation as a full-blown regulatory 
instrument to steer taxpayers’ behaviour, is another major cause of 
complexity (Gribnau, 2015). Taxes are also an important instrument of 
income and wealth policy. Furthermore, tax complexity arises from the 
need for fairness in taxation (distributive justice). Thus, tax systems are 
often driven by multiple policy objectives “many of which may not be 
jointly compatible” (Tran Nam, 2016, p. 13). More generally, Freedman 
argues that it “is elementary that a fundamental cause of tax complexity 
lies in flawed underlying policy” (Freedman, 2015, p. 255). 
Avery Jones, referring to the findings of two UK reports, sums up 
some several other causes of tax complexity reflecting “our whole legal 
culture” (Avery Jones, 1996, pp. 64-65).5 To our minds most of these 
causes go beyond a UK perspective: the common law approach (Krever, 
2008, p. 191).6 The need for legislation to prevent avoidance, the courts, 
(Krever, 2008, p. 192)7 political tinkering, the parliamentary process, 
4 In the event tax legislation fails to produce the desired outcome, it is often corrected “by 
increasing the level of statutory detail or by supplementing the basic rules of taxation with 
anti-avoidance techniques”. 
5 Following Atiyah & Summers (1987), he points at England’s tradition of narrow, detailed 
drafting as opposed to the American tradition.
6 Krever (2008), for example, points at the inherent uncertainty of key concepts in tax 
legislation caused by the misapplication of the doctrine of precedent. This is due to the 
“the propensity of Anglo judges (apart from US judges)” to use “transplanted categories” 
when interpreting tax legislation rather than interpreting these concepts in light of the 
objectives of tax laws. “However, any coincidence of the purpose of the transplanted 
concept in its original application and the purpose of the concept in tax law is just that—
pure coincidence”.
7 An important phenomenon is the inclination of many Anglo judges (again, other than 
US judges) to construe taxation laws narrowly, “resolving ambiguity in favour of the 
taxpayer and significantly, favouring form over substance” (Krever, 2008, p. 192).
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parliamentary counsel, the lack of time, tax reform, the increasingly 
global and sophisticated business environment and changes in general 
legal framework are also present in civil law. Last but not least, Avery 
Jones points at “the increasing desire for tax law to be detailed and pre-
cise so that it is certain in its application”. This desire results in ever 
more narrow and detailed drafted tax rules. This tendency may also 
be due to the absence of ‘principles’ or ‘general rules’, as Krever says: 
“There is little evidence of the simple principles of an income tax in 
the legislation. To the contrary, the current construction almost seems 
designed to obscure principles” (Krever, 2008, p. 192). Absent general 
principles or rules established by the legislature to guide the interpre-
tation and application of the rules everything has to be spelled out in 
rules which will inevitably have indeterminate borders generating new 
complexities – to be resolved with new rules.
Narrow, detailed drafting of the law is a particular manifestation 
of tax complexity. Rules are almost sacred in tax law – for rules are 
thought to secure legal certainty (and equality) for citizens. However, 
a rule-based mindset may result in a massive catalogue of rules with 
a high level of particularity and detail because of the inherent logic 
of ever greater specificity. This has become increasingly problematic 
because of its adverse impact on transparency, certainty and equality. 
Moreover, comprehensive narrow and detailed legislation is 
vulnerable to tax avoidance: one can play by the rules but can also 
bend the rules. This is a well-known reality in tax. Counteracting 
tax avoidance is one of tax authorities’ major concerns nowadays. 
Preventing this unintended use or even abuse of the tax law induces 
complex corrective legislative measures. Principles-based legislation is 
sometimes presented as an alternative regulatory instrument to counter 
both the complexity of detailed tax drafting and aggressive tax planning. 
It is seen as a remedy for the failures of narrow, detailed drafting 
of tax legislation. It has been argued that there is need of “a robust 
understanding of the differences between rule and principles” in order 
to achieve clarity on the relevance that “the rules or principles debate 
has for assessing the relative complexity or simplicity of a tax system” 
(Freedman, 2010, p. 717; Oats & Morris, 2015, p. 29). This chapter aims 
to contribute to such robust understanding. However, there are more 
instruments in the legislature’s toolkit for creating less detailed rules. 
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Principles-based drafting is but one of them. In this chapter we will deal 
with two other drafting styles – legal fictions and standards – before 
turning to principles-based drafting. 
This chapter will investigate the meaning of these three instruments 
from the perspective of (legal) principles as advocated by the legal 
philosopher Dworkin. Fundamental legal principles embody the 
dimension of morality (justice, fairness) in law (Dusarduijn & Gribnau, 
2020).8 They are regulative ideals that make morally sound positive 
law possible. They constitute a normative framework for legislation: 
legislation should be aimed at realising these principles. 
Lawmakers should therefore respect normative legal principles 
since they constitute the ‘internal morality of law’. Legislation should 
therefore not violate, for example, the principle of equality or legal cer-
tainty. However, often different and diverging principles are at stake. 
For example, the integrity of tax law requires on the one hand counter-
acting tax avoidance by establishing a system of robust rules. On the 
other hand, a price may be paid, for example in terms of a breach of 
the principle of legal certainty. Thus, securing the integrity of tax law 
requires a balancing act when choosing between different legislative 
drafting styles such as fictions, standards and principles-based draft-
ing (Cooper, 1996, p. 582; Elliott, 1997).9 In practice, the legislature will 
make use of mix of these styles.
This chapter will thus put the idea of principles-based drafting in 
a broader context, focusing on the question: how to evaluate the three 
drafting styles from the perspective of normative principles. This ques-
tion will be answered by first setting out the Dworkinian idea of norma-
tive principles which will be connected to the concept of the ‘internal 
morality of law’. Next, the conception of tax law as a system of detailed 
rules will be dealt with by analysing the importance and main features of 
8 In this chapter, we do not distinguish between general legal principles and more specific 
tax principles such as the ability to pay principle (income tax) and the neutrality principle 
(value added tax). 
9 Rewriting tax law in plain ‘English’– thus using less arcane language, allowing the law 
to be more easily comprehended by the general public – is often also presented as an 
instrument to reduce complexity in law. However, rewriting tax legislation in a clearer 
or simpler style will not cure the complexity, for a complex system of rules will remain 
a complex system even when it is clearly expressed.  However important it may be for 
legislative drafters to avoid incomprehensible legal language, for the purpose of this 
chapter drafting in plain English (promoting readability) is not a drafting style. 
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rules. Rules, however, have their drawbacks. A rule-focus often results 
in a self-perpetuating spiral of ever greater specificity and detail. This 
level of detail entails a lack of transparency. Another shortcoming of 
these narrow, detailed rules is their vulnerability to a legalistic and for-
malistic approach resulting in mismatches between the general nature 
of the rule and the goal the rule serves (the underlying justification). 
This tax avoidance goes at the expense of the principle of equality (dis-
tributive justice). The legislature may use different instruments to pre-
vent unnecessary detailed rules and/or counter tax avoidance: fictions, 
standards and/or principles-based legislation. Their main features will 
be brought to light and they will be evaluated from the perspective of 
normative principles. We will finish with a brief conclusion.
Values and principles in taxation
According to the legal philosopher Dworkin, the ideal of integrity in 
law requires a commitment to a coherent set of principles, “the prom-
ise that law will be chosen, changed and developed and interpreted in 
an overall principled way” (Dworkin, 1986, pp. 300-301). Examples of 
these fundamental (legal) principles are equality, legal certainty, pro-
portionality and fundamental rights. The ability to pay principle and the 
principle of neutrality are examples of important tax specific principles. 
This also goes for tax law, which therefore should meet the requirement 
of principled consistency (Dworkin, 2006, p. 90ff; McCaffery, 1996, p. 
107).10 Unfortunately, it does not, for both legal principles and non-legal 
principles are often seriously neglected. No wonder, trust in the integ-
rity of the tax system, governments and multinationals is under pres-
sure. This illustrates the foundational nature of tax. 
Dworkinian principles
A conceptual question is what kind of principles we are talking about 
when discussing principles-based drafting. As will be discussed later, 
principles-based drafting is based on the concept of a principle as an 
operative rule stating an object or purpose. Translating in this way 
intended outcomes into ‘principled rules’ seems rather confusing to 
legal scholars acquainted with Dworkin’s distinction between princi-
10  Dworkin (2006), where he applies two principles of human dignity, the principle of the 
“intrinsic value of human life” and the principle of “personal responsibility”, to tax policy.
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ples and rules – two logically different kinds of standards.11 On the one 
hand lawyers use rules, on the other hand “standards that do not func-
tion as rules but operate differently as principles, policies and other sets 
of standards” (Dworkin, 1977, p, 22; Gribnau, 2014). Before elaborating 
on the difference between principles and rules, Dworkin distinguishes 
principles and policies – though he also uses the term ‘principle’ generi-
cally. He then defines a principle as a standard which is to be observed 
because it is “a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimen-
sion of morality”. A policy is that kind of standard that “sets out a goal 
to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or 
social feature of the community”. The most striking difference is that, 
other than policies, Dworkinian principles express moral requirements. 
Thus, principles in the narrow sense embody the dimension of (inter-
nal) morality which, according to Dworkin is part and parcel of the law 
(Bingham, 2010, p. 8).12
The notion of ‘internal morality of law’ refers to the qualities legal rules 
must possess according to Lon Fuller in order to be recognisable as law 
at all (Fuller, 1977; Ratnapala, 2013). The very concept of law carries 
with it certain moral qualities. These are set out in his famous eight 
desiderata: there should be general legal rules, these rules should be 
reasonably clear and non-contradictory, duly promulgated, have pro-
spective effect, it should be possible for the citizen to comply with the 
law, rules should not change too frequently and there should be con-
gruence between the rules as announced and the acts of the administra-
tion (Fuller, 1977, pp. 46-91). 
Internal morality: a coherent scheme of normative principles
Trevor Allan argues there is considerable scope for refining the formal 
archetype of the rule of law. A satisfactory account of the rule of law 
must be more complex and demanding than a formal one. To his mind, 
the principle of the rule of law can be fully understood only in connec-
11 Dworkin uses standards in a broad sense, to our minds they could also be called “norms” 
(prescribing what ought or ought not to happen). 
12 Principles can be more or less general covering a larger or small part of the law. Thus, 
the rule of law may itself been seen as a higher-level principle. Cf. p. 8: “The core of the 
existing [constitutional] principle [of the rule of law] is, I suggest, that all persons and 
authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled 
to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally in the future and publicly 
administered in the courts.”
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tion with a certain view of the related ideals of equal dignity and worth 
of persons and individual liberty. The rule of law thus is not just a shield 
against the abuse of law since formal equality becomes a more substan-
tive ideal of equal citizenship. In this more substantive conception of the 
rule of law, law provides the conditions in which each individual’s lib-
erty understood as independence can be safeguarded. This moral ideal 
of governance according to law enforces a scheme of rights and duties 
preserving “the sovereignty of individual choice and action by allowing 
each person to pursue his own purposes, free from domination either by 
state officials or overbearing fellow citizens” (Allan, 2016, p, 205). 
Liberty is thus enhanced when the rules enacted reflect a coherent 
scheme of principles. “The development and application of legal prin-
ciples serve to give unity to the legal order, providing a shared moral 
foundation for the ascertainment of people’s rights and duties–the 
legal rules being illuminated by their reasoned application in particular 
cases” (Allan, 2016, p. 207). Allan refers to Dworkin’s principle of ‘integ-
rity’ which displaces conflicting views about justice by the requirement 
of adherence to a single, coherent, and comprehensive set of principles 
of political morality, treating all alike according to those principles. 
These legal principles may best be seen as internal standards generated 
and developed by the legal system itself – although they are strongly 
influenced by (external) morality. 
The moral nature of tax and the substantive conception of the rule 
of law make the role of principles in tax law all the more important. 
Principles in tax law are regulative ideals that are intimately connected 
to society’s moral values, and society’s views on the integrity of the tax 
system (Gribnau, 2014, pp. 203-206). Since (fundamental) legal princi-
ples embody the internal morality of tax law, the task of lawmakers is 
to secure that the tax system conforms to legal principles. This requires 
time and is again a balancing act since principles may collide.
Dworkin next distinguishes principles in the generic sense from 
rules. Principles differ from rules in a number of ways (Goodin, 1982, pp. 
60-63; Weber, 1978, p. 109).13 First, he argues that the difference between 
13  Some critics argue that the rule-principle distinction can be largely collapsed. To our 
minds, principles and rules are both to be seen as ideal types, which, as Weber explains, 
are used, partly for “heuristic” purposes, partly for “classificatory” because there are large 
number of events in empirical reality which conform to it with a greater or lesser degree 
of “purity”. 
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the two kinds of standards is a “logical distinction”, for they differ in 
the character of the direction they give with regard to legal decisions. 
Rules are applicable in an “all-or-nothing fashion”. If the conditions 
provided in the rule are met, the legal outcome follows automatically. 
Legal principles do not operate this way. They state a reason which 
argues in a certain direction but does not compel a particular decision. 
Legal consequences do not follow automatically, for there may be other 
principles (or policies) arguing in another direction. Unlike rules, prin-
ciples are therefore not directly applicable, they are not operative rules.
This first difference entails another. Other than rules, principles have 
a “dimension of weight or importance” (Dworkin, 1977, p. 26) This 
implies that when principles (or policies) collide, their relative weight 
has to resolve the collision. Fundamental (normative) legal principles 
carry serious weight, but here there is no such thing as absolute weight. 
Their exact weight has to be established in concrete situations (hard 
cases) where other principles may be at play. The principle of legal 
certainty never offers absolute certainty. The balancing of principles is 
context dependent. With regard to the rules, however, it does not make 
sense to ask how important or how weighty they are. Rules are “func-
tionally important or unimportant”, i.e., within the system of rules. So, 
the conflict between two rules cannot be resolved by establishing which 
rule supersedes the other because of its greater weight. The decision as 
to which rule is valid in case of a conflict between rules, “must be made 
by appealing to considerations beyond the rules themselves” (Dworkin, 
1977, p. 27). With the difference between these two key elements of a 
legal system, principles and rules, being explained, we will now elabo-
rate on rules.
Tax law as a system of rules
The foregoing defence of the relevance of principles notwithstanding, 
the rule of law is often seen as “the rule of rules” (Alexander & Sherwin, 
2001). But why have rules? And what are the main features of rules? 
Members of a society often have different views about their (moral) 
rights and obligations. People’s behaviour is motivated by their beliefs 
about what is the right thing to do. They may disagree over concrete 
courses of behaviour (the right way to behave) as well as about factual 
matters. The ensuing problem of coordination requires a mechanism to 
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settle these disagreements authoritatively. Some kind of authority thus 
provides a settlement as to what ought to be done and members of soci-
ety must consult the terms of this authoritative settlement. This means 
that these terms “must supplant the reasons upon which they are based” 
(Alexander & Sherwin, 2001, p. 13). Thus, according to Alexander and 
Sherwin, authoritative settlement solves the problems of coordination 
(caused by uncertainty on how others will choose to behave), expertise 
(reducing errors stemming from individual decision-making) and effi-
ciency (reducing decision-making costs) (Alexander & Sherwin, 2001, 
pp. 14-15). Rules are necessary for authoritative settlement. Thus, rules 
are justified as time-saving devices and as devices to reduce the risk of 
error in deciding what ought to be done (Raz, 1990, p. 59; cf. Mill, 1843).
Clearly, we are not dealing with rules of thumb, which are useful 
guides but do not, even when accepted, furnish reasons for action 
in themselves, but with mandatory rules. Mandatory rules, when 
accepted, provide reasons for action “simply by virtue of their existence 
qua rules, and thus generate normative pressure even in those cases in 
which the justifications (rationales) underlying the rules indicate the 
contrary result” (Schauer, 1991, p. 5). In the legal system, these manda-
tory rules are issued by a legal authority. The function of this legislative 
drafter is “to convert legislative policy into legislative shape” (Thorn-
ton, 1997, p. 149).
The legislature has different drafting styles to choose from. In this 
chapter we focus on narrow, detailed rules and three alternative styles 
characterised by a lower level of detail. Ignoring the many nuances of 
these techniques, detailed drafting can be pictured as a type of legisla-
tion with a high level of particularity as its rules are intended to cover 
as many conceivable eventualities as possible and these rules are to 
be interpreted literally. In contrast, a principles-based approach of the 
legislature tends to state general principles rather than attempt to deal 
with every possibility explicitly. Hence the level of detail is low. The 
same goes for drafting styles using standards and fictions.
In many countries tax legislation, which defines the rights and 
obligations of individuals and companies in relation to the state, is 
grounded in narrow, detailed rules (‘black letter law’). This drafting 
style is primarily rule-based, featuring precise and highly detailed rules 
to cover a whole range of possibilities rather than a simple statement 
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of policy. The rationale seems to be that taxation requires legislative 
drafters to spell out in great detail what is intended, rather than rely on 
‘fuzzy law’, that is, law based on general principles (James et al., 1998, 
p. 39).14 However, increasingly detailed tax legislation has quite a few 
drawbacks. It is incomprehensible except for a few specialists and lacks 
durability. Moreover, incomprehensible tax legislation compromises 
fairness, consistency, and coherence (see Comprehensive detailed tax leg-
islation: riding dead horses?, on p. 177). Thus, there is an urgent need for 
another drafting style.  In this section the current rule-based approach 
and its level of detail will first be analysed. 
Rules
What actually is this thing called ‘rule’? A rule can be defined as “a 
general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation” (Twining & Miers, 2010, p. 80). A key characteristic of (legal) 
rules is that they are future-oriented, they are forward-looking. They 
attempt to specify outcomes before particular cases arise (Sunstein, 
1996, p. 21). A detailed and precise rule better specifies outcomes than 
a rule formulated in broad terms. When formulating a rule, the past 
may be instructive. Rules are often based on solutions and answers to 
particular controversies and questions that came up in the past, while 
trying to resolve foreseeable disputes. They are “more general than the 
controversies and questions already resolved and thus anticipate and 
resolve controversies and questions that have not yet arisen” (Alexan-
der & Sherwin, 2001, p. 18).
Rules, be they descriptive or prescriptive, are general rather than 
particular (like a single observation or command). Generalisation is 
inherent to rules. Rules describe a regularity or uniformity among mul-
tiple instances or prescribe for a multiplicity of actions. Thus, rules are 
necessarily general, the result of a process of generalisation. Rules as 
such can, of course, differ with regard to the level of generality or par-
ticularity of a prescription or description, but even detailed rules with a 
high level of particularity are based on a generalisation. Generalisation 
entails the selection and inclusion of certain properties of particulars 
(persons, actions, things, words) and exclusion of other properties. Pre-
14 ‘Black letter’ law is intended to cover as many conceivable eventualities as possible and 
to be interpreted literally. In contrast, ‘fuzzy law’ tends to state general principles rather 
than attempt to deal with every possibility explicitly.’
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scriptive rules prescribe for all of some category. They are concerned 
with “ought (not), may (not) or can (not), in relation to behaviour” 
(Twining & Miers, 2010, p. 81) Indeed, rules are often made in response 
to a particular occurrence or to future expected events or behaviour. 
The goal to be achieved or the evil sought to be avoided (in case of pro-
scription) constitutes the justification of the rule (Schauer, 1991, p. 27). 
Legislation consists of rules which are general prescriptions. Gen-
eral and abstract rules promote certainty and equality, but there also 
is a drawback. These generalisations encompass a set of facts which 
stand in a relationship of probabilistic causation to the justification, i.e., 
this set of facts is probabilistically related to the likelihood or incidence 
of the justification. A rule such as “no vehicles in the park” does not 
contain vague norms or standards, but it predicts, so to say, that cars 
in a park are a nuisance. As often true as this may be, this does not 
go for an ambulance which enters the park to transport casualties to a 
hospital. Consequently, fewer or more cases fall under the rule than its 
aim justifies. Rules can sometimes yield outcomes other than those that 
would be indicated by direct application of the rationale or justifica-
tion lying behind the generalisation (Schauer, 1991, p. 32).15 Applying a 
rule, therefore, will sometime or other lead to mismatches between the 
general nature of the rule and the goal which this rule serves, which 
is the underlying justification. This under- or over-inclusiveness is an 
inevitable phenomenon (Schauer, 1991, pp. 78-79).16 Over- and under-
inclusiveness might be repaired by the tax administration or the judici-
ary to give the taxpayer certainty with regard to the actual application 
of the law. 
Rules are a key feature of modern legal systems (Fuller, 1997, p. 47).17 
There is no reason, however, for an excessive reliance on rules. A legal 
15 Schauer (1991, p. 32): “The generalization of the rule’s factual predicate is over-inclusive 
if it encompasses states of affairs that might in particular instances not produce the 
consequence representing the rule’s justification, even though the state of affairs, as a 
type, is probabilistically related to likelihood or incidence of the justification. The factual 
predicate is under-inclusive if it occasionally fails to indicate the justification in cases in 
which is present.”
16 This is in contradistinction with “particularistic decision-making” which focuses on the 
particular situation, case, or act, and thereby comprehends everything about the particular 
decision-prompting event that is relevant to the decision made (Schauer, 1991, pp. 78-79).
17 According to Fuller (1977, p. 47), the first desideratum of a legal system is “there must be 
rules of some kind, however fair or unfair they may be”.
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system of rules featuring a pervasive level of particularity and detail is a 
vice rather than a virtue. Tax scholars are keenly aware of the need of a 
balanced approach to rules. Indeed, it is sometimes observed that some 
countries seem to suffer from a disease called ‘tax rule madness’ (Vann, 
1995, p. 193).18 Fortunately, there is a cure available: “what we need is 
less detailed legislation construed in accordance with principles, not 
a continuation of the plague of tax rule madness”. In the next section 
we will diagnose the symptoms of this tax rule addiction and in the 
subsequent sections we have a look at other cures available in the tax 
legislature’s pillbox. 
Comprehensive detailed tax legislation: riding dead horses?
Modern regulatory states guide society and economy. The tax system 
is used to correct ‘market failures’ and market outcomes in terms of 
income and wealth which are deemed not to be fair and acceptable. 
Governments also take on responsibility for societal well-being such as 
health, education and environmental protection. They do so by steering 
behaviour by issuing specific commands backed by the force of law, but 
also by implementing tax regimes which for example reflect the social 
costs that a harmful activity imposes on society or incentive. Taxation 
is used to produce various social, political, and economic consequences 
(Bogart, 2003, p. 114). It is viewed as a cure all device and subsequently 
tax law (further) evolves into a highly technical language.
Thus, the urge to guide and steer complex society is an important 
driver of the proliferation of ever more detailed rules. Legislatures are 
continuously creating and changing existing and refining existing rules 
in response to all kinds of societal, economic and cultural develop-
ments. Of course, legislatures can let things run their course. However, 
society seems to expect government to provide a solution to all kinds 
of issues, and legislatures want to be responsive to societal needs. Leg-
islation reflects a society that has become obsessed with the search for 
precision to deal with every contingency. The allure of rules is clear: 
legislatures assume to be in perfect control of things with a comprehen-
sive system of clearly defined and detailed rules (Lacey, 1992, p. 362).19 
18 “We suffer from tax rule madness, a disease that affects the advanced Anglo-Saxon 
countries generally with Australia having a particularly virulent form”.
19 Legislative strategies are embedded in cultural and historical frameworks. With regard 
to those of Britain and the United States, Lacey argues that Dicey’s legacy produced a 
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With regard to tax legislation, the principle of legality, providing 
legal certainty (and equality), can be seen as a matter of major concern 
since it is the basis for the tax administration’s unilateral determination 
of taxpayers’ obligations. The principle of legal certainty is indeed a 
fundamental legal principle, which carries serious weight, especially in 
tax law – as for example Advocate General Poiares Maduro maintains 
(Cases C-2555/02 et al., 2005). This principle requires that the applica-
tion of legislation “must be foreseeable by those subject to it” (Cases 
70/83, et al., 1984). That requirement of legal certainty must be observed 
even more strictly in the case of rules entailing financial consequences, 
so that those concerned may know precisely the extent of their rights 
and obligations (Cases 325/85 et al., 1987, para. 17). The principle of 
legality guaranteeing certainty and equality thus seem to require a high 
level of particularity and precision. Detailed and precise tax legislation 
will be certain in its application, or so it seems. Thus, a statute becomes 
a catalogue of rules.
Ruling out every eventual contingency also goes for legislative 
responses to taxpayers using the rules in ways not intended by the 
legislature, or even abusing the rules, since this impairs equality and 
a level playing field. Such roads should be blocked, gaps have to be 
closed with new, more specific, that is detailed rules. Yet with greater 
specificity and detail there is an increased chance that something will be 
left unaccounted for. The rule-based mindset however leaves no room 
for hesitation or doubt about the solution: more specificity and detail – 
making the law more voluminous and complicated. The spiral seems 
self-perpetuating. “Even a conceptually simple change may only be 
achievable by means of a complex provision - because the new legisla-
tion has to fit into the conceptual framework and language of the exist-
ing body of law” (IFS, 1994, para. 3.15; cited in Avery Jones, 1996, p. 69).
An important, and perhaps the most important, driver of the leg-
islature’s rule-based mindset is the lack of trust in the courts. The leg-
islative rule focus thus reflects a ‘command-and-control’ approach to 
the determination of law – a far cry from seeing the courts as (junior) 
partners in the business of in law making (Barak, 2006, p. 17). The leg-
islature does not trust the judges to give effect to the ideas behind the 
tax rules. 
stereotypical “lawyer’s view” of the world. “Problems are typically seen as arising from 
ambiguities or ‘gaps’ in the rules, calling for clearer interpretation or further legislative or 
quasi-legislative action”.
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Surely, this high level of specificity and its accompanying volume of 
layers of detailed rules and complexity have a drawback. “Detail and 
certainty do not necessarily go together” (Avery Jones, 1996, p. 69).20 
Legal uncertainty arises when taxpayers faced with a thicket of detailed 
rules do not fully understand their rights and obligations, such as tax 
liabilities (Ulph, 2015, p. 48).21 Since the rule of law aims to make the 
exercise of government power predictable, enabling citizens to plan 
their affairs their activities with foreknowledge of its potential legal 
implications, there is a point where lengthy and detailed legislation 
begins to undermine the rule of law (Freedman, 2015, p. 254).
Indeed, the prevailing focus on drafting narrow, detailed rules has 
become increasingly problematic. Tax law lacking transparency goes 
at the expense of certainty and equality. Citizens find it hard to cope 
with voluminous catalogues packed with detailed tax rules which lack 
transparency for all but highly specialised tax professionals (Diver, 
1983, p. 67).22 These specialists can be expected “to charge special fees, 
thereby bidding up compliance costs” (Young, 1997). Taxpayers who 
are clever and knowledgeable or can hire clever and knowledgeable 
tax advisers are favoured. Moreover, the tax administration also has 
to deal with this complexity and become highly specialised, otherwise 
enforcement difficulties will follow, which will increase the costs of 
collection and increase taxpayers’ dependency on tax administration’s 
advice (Daly, 2020). Young succinctly summarises the disadvantages of 
drafting style focused on narrow, detailed rules. “Once the law reaches 
a certain level of complexity and incomprehensibility, fairness, consist-
ency, and coherence are compromised rather than enhanced” (Young, 
1997, p. 176). He subsequently makes the point that tax laws which are 
understood by neither lawmakers nor taxpayers can hardly be seen as 
promoting democracy and accountability. 
20 Avery Jones (1996, p. 64) cites IFS’s Tax Law Review Committee interim report on tax 
legislation (1995) para. 3.21 “The possible permutations of facts are virtually infinite so 
that legislation cannot possibly aspire to answer every question. In this sense complete 
immediate certainty is unattainable.”  
21 He subsequently points out that various groups of taxpayers are differently affected by tax 
complexity.
22 Diver (1983) seems to term this ‘accessibility’ that is, a rule is “applicable to concrete 
situations without excessive difficulty or effort” rather than ‘transparency’ which results 
from the use of “words with well-defined and universally accepted meanings within the 
relevant community.” 
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Tax laws seem to be detailed by nature. However, in our dynamic 
world rules are inadequate by nature as additional amendments have 
to be made “when ordinary factual variations have not been considered 
by the drafters, if more modern developments that arguably fall within 
the same general policy parameters or when ‘the list’ to deal with loop-
holes devised by taxpayers and their advisers needs to be expanded” 
(Smith, 1997). Detailed rules thus can quickly become obsolete and the 
resulting frequent changes to counter this risk makes it harder for tax-
payers to gear their activities to the law. This lack of durability (stabil-
ity) goes at the expense of legal certainty. The accumulation of these 
refinements, adjustments and additions to the details have resulted in a 
complex legal system which is no longer clear nor accessible for taxpay-
ers. This often-excessive complexity might even hinder economic activ-
ity, creating burdens for individuals, businesses and communities. As 
Heaton even concludes “It obstructs good government. It undermines 
the rule of law” (Heaton, 2013).
Complexity in tax law leads to a number of undesirable conse-
quences such as uncertainty for business and personal taxpayers and 
inflated costs of administration and compliance. A lack of knowledge 
and understanding of the (highly complex) system of tax rules may 
be a serious impediment to compliance, resulting in “unintentional 
non-compliance” and “(un)intentional overcompliance” (McKerchar, 
2001, p. 267; McKerchar, 2007, p. 192). Both go at the expense of equal-
ity because not all taxpayers are paying their due amount. Moreover, 
complex tax rules may reduce the willingness of taxpayers to comply 
voluntarily with the requirements of the tax system (Kayis-Kumar et 
al., 2020; Kirchler, 2007, pp. 12-13). It will also increase administrative 
and compliance costs and make useful discussion of tax policy more 
difficult (James et al., 1998, p. 32). Although the complexity of a tax 
system refers to several different issues, in the trade-off between rule-
based and principles-based drafting the predictability of the legisla-
tion catches the eye. A rule would be simple if that rule and its scope 
are easily and accurately understood by taxpayers and their advisers 
whenever necessary (Cooper, 1993, pp. 103-110).23 This simplicity how-
ever is rare in tax legislation.
23 The other issues being proportionality, consistency, compliance, administration, co-
ordination and (clear) expression. 
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Rule-focus breeds a calculating mindset 
The rule of law requires the tax rules established by the legislature to be 
firmly embedded in fundamental (normative) legal principles. Moreo-
ver, moral principles such as distributive justice should be respected. 
Well-tailored rules promote legal certainty and equality, but in practice 
the tax legislature is inclined to continuously refine the system of rules, 
for example by introducing exceptions and exceptions to exceptions. 
This is partly caused by the use of taxation as a regulatory instrument 
imposed to control, penalise, or encourage, behaviour (Pagan, 1993, p. 
90).24 The widespread use of tax incentives is one of the major reasons 
for the ever-growing complexity of the tax system. Complexity goes at 
the expense of predictability, but consistency in time, another element 
of legal certainty, is also seriously lacking because of the all too frequent 
changes made by the legislature (Steinmo, 2003, p. 218).
Thus, legal certainty is seriously eroded, resulting in lower levels of 
compliance (sometimes uncertainty is even deliberately created to put 
off taxpayers). Furthermore, important values such as consistency and 
transparency are treated in a step-motherly way. The prevailing politi-
cal view on taxation as a regulatory tool, to realise all kind of policy 
goals, increases the risk of the introduction of “tax privileges” – to the 
prejudice of the integrity of the tax system. Moreover, many taxpayers 
do not have the expertise to deal with tax complexity so they may not 
be capable of using tax incentives they are entitled to, which adversely 
impacts equality. Tax complexity may also negatively impact taxpay-
ers’ perception of the distributive justice and fairness of the existing 
tax system (Gribnau, 2015, pp. 233-234).25 Tax legislation thus regularly 
violates important legal values and principles, such as legal certainty, 
equality, neutrality and consistency. 
Indeed, the tax legislature would do well to show more respect for 
legal principles. Legislatures issuing these kinds of unprincipled rules 
show disdain for important legal and societal values and do not com-
mand respect. Eroding the internal morality of the law may chip away 
24 This regulatory or instrumentalist use of tax legislation violates the first commandment 
(“do only what is absolutely necessary”) and third commandment (“respect the basic 
principles of the existing system”) for new tax legislation as defined by Pagan (1993).
25 Also, the adoption of a calculating attitude is stimulated in which rules are seen as 
opportunities to pay less tax. An ethical attitude, which sees paying tax as contributing to 
the sustainment of society in a fair way shared by all, is crowded out.
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at tax legislature’s legitimacy and may produce taxpayers’ decreasing 
compliance (Kirchler, 2007, p. 39).26 
Tax rules thus become ever more complex – adversely impacting 
legal principles like equality and certainty. Unfortunately, complexity 
and tax avoidance go hand in hand; some expert taxpayers will play 
with the rules to their advantage (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 58).27 In an inter-
national context, differences between tax systems exacerbate tax plan-
ning opportunities. Multinational corporations, for example, exploit 
“areas where several tax systems must interact and the scope for tax 
arbitrage, playing the rules of one system off against another, is consid-
erable” (Shaw et al., 2010, p. 1151). 
Sophisticated taxpayers can turn around the rules to their advan-
tage (Gribnau & Dusarduijn, 2018, pp. 9-11). These taxpayers and their 
professional advisers exploit the formal characteristics of law.28 Accord-
ing to McBarnet and Whelan (1991, p. 849) “the combination of specific 
rules and an emphasis on legal form and literalism can be used artifi-
cially, in a manipulative way to circumvent or undermine the purpose 
of regulation” (see also Weisbach, 1999). The formality of tax law, as 
Prebble and Prebble (2010, p. 45) argue, “is an essential prerequisite for 
contriving artificial transactions that enable the creators of the transac-
tions or their clients to avoid tax” (see also Filipczyk, 2017). Thus, the 
fundamental legal certainty is undermined and therewith the value 
of the rule of law. These taxpayers shift their tax burden (partially) to 
others at the expense of the principles of reciprocity and equality (Grib-
nau, 2017; Wheatcroft, 1955, p. 213).
The tax legislature usually reacts with remedial legislation, that is, 
refined or new rules, adding to the existing complexity of tax law. This 
excessively detailed and extensive legislation seems however to be a 
dead end. As Braithwaite (2005, p. 147) argues, comprehensive tax leg-
islation designed to preclude avoidance opportunities results in exces-
26 Empirical research has found that continuous changes and complexity in tax law have a 
negative effect on the level of compliance (Kirchler, 2007, p. 39).
27 Wealthy taxpayers may opt for game-playing with rules by exploiting change and 
complexity. New products never conceived by the law may be created. Braithwaite argues 
that for multinational corporations this kind of financial engineering is “a newer modality 
of a more longstanding tradition of contriving complexity in their books, organizational 
complexity and jurisdictional complexity”.
28 Epithets for this attitude could be ‘legalistic’, ‘literal’ and ‘formalistic’ (Twining & Miers, 
2010, p. 115).
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sive complexity. Thus a “smorgasbord of rules engenders a cat-and-
mouse legal drafting culture – of loophole closing and reopening by 
creative compliance”. Schemes exploiting existing rules are marketed 
as opportunities while counteracting measures will take a number 
of years. The same goes for specific anti-avoidance rules: the drafters 
cannot cover in advance all possible transactions and it takes time to 
adapt to unforeseen taxpayer behaviour. Again, also these rules will 
inevitably be sidestepped (Dabner, 2003). Moreover, excessive length 
and complexity may be seen as “the result of a loss of and disregard 
for the art and discipline of tax legislation” (Pagan, 1993, p. 90). So, the 
question is: should we give up our faith in detailed rules altogether?
Enlarging the toolbox of the legislature
As seen, detailed rules lead to complex legislation. Rules are an impor-
tant feature of a fair and efficient tax system, but nowadays in many 
countries a rule-based mindset leads to a self-perpetuating spiral of 
ever greater specificity and detail. Some countries even suffer from this 
disease called ‘tax rules madness’. To counteract the complexity caused 
by detailed rules and the taxpayers’ opportunistic playing with the tax 
rules, the legislature may employ several instruments. We will now 
deal with three alternative drafting styles, all aiming at reducing the 
level of detailed tax legislation: fictions, standards and principles-based 
legislation. Each of them will be evaluated from the perspective of nor-
mative (Dworkinian) principles.
Fictions 
Fictions, legal assumptions created by the legislature, are often used to 
increase simplicity in the implementation of tax legislation. The rental 
income of owner-occupied housing is a well-known example of a ficti-
tious tax base grounded in simplicity. These legal fictions in taxation 
presuppose, for example, that someone enjoys a given income in a 
given period although he does not actually receive that income or, in 
any event, does not do so to that extent or at that time.29 Nonetheless, 
29 These pragmatic legal fictions in taxation generally take the form of a fixed rate levy 
applicable to similar or closely related situations and circumstances. The fiction thus is 
intended to approximate as closely as possible to the empirical reality of taxpayers but 
is still a generalisation that only by pure coincidence corresponds with the reality of an 
individual.
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he is taxed on the basis of his fictitious income, as if he actually receives 
that income. Thus, legal fictions disregard certain details of taxpayers’ 
empirical (economic) reality in order to promote the efficient implemen-
tation of tax law or to prevent abuse of the law. The presence of a legal 
fiction in tax law might even increase the legal certainty of a taxpayer. 
After all, the robustness of this provision allows taxpayers to calculate 
their tax liability and to predict the tax administration’s behaviour. 
Although legal certainty is enhanced; however, at the detriment of the 
equality and the ability to pay principle (Dusarduijn, 2015). The use of 
fictions in tax legislation leads to a system of ‘rough’ and robust rules 
that may well provide taxpayers with legal certainty but may not suf-
ficiently discriminate between differences in taxpayers’ ability to pay 
and therefore impinge upon distributive justice. 
On the other hand, a legal system with refined, detailed rules might 
also constitute an infringement on distributive justice as its clear, pre-
cise and predictable rules can be complied with creatively. Anti-abuse 
fictions in taxation, such as exit taxes, usually take the form of an ‘as if’ 
that expands the scope of a legal norm. By bringing certain facts and 
circumstances within the scope of what has proved to be an unduly 
narrow legal norm, an anti-abuse fiction can enable the norm to take 
better account of what taxpayers’ experience as the empirical reality in 
economic terms. This category of legal fictions in taxation is often used 
in cross-border situations. For example, the emigrating owner of a sub-
stantial interest in a company that is established in the Netherlands will 
be taxed on the basis of a fictitious disposal of this interest.30 This legal 
fiction in the Dutch Personal Income Tax Act is employed to prevent 
tax avoidance with regard to the realised increase in value of this sub-
stantial interest during his stay in the Netherlands. The desire to avoid 
loss of tax claims has also led to numerous legal fictions in the Dutch 
Corporate Income Tax Act. An example can be found in art. 8b, first 
paragraph of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act 1969. This rule states 
that if conditions are agreed between related entities which differ from 
conditions that would have been agreed by independent parties, the 
profit of these entities will be determined as if the last-mentioned condi-
30  See art. 4.16, para. 1, section h (fictitious alienation), Personal Income Tax Act 2001. As a 
consequence of this fictitious disposal the assumed profit from this substantial interest is 
added to the income in Box 2.
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tions were agreed.31 The purpose of this legal fiction is to avoid non (at) 
arm’s length profit transfers between affiliated companies affecting the 
calculation of the taxable profit. 
Thus, the use of legal fictions in tax law can be seen as a two-sided 
remedy for problems caused by detailed rules. While the pragmatic 
legal fictions occur when flaws start to show in tax law implementation, 
the anti-abuse fiction focuses on the ordinary rules of tax law when the 
application of ‘ordinary’ rules do not meet their underlying justification 
anymore. Both types of legal fictions fall within the scope of our defini-
tion of rules as their words reflect general norms mandating or guiding 
conduct of action for a given situation. 
This definition of a legal fiction as a deliberate and purposive depar-
ture from the ordinary legal reality implies that the ‘as if’ of each legal 
fiction creates a separate legal reality. It is essential to distinguish 
between these two dimensions of legal reality – the real and the fictitious 
– since we cannot otherwise appreciate that legal fictions in taxation are 
at odds with Dworkinian principles such as the equality principle. After 
all, the lack of detail in a fiction treats unequal situations unjustified as 
though they were equal. By departing from the ordinary legal reality in 
taxation, legal fictions clash with the principle of equality – one of the 
principles that forms the core values of our taxation system. 
The justification for any conflict with these principles of law is con-
nected with the presumed right of existence of legal fictions in income 
tax, the type of conflict also correlates with this motive. To be able to 
analyse the acceptability of ‘as if’ in a legal sense, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish why the tax legislature creates this deliberate and intentional 
departure from ordinary legal reality. Whereas pragmatic legal fictions 
might be seen as a deliberate departure from not only the legal system 
itself but from its underlying principles as well, an anti-abuse fiction 
can be seen as a return to these principles, a U-turn to the spirit of the 
law without explicitly using a principle-based approach. Although its 
aim is to repair a situation, this form of ‘as if’ can conflict with the prin-
ciple of good faith under treaty law, especially where the legislature 
31  The adjustment of the profit that results from this is often not seen as fictional profit. 
However, there are also arguments for another view. If you do not see the profit shift as 
a shame that must also be ignored by civil law, then there is a fictitious profit compared 
with the profit under civil law.
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wrongly uses this national legal fiction to arrogate to itself rights of tax-
ation. Moreover, the implementation of this fiction in cross-border situ-
ations may expose an individual taxpayer to double taxation owing to 
the concurrence of a fictitious and a real tax on income in two different 
States.32 Besides that, the use of legal fictions of this kind should always 
be restricted to the identified abuse. It should therefore be possible to 
assess whether an anti-abuse fiction is properly applied in each case or 
to adduce evidence to the contrary. 
It follows from the above that the use of legal fictions in taxation – 
the content of which is determined by the legislature – not only shows 
advantages but has also clear disadvantages.33 The special nature of 
legal fictions in tax requires that they are employed only with due 
caution. Their presence may, after all, be a source of tension with the 
requirements for a just system of taxation. The legislature therefore 
should carefully balance the fundamental legal principles at stake. 
Standards
Tax systems seem to become ever more complex and refined with highly 
detailed rules. Fictions, legal assumptions leading to rough and robust 
rules, are an exception to this development. Legislatures can also use 
other tools in order to avoid excessive complexity. As Weisbach (1999, 
p. 860) points out, in response to taxpayers’ manipulation of the rules, 
“lawmakers and regulators have shifted the tax system toward stand-
ards, primarily by adopting what are known as anti-abuse rules”. A 
typical anti-abuse rule allows the government (and only the govern-
ment) to override the literal words of a statute or regulation. Instead, 
the government may require a ‘reasonable’ tax result if the taxpayer 
enters into or structures a transaction “with a principal purpose of 
reducing tax liabilities in a manner contrary to the purposes of the stat-
ute or regulation, even if the transaction otherwise literally complies 
with the rules”.34
32 Moreover, this type of legal fiction might lead to a shift in the rights to levy tax under 
treaty law and can therefor conflict with the principle of good faith under treaty law 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), especially where the legislator wrongly uses 
this national legal fiction to arrogate to itself rights of taxation.
33 The presence of a legal fiction in income tax has also been found to influence the extent to 
which taxation is regarded as fair. As perceived fairness determines the degree of support 
for a rule of tax law, this also influences the willingness of taxpayers to pay their taxes. 
34 Weisbach (1999, p. 860). See more extensively about the Dutch GAAR (“fraus legis”) 
which is introduced by the courts (Dusarduijn & Gribnau, 2018, pp. 16-19).
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Terms in a rule such as ‘reasonable’ or ‘customary’ are called stan-
dards. They constitute a specific kind of legal norms containing broad 
evaluative terms – in contrast with narrow detailed drafting. If a stan-
dard is included in the text of law, reference is made to an external 
valuation for establishing the content of the norm, a valuation origi-
nating from the social system outside the legal system (Rustenburg, 
2020, p. 278).35 According to Alexander and Sherwin (2001, p. 29) stan-
dards “are posited norms that contain vague or controversial moral 
or evaluative terms in their formulations.” Well-known examples are 
a ban on excessive speed, the requirement of competence, good cus-
toms (morals), good faith, or reasonable behaviour. The legal philoso-
phers MacCormick and Summers point at the “evaluative openness” of 
these expressions. These concepts have “but little descriptive meaning 
over and above their evaluative component” (Alexy & Drier, 1991, p. 
75). Sunstein (1996, p. 27) argues that the nature of the provision thus 
cannot be read from its text, and “everything will depend on interpre-
tative practices”. Moreover, a standard must often be applied in many 
different factual contexts and across those contexts a uniform formula 
would make little sense. 
Although the legislature is the creator of a standard, the substantive 
interpretation belongs to the field of the judiciary (Rustenbug, 2020, p. 
245).36 Standards thus belong to the domain of the courts. They have to 
fill them with ‘descriptive meaning’, specifying their content and scope 
to match as well as possible their ‘evaluative component’. It is left to the 
courts to flesh out these standards and to determine their exact mean-
ing. By specifying the content of a standard, the judge thus creates a 
rule (ex post). The courts are likely to proceed casuistically. Case law 
thus shows the development of the descriptive meaning in the course 
of time.
This also goes for standards in tax law. Maybe the most famous 
Dutch example of a standard in tax law is ‘sound business practice’ 
(goed koopmansgebruik, which determines annual profit accounting; see 
Section 3.25 Personal Income Tax Act 2001 (Wet Inkomstenbelasting 2001 
– Essers & Russo, 2008, pp. 34-36).37 This standard is laid down in legis-
35 Rustenburg (2020) refers to this social system as “the real system”. 
36 An “uncoupling of the rule itself and its content”, see Rustenburg (2020, p. 245).
37 In German “goed koopmansgebruik” is translated as “guter Kaufmanssbrauch”.
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lation to enable law to be responsive to changing opinions concerning 
law in a community – adding a degree of flexibility in the law. Flexibil-
ity is needed in order to keep pace with societal, economic or technical 
developments rather than to respond to different situations. One of the 
reasons is that the legislature possesses insufficient technical knowl-
edge to formulate clear and distinct rules. The matter in hand may also 
be too complex conceptually to be regulated in detail.38 Interestingly, 
it is up to the taxpayer to fill in the details of the standard, rather than 
the tax administration. This standard offers the taxpayer a wide margin 
of freedom to make a choice between several options of tax account-
ing (Gribnau, 2010, p. 154). His choice is controlled by the courts. The 
annual profit is determined according to goed koopmansgebruik which is 
related to the principle of business economics. This standard has little 
descriptive meaning and seems to damage legal certainty. Nonetheless, 
the entrepreneur (or his bookkeeper or accountant) is thought to be 
acquainted with tax accounting practices. This expertise provides the 
entrepreneur with a quite a degree of legal certainty.
Substantive tax law also offers other examples. To prevent base ero-
sion, Article 10a of the Corporate Tax, an anti-abuse provision, contains 
the open-ended standard “a reasonable levy according to Dutch stand-
ards” (Parliamentary Papers, 1995/1996).39 
The content of the norm to be applied, and therefore of the deci-
sion or action to be taken, are not completely fleshed out in legislation. 
This is the courts’ job. The legislature explicitly leaves the task of deter-
mining the actual norm, i.e., legislating, to the judiciary who acts as a 
deputy-legislature – though the legislature sometimes interferes with 
case law deemed inexpedient. Thus, the judiciary has to provide the 
taxpayers with legal certainty by providing ex post content.
Standards leave deliberately more room for evaluation by (the tax 
administration) and the courts than detailed rules. This enables effec-
tive and flexible action and individual dispensation of justice. It is the 
judiciary’s task to remedy the indeterminacy by specifying standards 
38 Other examples are ‘bad faith’ (when to file a tax return) and ‘gross culpability’ in the 
context of fines.
39 This standard was partly a codification of existing case law and partly a corrective measure 
in response to existing case law. It was introduced in spite of the Dutch Council of State’s 
plea in favour of a more precise legislative norm. This standard did not last long. Quite 
quickly after the introduction it was replaced by a precise norm, i.e., a fixed rate.
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which consequently evolve in case law. However, a statutory stand-
ard may give the taxpayer little grip in spite of the existing case law. 
Flexibility may go at the expense of legal certainty, because tax conse-
quences of transactions become less predictable. 
Some anti-avoidance provisions to prevent undesirable use of tax 
legislation are a case in point. They are deliberately formulated too 
broadly to put off taxpayers. Due to the over-inclusiveness, more cases 
fall under the rule than justified by the underlying aim of the rule. The 
result is uncertainty for taxpayers. Moreover, the principle of equality is 
at stake for uncertainty may chill taxpayers who are in good faith who 
end up paying more than their due.
In this vein, Poiares Maduro (Case C-255/02, 2005, para. 77) argues: 
“Legal certainty must be balanced against other values of the 
legal system. Tax law should not become a sort of legal ‘wild 
west’ in which virtually every sort of opportunistic behaviour 
has to be tolerated so long as it conforms with a strict formalistic 
interpretation of the relevant tax provisions and the legislature 
has not expressly taken measures to prevent such behaviour.”
Though the courts are attributed the task of giving meaning to stand-
ards, at an earlier stage the tax administration has to make a choice as 
to the specific meaning of standards in the assessment procedure. Con-
sequently, the taxpayer depends for legal certainty (and therefore equal 
treatment) on the tax administration. In doing so, the tax administration 
exercises power over the taxpayer. The tax administration while coun-
teracting tax avoidance may opt for an over-inclusive interpretation of 
standards which lacks impartiality to put taxpayers off (chilling effect) 
– at the expense of the principle of equality. Of course, the courts check 
the tax administration’s interpretation. 
However, few taxpayers disagreeing with the tax administration’s 
interpretation will actually lodge an appeal to challenge that interpreta-
tion – tax procedures being time-consuming, stressful and often costly 
(Gribnau, 2010, pp. 153-154). Standards therefore may imply a shift 
of power from the legislature to the tax administration – although in 
the end checked by the courts. The tax administration should there-
fore exercise moral self-restraint. The introduction of standards thus 
requires the legislature to balance principles, like legal certainty and 
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equality, and having a good understanding of the tax administration’s 
legal practice and moral climate.
In some contexts, it might be advisable to substitute precise rules 
for standards. These rules specify outcomes and provide clarity with 
regard to the content of law in advance of applications of the law, 
whereas the meaning (content) of a standard will develop casuistically 
and depend on interpretative practices (Sunstein, 1996, p. 21, 27). By 
providing the ex-ante content clarity (legal certainty) is enhanced to the 
benefit of both taxpayers and tax authorities. But the story of rules and 
standards is not that simple. Neither rules nor standards are perfect 
drafting styles. As Dean argues, no matter how well tailored to a par-
ticular context, a highly specified rule with a set of readily observable 
criteria “is likely to be perceived as unduly rigid in at least some cases”. 
By the same token, since the content of a standard depends on what 
happens when it is applied, “even the most elegant standard, will fail to 
provide adequate guidance in others” (Dean, 2011, p. 556).40 
From an economic point of view, it can be noted that precise rules 
are costly to construct, but reduce costs, for example costs of conflicts 
and litigation, since there will be less disagreement about the correct 
application of narrow, detailed rules. A high level of specificity may 
indeed lower the costs of application, saving a great deal of effort, time 
and expense. However, even “significantly lower post-implementation 
costs” could “be dwarfed by increased rulemaking costs” if the legisla-
ture is unable to agree on the specification of the appropriate rule (Dean, 
2011, p. 558). As Sunstein (1995, p. 965) says: “Sometimes people can 
agree on a standard when they cannot agree on its specification”. An 
incompletely specified standard may be the best the political or regula-
tory system can do, allowing for shared commitment on a framework 
to decide particular cases. 
The legislature facing the choice between narrow detailed rules and 
standards has to balance principles, like legal certainty and equality. The 
relative weight of the various principles involved must be established. 
This relative weight is case-related, the weight of a principle depends 
40 He criticises efforts to substitute international tax rules for decades-old standards (the 
arm’s length method and cross-border treaty-based information exchange – providing 
only a broad sketch of the obligations it imposes). To his mind enhanced rule-based 
information exchange requirements and formulary apportionment, identifying a set of 
readily observable criteria will undermine the legitimacy of any international tax regime. 
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on the particular type of situation. Taxpayers may, for example, delib-
erately search the law for uncertainty which they might take advantage 
of. These taxpayers apparently prefer gaming the uncertainty inher-
ent in the law to the certainty which is also present in the same law. 
“They deliberately leave a passable road, where a toll is levied, to enter 
a marsh, where they think they do not have to pay that levy” (Gribnau, 
2013, pp. 92-93). Legislative standards to counter abuse create a degree 
of uncertainty because they are deliberately formulated in broad terms. 
To our minds, this curtailment of legal certainty in order to protect 




The third drafting style we deal with is principles-based legislation. 
This style might seem a perfect remedy to tax systems consisting of 
dense thickets of often thorny rules. Major simplification might be real-
ised by legislating in accordance with clear, coherent tax principles. 
Avery Jones has already argued for less detailed legislation interpreted 
in accordance with principles – drawing on the famous distinction 
between rules and principles made by Dworkin (see the second section 
of this chapter).41 He concludes that what “we need is less detailed leg-
islation construed in accordance with principles, not a continuation of 
the plague of tax rule madness” (Avery Jones, 1996, p. 89). 
Layers of tax rules go at the expense of transparency of the tax 
system and principles such as legal certainty (and its various elements) 
and equality. Thus, Avery Jones (1996, p. 590) argues for a shift from 
narrow, detailed drafting to a principled approach. To his mind the 
higher level of abstraction accounts for the principle being “something 
external to the rules which helps one to construe the rules”. In our view, 
the term ‘external’ should not be taken to mean that the abstract princi-
ple it not an operative rule itself, as will be argued in this section.
41 Pleas for principles-based legislation are also to be found in other contexts, for example 
ethics. With regard to ethical decision-making, rule-based legislation might lead 
professionals to simply “follow the rules” rather than actually to try to find out the best 
solution to the problem at hand; in a business ethics context Norman (2011) advocates 
“compelling principle-based guidance for when exactly firms in competitive markets 
must constrain themselves from pursuing profitable opportunities (that is, genuinely 
profitable, all things considered) that are legal but possibly unethical or irresponsible”.
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Braithwaite (2005, p. 147) seems to follow up on Avery Jones’ point. 
He proposes a theory to make law more certain for complex, dynamic 
domains. It starts with defining overarching principles and making 
them binding. Next, a set of rules specifying the most commonly used 
types of transactions or business arrangements in a complex domain of 
tax law is defined. Such rules are introduced explicitly as ‘no more’ than 
examples of how the principles apply, since they are not intended to 
be exhaustive. The overarching principle has special status in the sense 
that it provides more than just interpretative guidance which shows 
when a rule and the principle are in conflict. The overarching principle 
is namely used to assist in interpreting the rule, moreover it is binding, 
“with the rules to be used only to assist in applying the principle” (see 
also Weisbach, 1999, p. 870). Thus, “more general, open-ended princi-
ples that focus on substance rather than form, and are expressed purpo-
sively or in policy-oriented terms” may be an alternative to (regulatory) 
formalism (Picciotto, 2007, p. 14). This view on the use of principles as a 
drafting style is quite close to the conception of principles as set out by 
MacCormick (1978). He explains the distinctive meaning of principles 
in this way: “to express the policy of achieving that end, or the desir-
ability of that general mode of conduct, in a general normative state-
ment, is, then to state ‘the principle of the law’ underlying the rule or 
rules in question” MacCormick (1978, p. 156).42 Or rather, as Freedman 
argues, these norms express the intended outcome and are “part of the 
fundamental architecture of the tax system” (Freedman, 2010, p. 735).
A strict definition of principles-based drafting seems impossible. 
“The term is not one with a precise and agreed meaning”, for it is used 
by different people to mean different things (Cooper, 2010, p. 341). 
Some examples of principles-based drafting will therefore be helpful. 
An example taken from Dutch tax law reads: “Wage is all that is enjoyed 
from employment or past employment, including what is reimbursed 
or provided in the course of employment” (Wage Tax Act 1964, art. 10, s. 
1); this principle is followed by more detailed rules. And another Dutch 
principle: “Profit from business activities (profit) is the amount of the 
total benefits which, under whatever name, are earned from a business” 
42 Cf. Gribnau (2014, pp. 193-194). Filipczyk distinguishes another kind of principles, namely 
“construction principles” that are medium level: they are less abstract than principles of 
the Dworkinian type but more abstract than PBL-principles. They set out “the nature of 
tax” or ‘the legal character of tax” (Filipczyk, 2017, p. 271).
8: Principles-based Tax Drafting and Friends 193
(Income Tax 2001, art. 3.8). Both principles are very abstract and gen-
eral and intend to cover a wide range of situations. The intended policy 
outcome is to determine the type of tax base, that is ‘wage’ and ‘profit’ 
respectively.
Cooper gives the example of the so-called Single Entity Rule in sec-
tion 701-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 of Australia which is 
the central operative provision of the corporate consolidation regime: 
“(1) If an entity is a subsidiary member of a consolidated group 
for any period, it and any other subsidiary member of the group 
are taken for the purposes covered by subsections (2) and (3) to 
be parts of the head company of the group, rather than separate 
entities, during that period.”
Cooper cites subsequently the view of the Australian Taxation Office 
on this provision: “Parliament has expressed its intended policy out-
come in broad and simple language, in this case by equating a consoli-
dated group with a single entity”.43 Thus, the principle is broad and will 
apply in all situations without the need of a massive set of detailed rules 
(Cooper, 2010, p. 354).44
Though the principle employed in principles-based drafting is 
not easy to define, from the foregoing examples some features can be 
derived. Cooper (2010, pp. 341-342) distinguishes between three fea-
tures. First, “a principle is an operative rule”. Thus, a principle is a 
directly applicable legal norm rather than a norm external to the rules 
which helps to construe the rules (Avery Jones, 1996). Secondly, it is “a 
statement about an intended outcome, rather than a provision which 
sets out the means for accomplishing the outcome”. Rules spelling out 
in great detail what is intended are replaced by a statement on a higher 
level of abstraction about the intended outcome. Thirdly, because of the 
generality of the terms used and the rejection of the elaboration of detail 
a principle is intended to be comprehensive, applying to a wide range 
43 The explanation continues “A necessary feature of this drafting approach is the omission 
of statutory mechanisms for effecting the policy for each provision of the income tax law” 
Cooper (2010, p. 347).
44 Cf. Cooper (2010, p. 354) “The goal was to find a general principle which defined a discrete 
group of transactions (‘financial arrangements’) by reference to a series of observable 
generic characteristics.”
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of facts and circumstances.45 The generality of the terms accounts for a 
much broader scope than a detailed rule. 
Shifting perspectives and conceptions
At this stage we might ask ourselves how principles-based drafting 
style compares with Dworkin’s approach? Let us return to the differ-
ence between principles and policies. As shown above, according to 
Dworkin, principles express moral requirements whereas policies do 
not (Dworkin, 1997, pp. 22-23).46 The use of principles intends to intro-
duce the moral dimension of law, not as something accidental, but as a 
feature inherent to the very concept of law. So, law does conceptually 
depend on moral considerations. 
Moreover, Dworkin (1997) points at a second difference between 
principles in the narrow sense and policies: the legislature states a 
policy and formulates a rule or a set of rules to achieve a policy goal. 
For Dworkin, however, this is not a feature of principles in the narrow 
sense, for they are not constructed by the legislature. “The origin of [...] 
legal principles lies not in a particular decision of some legislature or 
court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession 
and the public over time” (Dworkin, 1997, p. 40). This specific origin 
accounts for a kind of ;empty place; which cannot be occupied by any 
law-making power (Gribnau, 2014, pp. 195-198). 
With regard to the first difference, it is clear that the hallmark of 
principles-based drafting is the use of principles without any reference 
to values which are external to legislation. There is no necessary con-
nection to morality, viz. an appeal to values. These principles are policy 
outcomes. They implement the legislative purpose. From a Dworkinian 
point of view these principles seem to be more like policies than princi-
ples. However, a closer look reveals that they are rules – which Dwor-
kin distinguishes from both policies and principles. Indeed, this kind of 
principle is “an operative legislative rule which specifies the outcome 
45 Cooper (2010, pp. 341-342). He subsequently deals with three claims – about certainty, 
legislative effectiveness and economic efficiency – made in support of principles-based 
drafting.
46 However, the distinction can be collapsed according to Dworkin. For example, a policy 
may be construed which states a principle – so as to realise “a requirement of justice 
or fairness”. In this way, a policy incorporates a principle and consequently embodies a 
dimension of morality. Dworkin (1977, pp. 22-23).
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[…] and expresses the outcome at the highest possible level rather than 
itemising a list of outcomes for every conceivable case” (Avery Jones, 
1996; Pinder, 2005).
The absence of the morality dimension (flowing from the difference 
between principles and policies) therefore leads to another conclusion, 
connecting to the Dworkinian difference between principle and rules. 
These principles have to be structured logically so as to work together 
to achieve the legislative purpose. Thus, a framework of a specific piece 
of legislation results: a pyramid with one or more principles at the top 
and, next specific sets of rules for the most commonly used types of, for 
instance, transactions and/or “carving out exceptions to the basic fall-
back rule” (Braithwaite, 2005, p. 149; Krever, 2008, p. 194). When new 
situations emerge, a properly constructed principle provides a frame-
work for working out how to deal with them. In short, a principle is not 
just a less specific rule, but it is a general statement about the essence of 
the intended outcomes in a general field. It is sufficiently determinate 
and directly applicable legal norm so as to operate as a fall-back rule 
(Filipczyk, 2017, p. 278). Probably, the term ‘principle’ is used because 
it regards a statement on a high level of abstraction using very general 
terms. Nonetheless, from a Dworkinian perspective it is a rule, though 
a very abstract and general one (Cooper, 2010, p. 341).47 We will use 
the term ‘principles-based drafting’ since it is established in literature. 
Besides, replacing it by the term ‘rules-based drafting’ would be very 
confusing.
Thus, we arrive at Dworkin’s second difference between princi-
ples in the narrow sense and policies: it is up to the legislature to state 
policies. Policies are the outcome of the legislative process. This also 
goes for principles featuring in principles-based drafting since they 
are policy outcomes. It is assumed that these principles are something 
which the legislature constructs – not some standard preceding any leg-
islative activity. For advocates of principles-based legislation as Judith 
Freedman explains, the principle is an expression of the scope that the 
legislature has decided to give to a legislative rule, “a charging pro-
vision or relief and, since it leaves no room for judicial law-making, 
it does not invite judgments based on morality” (Freedman, 2010, p. 
730). Principles, therefore, are not some standards with an aspirational 
47 “the principle is a rule” (Cooper, 2010, p. 341). 
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aspect external to the legislature, but the legislature’s domain par excel-
lence - a far cry from Dworkin’s position with regard to principles in 
the narrow sense. 
In sum, from a Dworkinian point of view, principles-based drafting 
style features rules, with no necessary connection to morality, rather 
than normative (moral) principles, which are issued by the legislature 
rather than originating in a sense of appropriateness developed in the 
profession and the public over time.
Principles-based drafting in context
Principles-based drafting is not a purely theoretical exercise. Australia 
and the UK, for instance, took steps to decrease the level of precision 
with which tax rules and their provisions are drafted and started exper-
imenting with principles-based drafting (Sawyer, 2007, p. 408).48 
The UK Government’s pre-budget review of October 2007 
announced a new approach to tax simplification in order to help busi-
nesses by, amongst other things, reducing their administrative burdens 
and enhancing “the City’s competitiveness by simplifying and modern-
ising the tax system for financial services” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 63). 
This approach included a proposal for consultation “principles-based 
responses to avoidance involving disguised interest to improve clarity 
and certainty” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 68). Countering tax avoidance is 
driven by the goal of ensuring that taxpayers pay their due. Principles-
based drafting is thus also seen as a means to enhance normative legal 
principles like legal certainty, equality and ability to pay (distributive 
justice).
Australia also has some experience with principles-based drafting.49 
Pinder (2005) explains how this drafting approach translates intended 
tax policy outcomes into ‘principled rules’ in tax law and argues that 
the resulting law can be more certain, less complex and more flexible 
than the current black letter tax law approach. To his mind, a princi-
ple means something to readers because it relates to their understand-
48  New Zealand opted for a hybrid approach of developing core provisions (like principles), 
with in the main parts general provisions, followed by more detailed provisions and 
exceptions to those provisions.
49 The Australian government’s principles-based approach is known as the coherent 
principles approach.
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ing of the real world. However, as Freedman (2010, p. 730) observes, 
“one major problem with using principles in the tax law area is that tax 
law is very abstract and may not always relate well to the real world”. 
Clear policy is therefore the sine qua non for clear tax legislation and this 
policy must be accurately and transparently translated into principles 
(Sawyer, 2013, p. 321). Principles enhance certainty by providing con-
text which relates well to the real world. As Marmor argues, context 
matters for interpretation, and should therefore be familiar and clear 
to the principle’s intended audience (Marmor, 2001, p. 75). In this vein, 
Pinder (2005, p. 2) says “When a principle works, it does so because the 
essence it captures appeals to readers at other than an abstract intel-
lectual level; it means something to readers because it relates to their 
understanding of the real world”. Freedman (2010, p. 730) concludes 
that by providing the context the principle “provides greater certainty 
than the alternative of detail” (see also Braithwaite, 2002, p. 75). 
Principles-based drafting to enhance Dworkinian principles
Principles-based legislation, like all drafting styles, should respect 
Dworkinian principles, such as the principle of equality and the princi-
ple of certainty. Considering that detailed tax legislation has also grown 
in complexity, it seems that the adoption of a principles-based approach 
in the drafting of statutes would lead to greater simplicity (Gribnau & 
Dusarduijn, 2018). A principles-based approach would indeed lead to 
a complexity reduction of tax law, at least in the length (sheer quantity) 
of the law considering the replacement of various detailed rules by a 
small number of general principles and a limited number of rules that 
exemplify the scope of the principle. 
The most contested element of using principles in legislation is 
the level of clarity, i.e., the level of (un)certainty of its application (see 
Freedman, 2010, p. 721; Smith, 1997, p. 169).50 Rules are seen as precise 
and detailed and therefore would provide more clarity and certainty. 
However, one might challenge this assumed high level of certainty 
50 In the UK, the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process (1992) recommended 
against general principles drafting on the basis that there “would have to be much more 
recourse to the courts to settle disputed interpretations of Acts” and that “certainty in the 
law must be the paramount aim in the drafting of statutes”. See Smith (1997, p. 169). This 
is linked with the issue of trust and uncertainty related to law-making, cf. Freedman (2010, 
p. 721): “If rules can be read subject to principles then, it is argued, this transfers power to 
the courts and administrators and creates a degree of uncertainty”.
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research198
often connected with legislation based on narrow, detailed rules alone. 
The more precise these rules are, the more complex and perhaps thorny 
the resulting thicket of rules will be (IMF/OECD, 2017, p. 44).51 This will 
inevitably leave gaps in legislation and therefore will, in the end, give 
rise to ‘unintentional non-compliance’ and ‘(un)intentional overcompli-
ance’ and scope for manipulation or creative compliance (see section 
Comprehensive detailed tax legislation on p.177, and Brathwaite, 2005, pp. 
63-64).52 Moreover, clarity – thus, certainty – of rules depends on the 
expertise of those who are reading it, the users (Black, 2008, p. 1). The 
greater risk of internal inconsistencies in application of detailed rules 
might in the end lead to a more uncertain legal system (Braithwaite, 
2002, pp. 47-82).53 In that respect, principles-based legislation might be 
seen as less precise but more predictable, thus more certain in the long 
run (Cooper, 2010, p. 343).54 However, achieving a high degree of cer-
tainty (and equality) is only possible by devoting a great deal of time 
and expertise to considering and perfecting the underlying policy and 
(overarching) principle and how they is expressed in words. The same 
goes for the specific rules for the most common situations which are 
intended to be within, or outside, the scope of the principle. Of course, 
this is easier said than done.
In terms of legal certainty, principles-based legislation could contrib-
ute to constancy and stability of statute law. The overarching principle 
is ‘unfolded’ in rules that exemplify the scope of the principle. It guides 
the interpretation of the exemplifying rules. Importantly, the principle 
is binding when it conflicts with a rule; the rules are used only to assist 
51 “A principles-based approach to drafting can help strike an appropriate balance in the 
inherent trade-off between certainty and simplicity” (CF IMF/OECD, 2017, p. 44). See also, 
www.oecd.org.
52 Braithwaite (2005, pp. 63-64) points out: “The classic process of writing more and more 
specific rules over time to cover newly discovered loopholes and apparent inconsistencies 
makes the body of rules as a package less capable of consistent assessment.” The greater 
the smorgasbord of rules, “the greater the discretion of regulators to pick and choose an 
enforcement cocktail tailored to meet their own objective.”
53 For a more in-depth analysis, see Braithwaite (2002, pp. 47-82). Braithwaite notes that as 
regulated phenomena become more complex, principles will deliver more consistency 
than rules as the iterative pursuit of precision in single rules increases the imprecision of 
a complex system of rules. 
54 Avery Jones also defends this view, stating that principles-based regulation would reduce 
the amount of detail necessary because the principles would give predictability. Therefore, 
this type of regulation would give as much, or more, certainty than would great detail. See 
Avery Jones (1996, p. 85).
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in applying the principle. Thus, in hard cases the ‘top’ principle works 
as a fall-back rule and provides certainty. In this way, there is no need 
for an exhaustive non-transparent system of rules to regulate every pos-
sible concrete arrangement or to lock the stable doors after the horses 
have bolted (which takes time creating a patch of uncertainty) (Eden, 
2017, p. 742).55  The principle at the top works like a safety net.
Again, principles-based legislation should respect Dworkinian prin-
ciples. The overarching principle and accompanying set of illustrative 
rules must thus be designed so as to provide the taxpayers who are in 
good faith with a reasonable degree of certainty. On top of that, princi-
ples-based legislation should not be used to put taxpayers off (chilling 
effect) which may even entail a violation of the principle of equality, 
since uncertainty may chill taxpayers who end up paying more than 
their due. 
Summarising, principles-based drafting calls for an optimal bal-
ancing of different Dworkinian principles. These rule-like-principles 
implement the legislative purpose (scope). They are more ‘open-ended 
rules’, more general and less detailed statutory provisions. They are 
less precise, in the sense of a lower level of particularity. In this respect 
principles-based drafting may provide less legal certainty. However, 
stability, another element of legal certainty may be enhanced.  The leg-
islature therefore should consider and express the underlying policy 
very carefully. A high degree of certainty (and equality) requires a pre-
cise expression of the overarching principle and the set of rules for the 
most common situations which are intended to be within, or outside, 
the scope of the principle.
Conclusion
Taxation and paying taxes involve deep moral and legal values and 
(normative) principles. These values and principles are no absolutes 
and always must be balanced against other values and principles in the 
case or situation at hand. Rules are key elements of the tax system. They 
serve fundamental legal values such as predictability and certainty. 
Other values and principles are at play in taxation as well: equality, 
distributive justice, ability to pay, neutrality, proportionality, etc.
55 (Mandatory) rules prescribing disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAS) enable 
counteracting measures to be taken more quickly. 
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research200
In many countries, however, tax legislation is grounded in narrow, 
detailed rules. This rule-based drafting style focuses on precise and 
highly detailed rules to cover a whole range of possibilities rather than a 
simple statement of policy. As a result, many tax systems are populated 
by dense thickets of often thorny rules. The existing urge to spell out in 
great detail what is intended has quite a few drawbacks. The system of 
tax rules becomes incomprehensible for many and lacks durability; it 
compromises fairness, consistency and coherence. 
Fictions, standards and principles-based legislations are three draft-
ing styles legislatures may deploy to counteract the drawbacks and dis-
advantages of overcomplicated tax legislation. Each ‘technique’ mini-
mises the presence of details in legislation, using a different approach. 
Where the interpretation of the content and scope of standards relies 
solely on the judiciary, this is the domain of the legislature when using 
fictions or principles-based legislation. All drafting styles should respect 
Dworkinian principles, such as the principle of equality and the prin-
ciple of legal certainty. All law-making should be a matter of principle. 
The weight of these embedding principles has to be established and 
they have to be balanced. 
This balancing has to be done in a particular context. For example, 
legal certainty may carry less weight for those engaging in aggressive 
tax planning (Wheatcroft, 1955, 218).56 The principle of equality (distrib-
utive justice) then outweighs the principle of legal certainty. Different 
contexts may call for different drafting styles. In practice, the legislature 
has to aim for a prudent mix of legislative styles in order to optimise the 
quality of tax legislation. No style should be viewed as a cure all. They 
are friends, not enemies.
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